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Abstract 
The thesis examines the key concept of 'incommensurability' in 
relation to issues of language and culture as they became salient to 
developments in English as a school subject in the United Kingdom 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Beginning with an outline of the notion of 
incommensurability as it has been discussed within anthropology and 
philosophy within the 20th century, the thesis traces the roots of a 
complex of educational issues through their immediate intellectual 
and social background in the mass culture debates in the 1920s and 
1930s and as they were developed in the post-war period. The thesis 
analyses the dominant themes within the paradigm shift towards a 
focus on language that took place in English education during the 
1970s. This it does particularly with respect to their immediate 
intellectual heritage, paying special attention to the position of F. R. 
Leavis, Basil Bernstein, James Britton and M. A. K. Halliday in the 
intellectual field. 
The thesis continues to pursue its analysis of ideas underlying 
issues in the period by tracing their origins and interrelations in the 
work of 18th century German philosophers of language, in particular, 
J. G. Hamann, J. G. Herder and W. von Humboldt. Within the work of 
these three writers, fundamental notions concerning the relation 
between language and thought and language and culture are found 
complexly explored. Some of the concepts generated by these thinkers 
came to have a direct and obvious influence on the thinking and 
writing of subsequent generations. However, this thesis attempts to 
clarify some of the contradictions and confusions evident within the 
domain of English education during the 1960s and 1970s with reference 
to less well kno';.'.'n aspects of the work of these thinkers. The 
argument attempts to draw together the threads of its investigation 
particularly to shed light on the question of the extent to which 
communication/understanding across difference is achievable. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction: The Quest for Commensurability 
This thesis examines the intellectual context of the relationship 
between developments within the English curriculum and the theories 
of language and culture that informed them. It focuses on the 1960s 
and 1970s period in English education in Britain, when this 
relationship became particularly relevant for educators and researchers 
involved in educational restructuring. The thesis examines the 
complex of ideas that informed debate over language and culture 
during this period and the political arena in which these ideas were 
played out. Its main objective in this regard is, therefore, to analyse the 
intellectual field of English education in the 1960s and 1970s, with 
special reference to theories of language and culture. 
An extensive literature exists on developments in English 
teaching during this period. Some of the relevant studies include: 
(Inglis, 1969; 1971; Shayer, 1972; Mathieson, 1975; Abbs, 1980; Allen, 
1980; Ball, 1982; Catt, 1988; Doyle, 1989; Goodson and Medway, 1990; 
Burgess and Martin, 1990; Burgess, 1988, 1993; Christie, 1993). All of 
these studies, in different ways, address English education in relation to 
social, political and/or cultural issues, both within the English 
classroom and in the wider British society. The majority focus on the 
period that is the ~oncern of this thesis, a period historically marked as 
one in which the question of who education was supposed to serve and 
how, had become an especially important social, political and 
educational issue. Some of these studies offer a comprehensive 
historical account of English teaching, while others are concerned with 
curriculum development and classroom practice. This thesis, while 
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overlapping to some degree with this literature, addresses a different 
set of issues. Its specific objective is to articulate the complexities of the 
deep and enduring intellectual problems that informed-and 
sometimes failed to inform-debate over the relationships between 
culture, language and social class identity-and to identify and then 
attempt to clarify the confusions and contradictions that were 
generated in these debates. 
There were at least two sources underlying the specific 
morphology of debate over curriculum innovation during this period. 
One was political, and had its own broader social causes. These are 
alluded to and addressed to some degree throughout the thesis, but 
mainly during the account given of the decades immediately preceding 
the 1960s and 1970s. The second was cultural/intellectual, that is, it lay 
in the apparent paradoxes and ramifications of some of the thorniest 
problems to have beset the western intellectual tradition, and in the 
specific form they took in the intellectual culture of the period. This 
complex of ideas-particularly those concerned with the relationship 
between thought and language-entered the field of educational debate 
during this period from a variety of disciplinary locations, including 
psychology, philosophy and literary studies. Their intellectual origins, 
however, can be found in the 18th century and earlier. Key problems 
evident in 20th century educational debates can be traced to the way in 
which these ideas were and were not explored in a period which had its 
own 'politics of the intellectual field.' In particular, the figure of 
Johann Gottfried Herder, writing in the 18th century to some extent 
against the grain of Kantian philosophy, yet during the period of its 
ascendance, made important contributions-especially to formulations 
of concepts of culture, thought and language. 
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The complex of issues about the relationship between thought, 
culture and language seemed to congeal around the theme of 
incommensurability, which can be a matter of the capacity for 
understanding evident between minds as much as between cultures, 
and always mediated by some communicative form. The' quest for 
commensurability,' suggested by the title of the thesis, refers to the 
often submerged uut historically tantalising, occasionally glimpsed, 
'holy grail' of mutual understanding, so commonly lost in the face of 
human diversity-with the result that diversity becomes problematic 
and the search is ended rather than continued. But as Barbara 
Hernstein Smith has pointed out, "The botanist who observed that the 
growth rate of the plant he was studying varied under different 
conditions would not murmur De gustibus and end his research but, 
on the contrary, begin it" (Smith, 1988: 11). 
As a theme, the 'incommensurability of cultures' argument 
frequently appear~ in debates in which at issue are the complexities 
involved in communicating across difference and in defining and 
establishing identity in multi-cultural settings. This thesis traces the 
elaboration of this argument in British society from its appearance in 
the wider social debates over class and culture that took place both 
prior to and following post-war social and economic reform, through 
its emergence as a theme in educational debates over language and 
culture. Of particular relevance to the elaboration of the 
incommensurability of cultures argument in English education was 
the emergence of theories which were supportive of cultural and 
linguistic relativism. The desire to address the needs, particularly of 
working and lower middle class pupils, shifted the attention of 
educators and researchers to the particularities of the culture and the 
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language of these pupils. In the event, the practice of literary criticism 
came under particular scrutiny, for its perceived bias, associated with 
Leavis, toward an appeal to a single universal framework of values and 
beliefs (see Mulli.'ern, 1981; Burgess and Martin, 1990). In an 
educational climate oriented toward empowering heretofore silenced 
voices, the idea of 'commensurability' began to be negatively perceived 
as a search for universals through a denial of difference, or as a 
hegemonic practice geared toward making the views of the dominant 
class appear as normative. In response to this, a form of relativistic 
argument prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s that, where and when it 
became salient, effectively invalidated the 'quest for 
commensurability,' by supporting the belief that cultures were 
'incommensurable,' and communication across difference was, 
therefore, unattainable. The concept of incommensurability, however, 
was embraced rather than explored-the idea was viewed as a 'natural' 
outcome of the current prevailing theories of linguistic and cultural 
relativity and proved useful as a means to political or other 
instrumental ends. Notwithstanding the strong educational gains of 
that period, an important opportunity was missed to explore the issue 
of incommensurability as a means to address the deeper intellectual 
issues that arose in the course of the debates over language and culture, 
to make incommeI1surability the starting point and not the end of the 
investigation into the dynamics of cultural and linguistic diversity. 
The Incommensurability Argument 
In a lengthy and informative discussion of the relevance of the 
term 'incommensurability' to the philosophy of science and to the 
social sciences, the philosopher, Richard Bernstein, describes it as " ... the 
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most exotic, controversial and perhaps the vaguest theme ... " (see 
Bernstein, 1991: 79-108). The term itself was brought into prominence 
in philosophy and the social sciences through the writings of Thomas 
Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend (see Kuhn, 1970: Feyerabend, 1975). In 
applying the idea of incommensurability to science, Kuhn suggested 
that scientists involved in competing scientific paradigms 'practised 
their trades in different worlds,' i. e., they imposed divergent, non-
inter-translatable, and possibly contradictory 'conceptual frameworks' 
on the same 'material' world. In suggesting this, Kuhn wished to 
demonstrate that scientific progress or knowledge was less linear than 
dialectical; that rival scientific theories, for the most part, did not and 
could not build on one another in a cumulative, linear way for they 
were not compatible enough to do so (Bernstein, 1991: 80-87; and see 
Kuhn, 1970). 
Kuhn's use of the term 'incommensurable' opened up a 
Pandora's box of controversy over the issues of relativism and 
universalism. He was criticised both for being a relativist and for 
claiming that scientific knowledge was irrational (see the collection of 
papers in Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970). Karl Popper, for example, 
suggested that Kuhn has fallen prey to what he referred to as the 'Myth 
of the Framework,' the idea that "we are prisoners caught in the 
framework of our theories; our expectations; our past experiences; our 
language" (Popper, 1970: 56). Against this idea, Popper argued that 
rational, critical, comparative discussion between conceptual 
frameworks was not only possible, but that it served the principle aim 
of scientific knowledge-to increase the truth-content of scientific 
theories. Neither. ~uhn nor Popper held to any extreme relativistic or 
universalistic position, indeed, there was some degree of overlap in 
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their respective views. Popper's critique was not a plea for a common, 
neutral epistemological framework through which conflicts might be 
settled, it was an argument against a notion of relativism that made 
inter-translation and, by implication, 'cross-cultural' communication 
impossible. Kuhn argued not that translation or communication were 
impossible, but that in the process of translation, meanings were 
inevitably altered, and that no 'neutral observation language' could 
ever emerge or be applied (Kuhn, 1970a: 266-269). 
The issue of incommensurability, and the controversies 
surrounding it, strike at the heart of questions about cultural and 
linguistic identity and the possibility of dialogue across different 
interpretive or conceptual frameworks. On the one hand, the notion 
of incommensurability challenges the idea that common measures, 
sets of standards, or 'criteria of rationality' exist or, as Popper argued, 
that "better and roomier frameworks" can come to exist, with which to 
understand and evaluate other cultures or languages. On the other 
hand, it raises the question of what happens when divergent cultures 
or languages do come into contact-of how, or indeed, if, it is possible 
to translate a set of ideas, beliefs, and values from one culture or 
language-one conceptual framework-into another (see Winch, 1977; 
Gellner, 1982; Lukes, 1982; Geertz, 1973, 1983). 
The notion of incommensurability is often taken to establish 
both incompatibility and incomparability between different cultural 
groups; thus suggesting a strong form of relativism. The idea that the 
conceptual frameworks of disparate cultures or languages are 
incomparable, moreover, frequently carries with it the further 
implication that such frameworks are not mutually expressible-i. e., 
tha t there are no terms used in one culture that can be equated in 
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meaning and reference with any terms or expressions in the other 
(Putnam, 1981: 114)-and that, therefore, communication itself is 
impossible. This view of incommensurability also tends to presume or 
encourage a view of cultures or language users as integrated wholes. 
The very idea of the incomparability of conceptual frameworks is based 
on the belief that cultures are fairly intact, non-evolving entities. This 
notion of cultures, however, downplays the differences between 
members of the same culture as well as the possibility that the 
distinctions between different cultures do not necessarily differ in kind 
from the distinctions between members of a single culture. 
The strong form of relativism which this view of 
incommensurability implies is also challengeable on the grounds that 
it leaves unresolved the question of how individuals from different 
cultures/linguistic groups determine that they are different-or, 
indeed, the same-if not by communicating with one another. This 
version of incommensurability has been criticised by 'relativists' and 
'rationalists' alike as self-refuting (see Chomsky, 1965; Apel, 1977; 
Habermas, 1979; Putnam, 1981; Hollis and Lukes, 1982; Davidson, 1984; 
Rorty, 1991). For the very fact of recognising conceptual differences 
would already imply that, to a certain degree, such differences had been 
overcome, 
... to demonstrate the existence of significant cultural difference 
that justifies speaking of cultural relativism, and that is not 
merely a matter of different problems, needs, priorities, 
preferences or tastes, we should be able to find rules of 
inference, methods of belief acceptance, or criteria of 
"rationality" which are in some way substantially different, or 
basic belief values that at least prima facie, are not 
formulatable in the other system. We should note, however, 
we would have modified at least one, and perhaps both, of the 
conceptual frameworks, and incommensurability would have 
been overcome. Nevertheless, a serious analysis along these 
lines would surely succeed in demonstrating that at some time 
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incommensurability did exist. This would be very welcome 
because incommensurability would have been defeated by that 
very fact (Olive, 1991: 73). 
As a philosophical issue of considerable depth, 
incommensurability is one that can often be seen to lurk beneath less 
analytically self-conscious discourses than philosophy, informing them 
in ways that are not always apparent at the surface. The issue of 
incommensurability played a central role in the language and culture 
debates in English education by introducing the notion of relativism 
which acknowledged the diversity of cultures and languages in multi-
(class) cultural settings at the same time that it problematised the idea 
of communication across difference. 
The uptake in liberal pluralist educational discourses of the idea 
of cultures and languages as 'incommensurable,' can be traced to the 
German-born anthropologist Franz Boas who, working in the United 
States, argued aguh1st the evolutionist tradition prevalent throughout 
the West in the 19th century (Stocking, 1974). Boas disavowed the idea 
of physical or biological causality with respect to cultural phenomena 
that was being used in the West to support racist attitudes towards 
'primitive' cultures. He maintained that cultures were integrated 
wholes comprised of 'almost accidental' accretions of elements-the 
products of "the history of the people, the influence of the regions 
through which it passed in its migrations, and the people with whom 
it came into contact" (Boas, quoted in Stocking, 1974: 5). He viewed 
the formation of c~ltures and of languages as both a conscious and an 
unconscious process, one in which the "genius of a people" acted to 
mold the accumulated elements of its history into traditional patterns 
of behaviour or meaningful wholes: 
12 
For Boas, the integration of wholes was not a matter of 
necessary or logical relations of elements. Its character was 
best described not in terms of 'structure' or 'system' but in terms 
of 'meaning,' 'theme,' 'focus' and 'pattern.' In all this it 
reflected its origin in the rather loose romantic concept of the 
'genius' or Geist of a people (Stocking, 1974: 8). 
Boas' ideas on culture were taken up by his student, Ruth 
Benedict, whose book, Patterns of Culture, published in 1935, reiterated 
Boas' belief in cultures as historically constituted articulated wholes 
and not as biologically transmitted complexes of behaviour. Against 
the prevailing Western ethnocentrism towards 'primitive' cultures, 
Benedict argued for the 'incommensurability' of cultures, echoing Boas 
in her emphasis on cultures as demonstrations of distinctive 'patterns,' 
not simply varied assortments of incoherent acts and beliefs. In her 
study of three 'primitive' cultures, for example, she argued, 
They differ from one another not only because one trait is 
present here and absent there, and because another trait is 
found in two regions in two different forms. They differ still 
more because they are oriented as wholes in different 
directions. They are travelling along different roads in pursuit 
of different ends, and these ends and these means in one society 
cannot be judged in terms of those of another, because 
essentially they are incommensurable (Benedict, 1935, 161). 
Both Boas and Benedict downplayed the universal aspects of 
human behaviour, although Boas did view human beings' tendency to 
classify phenomena as common to· all cultures (Stocking, 1974: 8). 
Moreover, although they acknowledged the historical fact of cultural 
interpenetration, they were primarily concerned to document and 
describe local processes of integration and classification. For Benedict, 
'primitive' cultures were the best sources for studying the diversity of 
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coherent patterns of behaviour precisely because they had been less 
affected by historical contact with others (Benedict, 1935: 12). 
This weaker form of relativism has carried on in the history of 
liberal pluralist cultures and in educational contexts concerned to 
acknowledge their diverse populations, and, at the same time, promote 
tolerance and harmony. Just as Boas and Benedict argued against racist 
and ethnocentric accounts of difference, the idea of 'different but equal' 
in educational contexts has aimed to recognise and empower the 
cultures and langnages of pupils that have gone unnoticed or have 
been undervalued. In such situations, where 'empowerment' is the 
aim, the priority is commonly deemed to be not dialogue across 
difference-but dialogue about difference. To this end, the emphasis is 
on what makes individuals or cultures distinctive, not what makes 
them similar. But while what makes one culture distinct from another 
is an important issue in its own right, or as a strategy within multi-
cultural education, and in struggles over social justice generally, it can 
also serve to close down rather than open up the question of how 
individuals criti~ally understand or alter their perceptions of 
themselves and others, thus implicating the extreme form of 
relativism outlined above. 
The 'quest for commensurability' undertaken in this thesis is not 
a denial of difference or even of 'incommensurability.' The title does 
not imply a search for universals or a common category of 'human' 
that transcends cultural and linguistic bounds. Diversity is not viewed 
as a problem which must be overcome. Instead, it argues that what 
must be overcome is the absolute endorsement of particularity and 
difference; the idea that individuals or cultures are so permanently 
... 
enclosed in radically different conceptual frameworks that no 
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comparisons or communication-in other words, no understanding-
can occur. 
The thesis approaches its theme through a historical and 
analytical account of the complex of cultural and language issues 
relevant to the field of English education. Beginning with a 
consideration of the themes of mass and popular culture and 
education, it moves through the broad cultural context of the 1920s and 
1930s and 1950s and 1960s, particularly through the prism of literary 
culture. It then moves to a close examination of some of the longer 
historical roots of some of the dominant concepts of the relationship 
betweeen language and culture that informed the period. These it 
relates to the relevant elaboration of the intellectual field, particularly 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Finally it returns to its underlying theme and 
reassesses the issue of in/ commensurability in the light of its analysis. 
Chapter Two considers the debates that took place over the 
status and function of mass culture, and culture in general, in the 1920s 
and 1930s. Three different perspectives-representative of the 
dominant strands of thinking in the culture debates of that period-are 
examined through the contributions of T. S. Eliot, F. R. Leavis and the 
British literary Left. This chapter establishes the issue of the 
incommensurability of cultures as one which historically has been 
implicated in debates over culture in Britain. In covering what is 
possibly over-familiar ground, the chapter is intended to serve as a 
relevant backdrop to the continued consideration given to the issues of 
culture and language in the rest of the thesis. 
Chapter Three provides further historical background on the 
theme of incommensurability and its relevance to the culture and 
language debates. The rise of 1950s' and 1960s' modernity is linked to 
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the reassessment of the status of mass culture in British society, and to 
the reappraisal of Leavis and literary criticism that began in this period. 
The attempts of the New Left to theorise the role of literature and 
literary criticism from a Marxist perspective are also considered. 
Chapter Four argues that the emergent critique of Leavis and the 
practice of literary criticism was both a product of developments within 
the field of English education, and a reflex of the wider social debate 
that emerged in British society in the late 1950s, which increasingly set 
tradition against modernity and was represented in the Leavis-Snow 
"Two Cultures" controversy. It re-analyses the significance of that 
controversy on developments within English education both with 
regard to Leavis and literary criticism and to the role of tradition and 
aesthetic practices in general. 
Chapter Five begins during the period of the frequently 
observed 'paradigm shift' from literature to language in English 
education. It offers a critical analysis of the politics of the intellectual 
field that informed the language paradigm, focusing primarily on the 
contributions of James Britton, Basil Bernstein, Harold Rosen and 
Michael Halliday. The language and culture debates are considered in 
the light of each of their contributions. Relevant influences from the 
field of sociolinguistics are also included. Particular consideration is 
given to the competing theories of language and culture that informed 
the language paradigm and the concept(s) of culture that emerged 
within English education as a result. 
Chapter Six traces the earliest formulation of the relationship 
between thought and language from its first appearance in the work of 
Leibniz and at greater length through the work of the often ignored but 
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fascinating German religious thinker J. G. Hamann and the further 
elaboration of Hamann's ideas in the also under recognised figure of 
J. G. Herder. Herder's contribution to the incommensurability of 
cultures thesis is examined in detail. The work of Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, the figure most commonly associated with providing an 
account of the relationship between language, culture and thought, is 
also considered. 
Chapter Seven reconsiders the theme of incommensurability in 
relation to the politics of the intellectual field of English education in 
the 1960s and 1970s, and to the fate of aesthetic experience as a 
component of the English curriculum. A role for aesthetic criticism in 
multi-(class) cultural contexts is considered, drawing on insights from 
Herder and other contemporary contributors to this theme. The 
chapter ends with a discussion of the relationship between 
linguistically-mediated activities and the extension and transformation 
of cultured meanings. This relationship is considered through the 
writings on language and hermeneutic understanding of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, and through the universal pragmatics and critical theory of 
Jurgen Habermas. 
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Chapter Two 
The Culture Debates in the 1920s and the 1930s 
The Politics of Culture: a social background 
The increasing influence of mass culture in British society 
during the 1920s and 1930s prompted a revival of public discussions 
about the status and function of culture which had first appeared in the 
19th century when the Romantic movement arose in response to 
industrialisation. The 'products' of mass culture that became available 
to all members of society in varying degrees by the 1930s, regardless of 
class background, e. g., radio and cinema, were viewed with suspicion 
by those who considered these 'passive' forms of entertainment a 
threat to the cultivation of culture, on the one hand (Seaman, 1966: 
160-161; Taylor, 1975: 177-182, 315), and on the other, a diversion from 
political activism on the part of the unemployed (Miles and Smith, 
1987: 27). The occurrence of what appeared to be the unceasing influx 
of mass culture in everyday life, particularly the more influential 
forms like advertising, broadcasting, newspaper publishing and the 
cinema, prompted debate amongst intellectuals and educators about 
the content of and relationships between high culture, working class 
culture, popular culture and mass culture and their respective force 
and status within British society. 1 
1 To take cinema as an example, the following statistics illustrate the kinds of 
trends that were considered by some as cause for concern: forty per cent of the 
population went to the cinema at least once a wee!<; twenty-five per cent went twice 
a week; in the Depressed areas, Cardiff, for example, fifty-two percent of 
unemployed youth went to the cinema once a week and almost half of these went 
twice a week; and in Liverpool and Glasgow, also areas of high unemployment, as 
many as eighty per cent went at least once a week (Mowat, 1968: 485, 501). 
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The motive underlying these debates, however, was not solely 
due to concern over the phenomenon of mass culture, although this 
was an important catalyst. The first World War had shaken the social 
and cultural foundations of British society, leaving incoherent and in 
doubt what had previously been perceived as a stable socio-cultural 
order. As Shils has commented about this period, 
Indeed, even when he loved his cottage, or his Regency house, 
or some little spot of English soil, the intellectual's love of 
Britain was overshadowed by a feeling of repugnance for its 
dreary, unjust, and uncultured society, with its impotent ruling 
classes and its dull and puritanical middle classes. It was not 
particular institutions or attitudes that were repellent but the 
whole notion of Britain or England. This was not just the view 
of the communists or the aesthetes. It was the view of nearly 
everyone who in the 1920s and 1930s was considered worthy of 
mention in intellectual circles in Great Britain ... the prevailing 
attitude, in quantity and emphasis, was one of alienation 
(Shils, 1955: 6). 
In the 1920's, this feeling of alienation was directly attributed to 
the war, as Taylor has suggested, "English people both Left and Right 
blamed everything on the war and believed that all would be well if its 
effects were somehow undone" (Taylor, 1975: 238). By the 1930s, 
however, images of hunger marches and of human deprivation had 
replaced those of the war and a new source of alienation became the 
conditions in the 'Depressed areas' in the north (Mowat, 1968: 463-468) 
where chronic unemployment was having devastating effects on 
whole communities. This, and the simultaneous rise of world fascism 
and the Great Depression contributed to the belief that chaos and social 
decay were the order of the day.2 
2 Many historians have stressed that these images are part myth part reality in 
that many working people in the thirties actually experienced a better standard of 
living and new levels of consumption than they had in the previous decade. For 
many salaried workers it became possible for the first time in the thirties to buy a 
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It was in this context that the culture debates became a forum for 
attempts to resolve how the restoration of a social and cultural order 
would come about, and in what form this new order would appear. 
The arguments evident at that time reveal a complex and often 
contradictory juxtapositioning of ideas and beliefs regarding the notion 
of culture that reflect the disorder of the period. There was no simple 
or clearly demarcated correspondence between beliefs held and class or 
political affiliations, and there was often implicit agreement between 
certain conservative and radical views regarding, for example, the 
negative influence of mass culture or the specific class nature of culture 
and cultural products. The debates included several inter-related issues 
which were particularly difficult for participants to untangle. Amongst 
these were: the problem of defining what constituted a legitimate and 
distinct culture or cultural form; the question of the role of an elite or 
vanguard party in influencing or determining the value or status of a 
culture or a cultural form; and the increasing blurring of any 
distinction between a 'mass' and a 'popular' culture. 
The notion of culture as grounded in some traditional 'way of 
life' was supported by conservatives and radical participants alike, and 
served in their respective critiques of mass culture. For their part, 
conservative elites sought to maintain and defend the 'cultural 
inheritance,' upheld within high culture, by denying claims to it by 
anyone other than themselves. Mass culture was viewed by them 
simultaneously as a disturbance to the integrity of high culture and as a 
threat to the class-segregated cultures of the past. This position was a 
particularly fragile one amongst the upper classes in the 1920s and 
home, own a car, and acquire a range of consumer goods (Taylor, 1975: 298-320; 
Stevenson & Cook, 1979: 5-6, 8-30). 
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1930s, however, since, in contrast to the traditional landed aristocracy 
who were grounded in the anti-materialism of the public schools, 
many of the newer members of the upper classes came from the 
commercial bourgeoisie and owed their newly acquired social status to 
their success in commerce and industry (Hobsbawn, 1967: 235; Weiner, 
1981: 96; Rubinstein, 1993). Hence, their links to the mass culture 
industry were inextricable. Although increasing economic and 
political ties between these two groups clearly made it expedient to find 
some common cultural ground on which to firm up their partnership, 
the difference in their backgrounds was not always easily disguised 
(Miles and Smith, 1987: 10-11). 
A challenge from within the upper classes came from aristocratic 
youth who, both as a reaction to the horrors of the war which they 
blamed on their parents' generation and due to their growing 
enthusiasm for the popular culture of their own generation, began to 
question the class system itself and its high cultural elitism (Taylor, 
1975: 177; Seaman, 1966: 157). Some of these youth became (for the 
most part temporarily) aligned with the Left and in particular, 
Marxism, during the 1930s, and developed their critiques of society 
along radical political lines, while for others it remained merely a 
generational dispute. 
According to historians of the period, whatever their positions, 
most of this younger generation found themselves aligned with their 
class with regard to mass culture. Some, like their parents, viewed 
mass culture as evidence of the invasion of bourgeois industrial 
society. While they were prepared to mount a challenge to the class 
system from within their aristocratic traditions, they were not prepared 
to witness the de~ise of the tradition altogether. Others shared the 
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more radical critiques of mass culture that were popular with the Left 
during this period. This group were dedicated to strengthening both 
the ideal and the reality of an 'authentic' working class culture to 
challenge bourgeois capitalism and protect the working classes against 
capitalism's imposition of mass culture. They viewed the products of 
mass culture as tools of capitalism which both imposed capitalist 
ideology and militated against class struggle.3 
At the same time, however, the Left had to acknowledge that the 
forms of entertainment and leisure provided by the mass culture 
industry appealed to members of the working and lower middle 
classes, and were perceived by them as improving the quality of their 
lives.4 Moreover, at some level, popular forms of entertainment and 
leisure actually broke down barriers between class cultures by appealing 
to and recognising a broader 'classless' public. Participants in the 
debates on the Left thus found themselves embracing several 
contradictory realities. Their stand against mass culture, for example, 
put them in conflict with much of the population's relationship to it 
and unappreciative of its corrosive effects, however minimal, on the 
3 This view is supported in the account given by Miles and Smith who claim that 
the cinema contributed to the absence of class confrontation in the inter-war period. 
They claim that feature films defused issues like unemployment through means of 
comedy and by moving the context from the social and political to the personal and 
moral. Instead of being considered as a national disaster, for example, the issue of 
unemployment was translated in both newsreel footage and feature films into 
national valour while the Depressed areas were transformed into heroic examples 
of British fortitude. Likewise, reports on hunger strikes or the conditions of the 
unemployed were presented as a form of entertainment rather than journalism-"the 
dole [became] just another of those institutionalised difficulties that were the stock-
in-trade of the earlier music hall comedians, like mothers-in-law, rentmen and 
toffs. "-and this, they suggest, encouraged adaptation rather than revolution on 
the part of the working classes (Miles and Smith, 1987: 27). 
4 The historian, A. J. P. Taylor, who has called the cinema the "greatest educative 
force in the early twentieth century," supported this view. In his estimation, the 
cinema changed the pattern of life for the better for the lower middle classes in 
general by, amongst other things, taking people from their homes and allowing men 
and women to share their leisure time (Taylor, 1975: 237). 
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rigid class nature of British society in general. Moreover, their 
privileging of an authentic working class culture implied and even 
encouraged the exclusion of the working classes from high culture, a 
position which aligned the Left's position with that of the conservative 
elites. Finally, the Left, and this is particularly true of those Marxists 
who came from the upper classes, although opposed to the idea of a 
class-based elitism, tended to install themselves as the intellectual 
vanguard of the working classes. The desire to privilege working class 
culture and raise its status both as a resource against capitalism and 
within socialism at times involved a kind of 'cultural engineering' in 
which upper class intellectuals took it upon themselves to select and 
distinguish between authentic and inauthentic forms of working class 
culture.5 
The Culture Debates-Literature and Literary Criticism 
By the 1930s, within the culture debates, a renewed and vital 
interest in the role and function of literature in shaping and 
maintaining I cultural continuity' emerged in the face of the increasing 
effects of mass culture and modern industrialisation in Britain, and as 
a reaction to the social disorder caused by the war. As Terry Eagleton 
remarks, 
5 The Left were not alone in their desire for an 'authentic' popular culture to ward 
off the invidious effects of mass culture. Amongst folklorists, for example, the 
desire to contrast the healthy, worthwhile folk song with the vulgar, emasculated 
popular tune was strong during this period and there were increased attempts to 
revive the old English folk songs before they were overtaken by the popular blues 
and hit tunes from America and the Music Hall of the urban working classes 
(Seaman, 1966: 161). In 1924, Sir Hubert Parry of the Journal of the Folk Song 
Society described such "modem tunes" as representing "all the brazen effrontery, the 
meanest grossness, and the most hideous and blatant repulsiveness" (Shiach, 1989: 
125). However, it has been pointed out that many of these folklorists excluded songs 
dealing with drink and removed objectionable words and erotic references from their 
own collections of 'culturally authentic' texts (Shiach, 1989; and see Harker, 1980). 
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Literature rode to power on the back of wartime nationalism; 
but it also represented a search for spiritual solutions on the 
part of an English ruling class whose sense of identity had been 
profoundly shaken, whose psyche was ineradicably scarred by 
the horrors it had endured. Literature would be at once solace 
and reaffirmation, a familiar ground on which Englishmen 
could regroup both to explore, and to find some alternative to, 
the nightmare of history (Eagleton, 1983: 30). 
The tensions and contradictions contained within the various 
responses to changing class cultures and the emergence of mass culture 
discussed above took on particular meaning in the fields of literature 
and literary criticism. Several key spokespersons emerged to take part 
in the debates about literature and it relationship to culture. 
T. S. Eliot, who played a pre-eminent role in defining the 
parameters of contemporary poetry and whose ideas on education and 
culture provoked praise and criticism in the literary world and beyond, 
was one such contributor. His position, for reasons discussed below, 
was an elaboration of that held by the traditional conservative elites. 
Another contributor was F. R. Leavis whose influence on the field of 
literary criticism arLd the content and practice of English teaching from 
the 1930s to the 1950s was profound. Leavis and the Leavisites 
introduced the idea of English literature and literary criticism as a 
means by which to both maintain and spread the cultural heritage 
beyond the bounds of the traditional elite. The Leavisites contributed 
the idea of the 'democratisation' of high culture to the culture debates, 
incorporating both radical and conservative ideas in pursuit of this 
cause. Finally, the literary wing of the British Marxists and other 
writers and artists of the Left contributed to the debate guided by 
developments within the artistic bloc of the Soviet Union and by their 
own readings of Marx and Engels, Lenin and Trotsky. 
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All of these participants both reflected the positions outlined 
above and added new dimensions to the debates taking place in the 
wider society. One central and persistent question which arose from 
their discussions about literature and culture was that of the need for 
and the role of a cl;l.1tural elite or an elite culture in British society. This 
question was not, of course, a new one. In the 19th century, Coleridge 
had argued for the notion of a Clerisy, or National Church whose 
responsibility to society would be the cultivation of culture (Williams, 
1958: 63) and Matthew Arnold had called on men of culture- the "true 
apostles of equality"-to deliver the "sweetness and light" of culture 
from one end of society to another (Arnold, 1983: 31). More recent 
influences came from European theorists like Vilfredo Pareto, Karl 
Mannheim and Jose Ortega y Gasset whose theories of mass society and 
the role of elites had become influential in Britain and America by the 
thirties (Ortega y Gasset, 1932; Kornhauser, 1959; Bramson, 1961). 
While these theorists supplied the more conservative thinkers with 
ideas during this period, a more radical perspective was made available 
in Britain through writers, politicians and events in the Soviet Union 
and Spain (see discussion below, pp. 35-42). 
If any definite conclusions emerge from this study, one of them is 
surely this, that culture is the one thing we cannot deliberately aim 
at ... T. S. Eliot 
Eliot's cultural conservatism was determined by a conflux of 
influences in his personal biography. He had come to London in 1915 
from the United States where he had already witnessed the decline in 
the role of the aristocracy (of which his own family was a part) in 
dictating the culture and tradition of the nation. With the possible 
exception of the American South where "blood and breeding still 
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counted for something," he perceived that the traditional aristocracy in 
the United States had begun to be overtaken by the industrial middle 
class. Upon his arrival in England, Eliot thus began "a wholesale 
salvage and demolition job on its literary tradition" (Eagleton, 1983: 38). 
His chief criticism of modern English sensibility was that it had become 
'unself-conscious.' He believed that in order for culture-which he 
defined as a 'way of life'-to survive, it had to be 'organically' related to 
experience, a sixth sense of sorts. 
Eliot opposed the ideology of middle-class liberalism that 
prevailed under industrial capitalism because, according to him, it 
encouraged the idea of 'sociallaissez-faire'-a by-product of economic 
individualism which created an 'atomic' as opposed to an 'organic' 
view of society. If elites were chosen on the basis of professional 
interests, they would be likely to lack the social cohesion and 
continuity vital to sustaining the cultural heritage (Eliot, 1948: 35-49; 
and see Bantock, 1949; Williams, 1958; Eagleton, 1983). He was 
similarly opposed to the creation of a national education system that 
would advocate 'parity of esteem' for although he allowed for the 
mixing of classes-each should have constant additions and 
defections-he believed that ultimately classes themselves should 
remain distinct, 
... to aim to make everyone share in the appreciation of the 
fruits of the more conscious parts of culture is to adulterate and 
cheapen what you give ... (Eliot, 1948: 106). 
Eliot was particularly concerned that education in democratic, 
industrialised countries was tending toward some unguided, abstract 
notion of uniformity which threatened the cultural heritage of the 
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nation. For him, to force all students, regardless of class background, to 
acquire a variety of specialisms that had no connection with the life of 
the individual student would be an superficial and artificial 
endeavour-"a mass culture will always be a substitute culture" (Eliot, 
1948: 107). Eliot's assumption was that culture, language and lived 
experience combined to create a unity of sensibility among members of 
the same class and that, therefore, the democratisation of culture 
would inevitably lead to a dissociation of sensibility. 
Eliot's literary criticism did contain a universalistic, spiritual 
dimension that can be seen in his belief that culture and language must 
be closely connected to experience and that a poem should succeed 
through enigmatic images in penetrating the "primitive levels at 
which all men and women experienced alike" (Eagleton, 1983: 41). His 
engagement with the collective unconscious in poetry was influenced 
by his own membership in the Christian church (see Eliot, 1939, 1948, 
1960). As Miles and Smith suggest, "at the heart of his literary criticism 
was a quasi-medieval idea of the civilisation of Christendom, of a 
supranational European civilisation unified in spirit through its 
common foundation in Christian values and beliefs" (Miles and 
Smith, 1987: 96). 
Nevertheless, Eliot's universalism relied on the existing class 
system to explicate the role of culture and language in society. His idea 
of the unified spirit of a "supranational European civilisation" was 
based on an ideal order which was imbued with all of the social and 
cultural characteristics of the aristocratic and upper middle class of the 
period, not the population as a whole. Moreover, not only was Eliot's 
definition of culture grounded in a class-based society, the idea of 
distributing high culture to members of all classes was anathema to 
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him. The responsibility of the literary critic was to uphold and keep 
hold of the 'tradition,' not to dispense it to the whole of society-an act 
which would fail, in any event, since it would be induced by conscious 
effort. 
Eliot's notion of culture as unself-conscious was similar to the 
view of cultures as incommensurable expressed by Herder, who 
maintained that certain activities located within a culture revealed a 
property or quality-not capable of being abstracted or articulated-that 
was specific to that culture. For Herder, as Berlin explains," ... to be fully 
human, that is, fully creative, one must belong somewhere, to some 
group or some historical stream which cannot be defined save in the 
generic terms of tradition and milieu and culture, themselves 
generated by nahl!."al forces ... "(Berlin, 1965: 43). However, there are 
important differences in the uses to which Herder and Eliot put their 
views. Whereas Herder argued for incommensurability in order to 
break with the classical rationalist tradition and to oppose the forced 
migration of peoples from their native environments (Herder's views 
will be discussed at length in Chapter Six), Eliot embraced the idea of 
incommensurability to argue that since mutual understanding was 
impossible between members of different class cultures, the idea of 
common education was unnatural and doomed to failure. The 
malleability of the. notion of cultural incommensurability/relativism 
which these different applications suggest will be explored in 
subsequent chapters. 
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The aim is to produce a mind that will approach the problems of 
modern civilisation with an understanding of their origins, a maturity 
of outlook, and, not a nostalgic addiction to the past, but a sense of 
human possibilities ... F. R. Leavis 
Leavis shared with Eliot a concern for the breakdowns and 
disjunctures within the social and cultural life of the British people 
due to industrialisation and the effects of mass culture. However, 
Leavis and his colleagues were, unlike Eliot, a product of the new state 
of British socio-cultural affairs as well as major contributors to its 
impact on English literary-academic life. Socially they reinforced the 
emerging class pattern of newly educated intellectuals who were for the 
most part petit bourgeois or lower class in origin; they were from 
amongst that layer of society who were entering the traditionally upper 
class universities for the first time, but without the class allegiances 
which would prevent them from challenging the authority of those 
institutions. Thus their presence at Cambridge suggested the possibility 
for the first time in Britain of participation in positions of power and 
prestige by intellectual and aesthetic means rather than through class 
or inheritance (Miles and Smith, 1987: 90; Green, 1959, 1961). 
Against traditional conservatives like Eliot, Leavis introduced 
the idea that the democratic distribution of high culture-and more 
specifically, literary culture-by a trained intellectual vanguard was the 
way to combat the adverse effects of mass culture and bourgeois 
individualism. His wife and colleague, Q. D. Leavis, in her book, 
published in 1932, Fiction and the Reading Public, maintained that 
industrialisation and urbanisation had debased inherited values and 
deprived the masses and the dominant classes alike of critical standards 
by which to judge and maintain their traditional cultures (Leavis, 
1932). The Leavisi:8 sought to counter the influences of popular fiction 
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and the popular press with the re-establishment of a community of 
values, intellectual authority and culture (Mulhern, 1981). 
Inspired by 1. A. Richards' Principles of Literary Criticism, 
published in 1924, and Practical Criticism, published in 1929, Leavis' 
commitment to the critical method shared with Richards a belief in art 
as continuous, not contrastive, with the rest of human activity, and in 
art as the most valuable of all such activities because it encouraged 
what Richards had described as the balancing and ordering of human 
impulses (Richards, 1935). Furthermore, Leavis perceived literature 
and art as expressions of culture, which he viewed not simply as a 
distinct 'way of life' but as a form of human community. He believed 
that he and his colleagues were laying down the foundations for a 
universal "human culture" achieved by cultivating a certain 
autonomy of the human spirit (Leavis, 1986: 35). 
Leavis' mod.~l for this community was based on his notion of 
the organic, rural community which he felt had been destroyed by the 
impact of the Industrial Revolution. Leavis' description of the rural 
community of the past is reminiscent of Durkheim's description of the 
'mechanical' social solidarity which characterised societies prior to 
industrialisation and which was based on the homogeneity of moral 
belief and a simple correspondence between material and social life 
(Durkheim, 1933). Durkheim was interested in how members of a 
society dealt with the shift from a common moral culture to the more 
abstract collective, .t:onsciousness found in modern industrial societies. 
It was Leavis' intention to intervene in this shift, providing the tools 
necessary for the formation of a modern sensibility that equalled that of 
the organic communities of the past. As he stated in 'Under which 
king, Benzonian?,' 
30 
For it j.~ true that culture in the past has borne a close relation 
to the ;methods of production'. A culture expressing itself in a 
tradition of literature and art-such a tradition as represents 
the finer consciousness of the race and provides the currency of 
finer living-can be a healthy state only if this tradition is in 
living relation with a real culture, shared by the people at 
large. The point might be enforced by saying (there is no need 
to elaborate) that Shakespeare did not invent the language 
that he used. And when England had a popular culture, the 
structure, the framework, of it was a stylisation, so to speak of 
economic necessities; based, it might fairly be said, on the 
'methods of production' was an art of living, involving codes, 
developed in ages of continuous experience, of relations between 
man and man, and man and the environment in its seasonal 
rhythm. This culture the progress of the nineteenth century 
destroyed, in country and in town it destroyed (to use a phrase 
now familiar) the organic community. And what survives of 
cultural tradition in any important sense survives in spite of the 
rapidly changing 'means of production' (Leavis, 1986: 40). 
Leavis was critical of the popular Marxist position of the 1930s 
which argued for a direct correspondence between 'methods of 
production' and cultural products, for he felt that the Marxists were 
discouraging "the kinds of discipline without which culture will 
indeed be something like a mere function of the economic conditions, 
of the machinery of the civilisation" (Leavis, 1986: 35). He was 
convinced that the way to combat modern industrialisation and the 
accompanying onsla~ght of mass culture-"the work of capitalism and 
.' 
its products, the cheap car, the wireless and the cinema" (Leavis, 1986: 
44)-was through rigorous and disciplined intellectual, aesthetic and 
moral activity that was "not merely an expression of class origin and 
economic circumstances" (Leavis, 1986: 35). He was completely against 
the glorification of "working class values" as he believed they were 
"inevitably those induced by the modern environment-by 'capitalist' 
civilisation" (Leavis, 1986: 43). In fact, according to Leavis, any values, 
bourgeois or Marxist, which were linked to the material environment 
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in the industrial age were to be rejected in favour of a 'critical' 
education, 
A cogent way in which the human spirit can refute the Marxian 
theory and the bourgeois negative lies open in 
education ... Whether or not we are playing the capitalist game 
should soon be apparent, for a serious effort in education 
involves the fostering of a critical attitude towards 
civilisation as it is. Perhaps there will be no greater public 
outcry when it is proposed to introduce into schools a training in 
resistance to publicity and in criticism of newspapers - for this 
is the least opposable way of presenting the start in real 
modern education ... The teaching profession is peculiarly in a 
position to do revolutionary things; corporate spirit there can 
be unquestionably disinterested and by a bold challenge there 
perhaps the self-devotion of the intelligent may be more 
effectively enlisted than by an appeal to the Class War 
(Leavis, 1986: 53). 
The training offered through practical criticism was to serve as 
the means to empower the public with the ability to distinguish and 
insist on an anti-acquisitive and anti-competitive culture that was not 
tied to the material environment. Leavis' 'immanent' concern was 
that the erosion of any cultural authority in Britain created too fertile 
an environment for the proliferation of mass culture. He was 
convinced that it was the duty of the intellectual to act to re-establish 
such authority in order to avoid the decline and fall of culture. What 
or whose cultural knowledge should be dispersed was not a question of 
social class or political hegemony. The 'authority' Leavis appealed to 
was that of the inner and spiritual essence of civilisation-"a point of 
view above classes"(Leavis, 1986: 35)-and as far away from the forces 
of production as possible. 
Leavis' universalism distanced him from the Left, and did not 
gain him favour with the traditional ruling class either, at least not 
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initially.? The Leavises' vision of how the "self-devotion of the 
intelligent" should proceed was considered at the time both radical and 
threatening to the pre-war upper-class British literati (Eagleton, 1983) 
and they were frequently attacked by members of the literary 
establishment, 
Attacks on 'the preferences of a rather pharisaical minority', 
reviews snidely entitled 'First Class Passengers Only' and 
facetious references to 'the storm troops of Discrimination' were 
the natural reflexes of a consumerist literary culture whose 
latitudinarian 'taste' was less democratic than patronising, 
and formed by the same complacent social expectations that 
supported the more subtle pleasures of belles lettres and 
'scholarship for its own sake' (Mulhern, 1981: 318-319). 
The Leavises, in turn, antagonised members of the traditional 
literati. The Bloomsbury group, for example-which Mowat suggests 
did in fact become a haven for pseudo-intellectuals and the arty-crafty 
crowd in the period following the twenties (Mowat, 1968: 217)-were 
criticised by the Leavises for "[celebrating] their own subjectivity for a 
modest public salary" (Inglis, 1982: 100). Q. D. Leavis' attack on 
Virginia Woolf's Three Guineas as nothing more than "boudoir 
scholarship" written by a "self-pampering victim of class privilege" is 
illustrative of just how scathing Scrutiny reviewers could be against 
members of the Bloomsbury set (Mulhern, 1981, 1990). 
Although it was the Leavisite's renegade literary criticism that 
was the target of the traditional aristocracy's criticism, the hostility they 
expressed toward the Leavises and Scrutiny was also a reaction to the 
7 In fact, it has often been affirmed that Leavis and Scrutiny were never fully 
accepted at Cambridge (Anderson, 1968; Hayman, 1977; Miles and Smith, 1987) nor 
recognised by the main literary weeklies of the day (Bradbury, 1956; Watson, 1977). 
Mulhern, however, offers evidence to refute this latter claim (Mulhern, 1981: 314-
318). 
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fact that during the 1920s and 1930s the public schools and Oxbridge 
were experiencing a relative decline within an expanding educational 
system while educational prospects improved to a degree for lower 
middle class children. Leavis and others like him at Cambridge were a 
reminder of the weakening of the intellectual order led by the old 
Victorian ruling class. Mulhern, in his book The Moment of Scrutiny 
argues that the power of disturbance so often attributed to Leavis 
himself was in reality that of a whole cultural current and of Scrutiny, 
the instrument that sustained and directed it (Mulhern, 1981). Within 
a short period of time, instigated by figures such as H. M. Chadwick and 
1. A. Richards and carried on by Leavis, a newly formed discourse on 
literature in the national culture had been established with Cambridge 
as its institutional base (Hayman, 1976; Mulhern, 1981; Eagleton, 
1983)-a radical move within English as a discipline. The reform of 
English studies at Cambridge threatened the art for art's sake 
aestheticism which historically had dominated at that institution. The 
impact of this was more than slightly felt, as Eagleton states, "in the 
early 1920s, it was ~esperately unclear why English was worth studying 
at all; by the early 1930s it had become a question of why it was worth 
wasting your time on anything else" (Eagleton, 1983: 31). 
Ironically, although in subsequent years, Leavis would be 
considered an upholder of an old social order, in the 1930s his literary 
criticism was founded on radical intellectual grounds. Marxist writers 
have suggested that Leavis' anti-Marxist stance was largely a reaction to 
the particular brand of 'vulgar leftism' that predominated in the 1930s 
in Britain. Perry Anderson, for example, maintains that Scrutiny was 
actually "born in close relation to Marxism" and that Leavis' 
antagonism to the Marxist critics and writers was more a response to 
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the "modish literary leftism," that took over the literary world in the 
thirties than disagreement over the idea of some form of economic 
communism (Anderson, 1968: 50-51). Some writers have also asserted 
that the intellectual dimension of the work of 'literary' Marxists like 
W. H. Auden, Christopher Caudwell and C. Day Lewis offered no real 
challenge to the work being produced by Leavis and Scrutiny during 
the same period (Anderson, 1968; Mulhern, 1981; Williams, 1981). But 
Mulhern, in particular, nevertheless criticises Leavis for his refusal to 
frame the question of cultural authority in political terms (Mulhern, 
1981: 330). While Mulhern's point is a legitimate one, he himself has 
acknowledged that the impact of the Left on English literary culture in 
the 1930s was, in reality, not as radical as the Leavises during the same 
period-and it is indeed arguable that the Leavisites' 'non-political' 
challenge to both the Cambridge literary establishment and the 
tradition of belles lettres had a more radicalising cultural effect than the 
politicised rhetoric of the literary Left during this period. The Left's 
contribution to the culture debates in the 1930s, discussed below, 
nevertheless remains important, for it established a radical view of the 
relationship between class, culture and literature that would re-emerge 
as significant in the post-war period of educational restructuring. 
The British Literary Left 
The contributions of the literary Left of the 1930s to the culture 
debates were motivated by several interrelated issues and events which 
had taken over the country during that period. Amongst these were 
the rise of fascism in Europe and, in particular, the Spanish Civil War; 
discussions taking place within the Soviet Union on literature and 
culture; the increasing impact of mass culture on the British public; 
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and a concern for the massive, chronic domestic unemployment that 
continued in many areas of Britain. The issue of unemployment, in 
particular, led to the increasing perception of the thirties in Britain as 
"the devil's decade" (Taylor, 1975: 317; Stevenson and Cook, 1979: 3), 
and prompted many British writers of this period to express what they 
believed to be the general sentiments of the times. As Mowat perhaps 
somewhat cynically suggests, "To write only for themselves seemed a 
guilty indulgence; they must strike against bourgeois illusions, such as 
liberty, they must join forces with the millions of unemployed workers 
who have nothing to lose but their chains" (Mowat, 1968: 529). 
Poets like W~ H. Auden, C. Day Lewis and Steven Spender were 
some of the more prominent members of a newly formed Marxist 
literary set that appeared during the 1930s. They, along with other 
writers like Christopher Isherwood, Ralph Fox, John Strachey and 
Lewis Grassic Gibbon, developed their theories on the relationship 
between social and aesthetic values mainly through their associations 
with the British Section of the Writers' International, the monthly 
journal Left Review and through the Left Book Club. The Left Review 
organised its agenda in the 1930s around the defeat of fascism and the 
publication of 'rev<?lutionary literature.' Similarly, the Left Book Club 
founded in 1936 by publisher and businessman Victor Gollancz, sought 
out authors sympathetic to the struggle for socialism. In addition, the 
Club organised meetings and rallies in support of Spain and the 
u. S. S. R. (Seaman, 1966: 301-302). The Left Book Club, whose 
membership reached 50,000 by 1937, also brought the issue of 
unemployment to broader public awareness by publishing books such 
as Gollan's Youth in British Industry, M. Cohen's I Was One of the 
Unemployed and Wal Hannington's The Distressed Areas (Stevenson 
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and Cook, 1979: 75). During this period, writers and intellectuals 
looked increasingly for new ways of conceptualising the relationship 
between Marxism, literature and culture. Their discussions and 
inquiries took two specific directions in terms of the culture debates-
the role of the Left (and in particular, Marxism) with respect to literary 
studies/ criticism and the relationship between the Left and mass 
culture. 
Many Leftisi: and Marxist writers/ critics in the 1930s argued that 
literary criticism should consist of distinguishing between 
revolutionary kinds of writing, i. e., writing that reflected the 
fundamental tensions in the social order, and reactionary writing, i. e., 
writing that emphasised the liberal individualist hero. While there 
was some debate amongst the Left, influenced by Lenin's and Trotsky's 
interpretations of Marx on culture, over such issues as which writing 
should be considered revolutionary, what constituted authentic 
working class culture, how much freedom the artist should have 
under socialism ar.d how important past works of literature were to 
the struggle (see Left Review, I, No.5, 1935), it was nevertheless the 
case that a rather narrow version of Marxist literary theory 
predominated in the thirties in Britain (see the Introduction in 
Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature, 1977). 
The task of the Marxist writer and of Marxist literary criticism 
was to find ways to increase production of politically-engaged texts-
with the primary emphasis on textual production rather than criticism 
(Williams, 1981). The prevailing belief was that socialist writers should 
seek to substitute the bourgeois model of individualism with 
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representations of a collective consciousness. Thus, the collection of 
essays in C. Day Lewis' The Mind in Chains: Socialism and the Cultural 
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Revolution published in 1937 called on writers to link their works to 
the class struggle. This was the popular appeal of the decade, as 
Spender expressed it, 
The socialist artist is concerned with realising in his work the 
ideas of a classless society; that is to say, applying those ideas 
to the life around him, and giving them their reality. He is 
concerned with a change of heart (Spender, 1935: 146). 
The type of criticism that these writers/critics offered tended 
to be concerned with how or whether a novel or poem served a 
revolutionary political purpose. Spender wrote of a C. Day Lewis 
poem, for example, that it "asserts that two worlds exist and are 
fighting: the striving worlds are obviously intended to represent the 
class war, or at all events the rivalry between revolution and 
reaction." And while he acknowledged that some might see these 
issues as overly simplified in the poem, he argued that "this does 
not really affect the real claim of the poem to value. The implicit 
assertion of the poem is that it is about realities: that the struggle 
between two worlds is real-as real as the descriptions of 
environment in novels-that the material of the poem is life" 
(Spender, 1935: 145-146). 
In addition to producing their own texts, much attention was 
given to defining the appropriate aim and content of 'the working class 
novel,' 'the sociaHst novel' or 'the proletarian novel' as it was 
simultaneously labelled. Ralph Fox's posthumously published book 
The Novel and the People (1937) advanced the view that the novel was 
a peculiarly bourgeois art form and as such was a sensitive indicator of 
the health of bourgeois society. He and those who shared this point of 
view believed that the novel was headed for decline (corresponding to 
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the impending crisis in capitalist society) and that the time was ripe for 
the novel to be appropriated by the working classes and re-emerge in 
new form-although, others, including Orwell, thought that until 
proletarian culture achieved dominance the proletarian writer would 
only produce bourgeois literature with a slightly different slant and 
that, therefore, perhaps more attention should be paid to more typically 
working class cultural forms e. g., the music halls or even the cinema 
(Left Review, I, No.5, 1935). 
Setting the guidelines for the appropriation of the bourgeois 
novel was not, however, to be undertaken by working class writers. 
Writers of working class origin during the 1930s found themselves in 
the position of writing 'working class novels' whose 'authenticity' was 
being judged primarily by middle or upper class intellectuals and 
readers. Many of their novels were published by the Left Book Club 
and they often found themselves caught up in the controversy over 
what constituted revolutionary writing that filled the pages of the Left 
press. Walter Brierley's novel Means Test Man, for example, reviewed 
in The Daily Worker in 1935, receives praise for communicating the 
mental and spiritual anguish of unemployment to an audience 
unfamiliar with it but is nevertheless charged with embourgeoisement 
because it fails to bring out the fighting spirit of the unemployed. And 
Gwyn Thomas' novel Sorrow for thy Sons was rejected by Gollancz 
because, as he advised, "some of the physical descriptions were so 
realistic as to produce actual nausea" and that "as your audience will be 
99% tender-stomached, you will frighten them all away if you write in 
this fashion" (Miles and Smith, 1987: 153-154). The controversy 
continues to the present about whether such novels as Robert 
Tressell's The Ragged Trousered Philanthropist, Walter Greenwood's 
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Love on the Dole and Lewis Grassic Gibbons, A Scots Quair, are 
genuinely proletarian novels (see Swingewood, 1977; Johnson, 1978; 
Wolmark, 1981). 
There were some Leftists in Britain who followed a more 
Trotskyist line and upheld the importance of cultural continuity in the 
transition to socialism with ideas that had an undeniable Leavisian 
ring to them (Leavis himself had actually praised Trotsky'S continuist 
view of the transition from bourgeois to 'human' culture but 
condemned him for falling back on a materialist notion of culture thus 
laying socialist society open to the same danger from mass culture as 
capitalist society). The writers who fell into this category advocated 
retaining the literature of the past and insisted upon standards which 
would encourage the "full rigour of the language." They were 
concerned with the lack of intellectual rigour of those who claimed to 
be doing Marxist literary criticism. The idea that a piece of writing that 
contained revolutionary ideals was necessarily good socialist literature, 
was condemned as inimical to the construction of a socialist literary 
canon (Left Review, I, No.5, 1935). 
Leftist writers' and critics' response to the phenomenon of mass 
culture in the 1920s and 1930s was characterised by their almost total 
refusal to accept or engage with any form of leisure pursuit that was 
associated with commercial culture. Articles appeared periodically in 
Plebs, attacking the role of the wireless, the cinema, the bourgeois 
theatre and the press as agents of capitalist propaganda, feeding the 
workers seductive dope (Shiach, 1989). Hostility was also expressed 
towards Hollywood cinema and its trashy romances which, it was 
claimed, induced a state of stupor in the audience (Bond, 1979). One 
member of the British Section of The Writer's International urged that 
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writers "give a precise and cogent meaning to the abused word 
'civilisation'" threatened by the "pretentious humbug of democratic 
culture as represented by popular fiction, film, etc." (Left Review, I, No. 
5, 1935: 180). Although revolutionary cinema in the Soviet Union was 
looked upon more favourably, there was nevertheless a clearly stated 
preference on the part of writers for the transformative powers of 
poetry and literature. 
The one form of popular culture that was deemed capable by Left 
intellectuals of representing the workers and their interests was the 
theatre. In the thirties, under the rubric of the Workers' Theatre 
Movement (WTM) various companies were formed like The Group 
Theatre (of whom Auden was a member), Unity theatre, The Left 
Theatre and the Gbsgow Workers' Theatre Group. However, while all 
of the companies were committed to 'socialist theatre,' they interpreted 
this notion rather differently. For Scottish playwright Joe Corrie, for 
example, theatre was a representation of the 'tradition' of the 
'common people.' Similarly, Unity Theatre's aim was to "carryon the 
tradition dating back to the earliest time" when theatre was "a part of 
not separated from the life and ideals of the people." Meanwhile other 
companies experimented with Brechtian or agit-prop theatre taking the 
theatre to parks and political rallies and performing satirical sketches 
against the NationClJ Government in street clothes (Shiach, 1989). 
Generally speaking, British Left intellectuals in the 1930s took 
their cue from their Soviet counterparts in attempting to create the 
terms for a specifically 'proletarian' culture. This entailed their 
adoption of several beliefs and assumptions regarding the class nature 
of culture and cultural products. It led to their insistence on a 
homogeneous working class culture that would be fully realised and 
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come to dominate through the overthrow of capitalism in a certain 
predictable way-thus negating the possibility of mixed realities within 
working class culture or any degree of overlap between bourgeois and 
proletarian cultures, particularly in the face of the influence of mass 
culture. Within literary circles, this notion was played out by writers, 
critics, editors and publishers who assumed the role of determining the 
authenticity of working class/proletarian writing through divergent 
sets of their own criteria, e. g., whether a text reflected the class struggle 
or the struggle against fascism, whether the working classes were 
depicted with a revolutionary class consciousness, whether characters 
communicated in their own dialects (the ones who swore, gambled and 
drank were considered truly representative of their class) and the 
extent to which workers ceased to embody bourgeois values. This 
preoccupation with authenticity, furthermore, led to a predisposition 
towards realist texts as those most able to represent proletarian social 
relations and values. 
In the 1930s, Leavis' concern for the democratisation of culture 
was antithetical to the ultimate goal of the Left-a utopian socialist 
society in which a 'proletarian' culture would replace 'high' culture as 
the dominant cultural expression. Leavis' campaign to form a 
collective sensibility amongst a community of readers-through the 
reading of high cultural texts-was not deemed compatible with this 
agenda. Leavis sought to make culture I commensurable' by claiming 
the collaborative and creative possibilities within language itself to 
establish common access to meanings that were not class or culture 
bound. His appeal to a 'point of view above classes,' however, was 
incompatible with the agenda of both conservatives and radicals of that 
period. Paradoxically, the Left, in opposing Leavis' agenda and 
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emphasising the strengthening of 'proletarian' culture as the workers' 
alternative to high culture, ended up aligned with Eliot and his 
commitment to the idea of incommensurability. Conservatives like 
Eliot had embraced the idea of incommensurablity as a reason to keep 
the class system intact and membership to high culture limited. The 
efforts of the Left to promote working class writers and working class 
themes, though they helped to legitimate working class culture, 
simultaneously served this conservative interest. In the end, the Left's 
efforts on behalf of working class culture encouraged the maintenance 
of class divisions, particularly because, in practice, the production of 
proletarian literature and/or literature with socially real 'proletarian' 
themes was not accompanied by a challenge to the traditional canon 
itself. Marxists like Auden and Spender, for example, continued to 
generate and estabIish their own poems, novels and essays within the 
traditional high cultural canons to which they, by virtue of their social 
class origins, remained unquestionably attached. 
While the participants in the culture debates of the 1920s and 
1930s differed markedly amongst themselves in terms of their political 
and ideological aims or beliefs, they were nonetheless united in their 
interest in specifying the conditions under which a particular culture 
could flourish within the increasing climate of economic 
individualism in Britain. All were concerned to develop the cultural 
means that had to be in place in order to combat the influx and effect of 
mass culture. They were all also concerned to broaden the categories of 
what constituted legitimate culture, although conservatives like Eliot 
were not interested in broadening class access to these categories. Some 
on the Left were committed to the maintenance of class-based cultures 
within a classless society, and none questioned their own role as a 
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vanguard or a miliority culture in determining what was or was not 
legitimately proletarian. The paradoxes that emerged, and that were 
not easily reconciled, amongst these competing concerns in the 1930s, 
particularly the inherent contradictions in a leftist incommensurability 
argument, would reappear in slightly different form, as the 
interrelationship of class, culture and cultural products continued to be 
discussed in the period following the second World War when the 
range of participants in the debates underwent an important 
transforma tion. 
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Chapter Three 
The Culture Debates in the 1950s and 1960s 
The New Cultural Critics 
When the culture debates re-emerged in post-war Britain, many 
of the issues which had featured in the debates in the 1920s and 1930s 
reappeared-but this time within a more established and elaborated 
welfare state with some key social reforms having addressed the major 
problems of poverty and unemployment. If at the beginning of the 
fifties, however, it appeared to politicians in both parties that a social 
revolution had occurred, by the middle of the decade, it was clear that 
this was not the case. Just as the nation seemed to be restored to order 
(and as far as many Tories were concerned the old order), signs of 
dissent and discontent began to surface from within divergent 
segments of the ... population. Some of this dissatisfaction was 
motivated by an increasing distrust that old Tory values were making a 
comeback under Churchill's ageing government. A major catalyst for 
this dissent, however, was the breakdown of the class and social 
structure that had resulted from post-war social and economic reforms 
(Addison, 1985; Howarth, 1985; Sissons and French, 1986). 
Suburbanisation and the construction of massive urban housing 
estates had altered patterns of family and community life and 
educational restructuring had begun to have an impact on social 
mobility and inter-generational relationships within families. 
Moreover, the 'coming of affluence' of the 1950s became the gateway to 
the new technological age of motorways, supermarkets, televisions and 
fully automated assembly lines of the 1960s which also contributed 
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significantly to the transformation of social and cultural relations 
(Booker, 1969; Sinfield, 1989). 
Due to the ~ocial shifts that had taken place since the war, the 
lines had become blurred with regard to who could say what 
constituted 'culture' of whatever kind. Participants in the culture 
debates in the 1950s and 1960s included: a newly constructed 'literary 
elite,' which contained a mixture of conservative and progressive 
elements and included members from diverse class backgrounds; the 
continued influence of the Leavises' literary criticism and critique of 
mass culture, though there were attempts to adapt Leavisism to post-
war social realities; the members of the New Left who attempted to 
reconstruct a radical theory of culture and society in light of post-war 
developments, and in particular, to reconsider the relationship 
between mass culture and class culture under capitalism; and the 
producers and consumers of mass culture who felt the need to defend 
their 'art' to the cultural critics. The debates also continued to be 
influenced by an expanding literature on mass culture from both 
Europe and the United States and an already existing literature from 
the Frankfurt School, many of whose members had found temporary 
refuge in the United States during the war. 
Some of the first signs of discontent in the post-war era came 
from the southern suburbs of London's working class sectors by way of 
the 'teddy boys' in around 1953. The forerunners of the trend of post-
war youth sub-cultures that would appear in Britain, they expropriated 
the style of the Edwardian upper class to express their alienation with 
that class and their resentment at being "left out of the upward 
mobility of post-war British affluence" (Brake, 1985: 73). Deprived of 
access to better jobs and grammar school educations, they responded, 
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sometimes violently, by cultivating a cultural territory of their own in 
snack-bars and cinemas accompanied by fifties style rock and roll 
(Melly, 1972; Bedarida, 1979; Bennett, et. aI, 1981). But while the teddy 
boys remained a 'subcultural' group, other members of the working 
classes emerged who began to challenge the dominant culture of the 
mid-fifties from within. Most of them were first generation recipients 
of grammar school educations, the products of post-war social reforms 
which had included an expanding educational sector that attempted to 
introduce a system based on merit rather than birth. Particularly 
relevant to the culture debates were the novelists, poets and 
playwrights from the upwardly mobile urban working classes who 
began to appear on the scene, introducing themes of working class and 
lower middle class life, making these legitimate subject-matter for 
literature, the theatre and the cinema. In contrast to the proletarian 
novelists of the thirties, with some exceptions, these writers spoke by, 
for and about themselves. In novels like Colin MacInnes, Absolute 
Beginners, Alan Sillitoe's, The Loneliness of a Long Distance Runner, 
and Saturday Night Sunday Morning, and David Storey's, This 
Sporting Life, and plays like Shelagh Delaney'S, A Taste of Honey, 
Arnold Wesker's, Roots, John Osborne's, Look Back in Anger, and 
Keith Waterhouse's, Billy Liar, for example, working and lower middle 
class life was portrayed to middle class audiences, while 
simultaneously often dealing ambiguously with the social future of the 
protagonists. 
Other 'Movement' writers who appeared on the literary scene in 
the 1950s, Philip Larkin, Kingsley Amis, John Wain and John Braine 
amongst them, were not so much interested in legitimating working 
class culture as in carving out a space for the legitimacy of their own 
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independent judgements in the face of the traditional literary elite and 
the modernist trends of the previous decades. Theirs was a rebellion 
against the traditional elite but not necessarily a challenge to the very 
notion of middle class, bourgeois culture. They adopted a stance which 
was at once class conscious and accepting of class divisions, combining 
"subversive irreverence" with "a fantasy for social advance" (Booker, 
1969). These tensions are played out in their novels and poems where 
nostalgia, conservatism, cowardice and compromise are characteristics 
commonly found in the protagonists (Rabinowitz, 1967; Morrison, 
1980; Stevenson, 1986; Bradbury, 1988). 
Reactions to the emerging social and political formations in 
post-war 1950's Britain were not limited to rebellious youth groups and 
a newly constituted literati, however. The seeds of a more broadly 
focused new radicalism also emerged in Britain at this time which 
evolved into the New Left. Made up primarily of intellectuals and 
academics, the New Left were committed to "the clarification and 
definition of theory as a precondition of mass political action" (Inglis, 
1982: 177).1 In the pages of the New Left Review, this group of ex-
1 There was increasing hostility, expressed in political terms, toward the British 
government's international policies spurred on by the Eden government's decision in 
1956 to send troops to overthrow Nassar in response to the nationalization of the 
Suez Canal. Members of 'the bomb generation' saw Suez as representative of their 
government's desire for economic expansion at any cost and associated the action 
with cold war 'atomic bomb' style politics. In 1958, the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND) was formed as a symbol of resistance to government policy on 
atomic warfare. CND-!..."'1.d The Committee of 100 (an arm of the organization which 
advocated civil disobedience) were influential in both bringing to public attention 
the realities of nuclear war and making the issue of unilateral disarmament a 
political one that neither party could ignore. The organization, sponsored and 
supported by aristocrats, students, artists and politicians alike, replaced the 
influence of the Labour Party and (to a lesser extent ) the Communist Party on 
middle class intellectuals; both parties had begun to lose credibility, the former 
because its socialist agenda had been abandoned in favor of 'Establishment' 
political solutions and the latter due to Soviet policy and the invasion of Hungary 
(Ryder and Silver, 1977). 
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communists and socialists, some of whom had been activists since the 
thirties, attempted to reconstitute their ideological position following 
the Soviet Union's invasion of Hungary and in the face of the 
increasing reformist tendencies of the Labour Party. As Inglis recalls, 
For all those persuaded by total war that socialism was 
desirable and possible, the same light was dreadfully dimmed 
by Stalinism. If we take 1956 as the point of departure for 
what came to be known as the New Left, then its significant 
moment was the moment of Suez and Budapest. All that was 
gradually being learned about Stalinist Russia by that date 
was thrown into hideous relief as the champions of socialist 
freedom shot the socialist insurrections of Hungary and Poland 
to pieces with tanks. At the same time Old Corruption at home 
had lied in its teeth to Parliament and the Allies, and 
launched the ludicrous adventure of the Suez landings. Eden's 
and M.~cMil1an's governments were bound tightly into the lies 
of the Cold War, the deadly race for ever more ruinous 
weaponry, the grudging extension of a capital-dependent 
independence to the colonial territories. These were the signs 
of the times, and signs were taken for wonders. It was time for 
new signs and images, if not for theories (Inglis, 1982: 159). 
Some of these new signs and images came by way of the visual 
arts world, which by the 1960s, had witnessed the arrival of 'pop' art. 
The spread and success of pop culture throughout British society 
provoked a significant shift in the post-war culture debates. Its 
undeniable relationship to mass culture, and eventually high culture, 
forced a reassessment of the universal rejection of mass/popular 
culture that had characterised the debates in the 1920s and 1930s. One 
of the earlier attempts to question the cultural significance of pop art 
came from a group which formed in the early fifties and called itself 
the Independent Group. Among its members was Richard Hamilton 
whose famous 1956 collage, Just What is it that Makes Today's Homes 
so Different, so Appealing?, expressed a fascination with the products 
coming out of urban popular culture, especially from the United States 
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(Lucie-Smith, 1989), while at the same time implying a certain irony. 
The discussions held by members of this group included many of the 
themes already evident in the culture debates. This time, however, the 
backdrop was a modernising society, more enthusiastic about the 
products of mass culture across all class and cultural lines. As Melly 
recalls, 
[They] began to meet regularly at the Dover Street premises of 
the LCA. to discuss what Mario Amaya has defined as " ... the 
paradox of the creative individual in a mass-think society." 
At first this activity seems to have been an attempt to resurrect 
the concept of the artist as a Universal Man in the context of an 
increasingly complex civilisation, and with this in mind 
various aspects of science and technology, philosophy and 
linguistics were discussed side by side with such "debased" 
forms of popular culture as American comic books; but as the 
majority of the group were artists, they found their interest 
more and more centred on the despised aesthetics of a society 
geared for profit and turn-over, and in particular with the 
mass-produced dream which had evolved to help sell the ever 
growing flood of products and objects: the lurnpen-fantasy world 
of long-limbed compliant girls, fast cars, penthouses, 
streamlined violence and neon lights reflected in private 
swimming pools. Almost accidentally the group had brought to 
light a potent myth (Melly, 1970: 13-14). 
Significantly, it was in the context of debating this "potent myth" of 
mass culture that discussions about the continuing role for literature 
and literary criticism would take place in the post-war period. 
The Role of Literature and Culture-the Debates Revisited 
The Old and New Literary Elite 
After World War II several divergent groups of novelists and 
poets emerged to form what would become by the end of the 1950s a 
new / old literary elite. There was the 'old'-i. e. those who had been 
writing since before the war-elite, which included writers like Evelyn 
Waugh, Anthony Powell, William Plomer and Angela Thirkell, whose 
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responses to the post-war restructuring of society varied from 
resignation to resistance. From Waugh's classic, Brideshead Revisited, 
to Thirkell's more populist, Private Enterprise, the characters in their 
novels looked back regretfully to the established order that was no 
more. Like Eliot, they were of the opinion that the traditional class 
system had served a necessary function and that "to muddle it up, as 
was happening, was only to confuse the system that sorted out, as it 
were, which human letter should go into which social envelope" 
(Pryce-Jones, 1986: 204). 
There were also figures from the old 'radical' elite like Graham 
Greene and George Orwell who, though they continued to explore 
social and intellectual phenomena, had been unalterably affected by the 
war. The effects were clearly present in their writing which tended to 
prophesy gloom and a sense of collapse, as in Orwell's, 1984, and 
Greene's, Heart of the Matter. The war and developments under the 
Soviet system, changed their relationship (and that of others from the 
Auden-Spender group) to Marxism and also changed their attitude 
towards the political responsibility of the writer. Greene converted to 
Catholicism and Orwell, as early as 1940, in his influential essay, 
"Inside the Whale," expressed disillusion with the Left and a growing 
fear of totalitarianism. He concluded by advocating quietism, "robbing 
reality of its terror simply by submitting to it" (Orwell, 1957: 48). 
The newest members of the literary elite came from the group of 
working class and lower middle class writers and poets referred to 
above. These writers (with some exceptions) rejected the modernist 
texts of Virginia Woolf or James Joyce in favour of the type of realism 
and concern for social and moral themes found in 19th century British 
novels. William Cooper, whose 1950 novel, Scenes from a Provincial 
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Life, has been considered a major influence on many of these novelists 
(and whose title recalls George Eliot's, Middlemarch, A Study of 
Provincial Life), emphatically rejected the "Experimental novel" 
because of its stress on "Man-alone" rather than "Man-in-Society" 
(Stevenson, 1986: 129-130). Although Cooper went so far as to suggest 
that the romantics, existentialists and modernists made "the ripest 
meat for authoritarianism and then totalitarianism," most of this new 
group of writers rejected these traditions on aesthetic and philosophical 
grounds, not political ones (Rabinowitz, 1967: 31). Influenced by A. J. 
Ayer at Oxford and Wittenstein at Cambridge, many of these writers 
submitted to a belief in logical positivism, which had strong English 
roots, against the existentialism of the Continent. They considered the 
fictional and poetic themes presented through logical analysis and 
rationalism socially more progressive that the visions of chaos and 
anarchy found in much modernist writing (Rabinowitz, 1967: 31) 
In general, the novelists and poets who emerged in the 1950s 
were distinctly uninterested in questioning in political terms (Marxist 
or otherwise) the relationship between literature and society. This is 
not to suggest tha~,the writers who emerged during this period never 
engaged in political activity or included political themes in their work. 
Many of them, for example, participated in the CND movement. 
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that Orwell's disillusionment with 
the Left was a major influence in determining their attitudes towards 
politics-that they felt themselves to be more politically mature and 
"not so starry-eyed" as the Marxists of the 1930s (Rabinowitz, 1967: 32). 
This attitude, however, has equally been seen as designed primarily to 
serve an already strong conservative impulse in the group (Morrison, 
1980: 96); and that, in spite of their 'angry' images, many of these 
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writers were actually backward looking, tied to the traditional 
overarching class structure of Britain and desirous of assimilation 
"into the ideal pattern of the old intellectual class" (Shils, 1955: 15). 
The following remarks made by Kingsley Amis in 1960 are illustrative 
of just how angry he was, 
When Ilook back on the Fifties, I can see, despite the quarts of 
adrenaline they made me release at times, small cause for 
complaint in matters affecting me personally. The world of 
letters, into which I finally contrived to infiltrate, proved 
benign, not at all in the grip of that "London literary racket" I 
had heard so much about before I got there. It contains, to be 
sure, some persons of more influence than ability, but however 
"disquieting" their existence may be, they have never done me 
any harm that I know of. And, starting off as a non-Etonian 
without acquaintances in that world, I found it a surprisingly 
easy one to move about in (Amis, 1960: 10). 
In 1955, in response to an article in Encounter in which Edward 
Shils calls British intellectuals to task for being too "at ease with the 
symbols of sovereign authority," John Wain (named in the article as 
one of the guilty), agrees that what Shils had written was "incontestably 
true." A large part of the problem, they concur, is the continued 
dominance of the Oxbridge-London circles of influence and the failure 
of the intellectual community to bestow equal status on the 'redbrick' 
provincial universities in spite of their high standards. Wain discusses 
"the English tendency to equate 'culture' with education and social 
status" and suggests that out of the many undergraduates enrolled at 
Oxford and Cambridge "perhaps more than half are consciously using 
the university as a means of crossing the fence from one class to 
another." He concludes that, "the more able members of the working 
and lower middle classes are diverted from the task of creating a 
'culture' which would reflect the milieu from which they came" 
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(Wain, 1955: 68).2 Thus, in spite of tensions within the culture and the 
impact of working and lower middle class representation within 
literary circles, ultimately old and new members gradually came 
together in a replenishment of a literary elite. 
It would be wrong to suggest that all of the new writers were 
equally willing to join or were welcome in established literary circles, 
however. A certain tension can be noted, for example, in a review of 
Alan Sillitoe's work in a piece for the New Statesman written in 1961. 
In what is written as a favourable review of Sillitoe's success in 
"making the deprived something better than unthinkable," there are 
nevertheless undertones of class positioning in comments like 
" ... What hindsight allows is that the book's main achievement was to 
have caught and rendered a class context unfamiliar to most readers 
and writers of novels," "Mr. Sillitoe is best when he keeps to the 
realities of his background," "Mr. Sillitoe's novel doesn't satisfy one's 
habitual demands on the genre: organisation, direction, a denouement 
of sorts/' and finally, "This is the kind of tiresome allegory that Rex 
Warner used to confound us with and in Mr. Sillitoe's hands it is even 
less satisfying, demanding as it does a quality of intellectual stamina 
that he notably lacks." (Coleman, 1961). Similarly, works by 
playwrights like Shelagh Delaney, Joan Littlewood, and Keith 
Waterhouse were cdticised in the mainstream press (Hunt, 1961). 
2 The insidious effects of the class system on many of the 'Movement' writers is most 
apparent when one considers how they became positioned within their own critiques 
of class. For example, it has been suggested that their attempts to attack upper 
middle class pretensiousness often appear more as attacks on the aping of upper 
middle class values by the provincial bourgeoisie, of which many of them were 
members. Moreover, in attacking the cosmopolitanism of the upper middle classes in 
their novels, they adopted an insular 'little England' attitude for themselves 
which made them appear to be closed off to anything foreign, particularly 
European. Thus, social values like elitist culture and metropolitan patronizing of 
the provinces were ultimately preserved (Morrison, 1986). 
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During this period there was one important attempt, through 
Arnold Wesker's Centre 42, to challenge the assimilationist tendencies 
described above and to engage art with politics. Wesker, one of the 
group of Left working class playwrights to emerge after the war, was 
concerned that although post-war reforms had made it possible for 
more members of the public to engage in cultural activities, people, 
and in particular the working classes, needed to become aware of the 
relevance of the arts in their everyday lives. He was also aware of the 
reality that his work and that of others like him was becoming either 
co-opted or marginalised by the established literary elite and, in both 
cases, defused of its 'revolutionising' potential. For Wesker, the only 
hope of avoiding this was to radically alter the means by which art was 
produced, supported and distributed within society. In order to achieve 
this aim he brought together a network that included artists, trade 
unionists and Labour politicians who supported his vision of bridging 
the gap between the production of artistic works and their reception in 
working communities all over England. 
Wesker's campaign, however, quickly found itself entangled in 
the question of what rightly constituted culture in a post-war society in 
which the meaning of terms like 'high brow,' 'popular,' 'middle brow,' 
'mass,' 'pop' and 'working class' culture had become unclear. Wesker, 
while stressing the not-for-profit aspect of his project, showed a 
preference for what traditionally was considered high art or traditional 
popular art while expressing a disdain for pop culture. As he remarked 
in a lecture in Birmingham in 1966, where he presented himself as an 
artist and a playwright "not a theoretician:" 
The society in which we live belongs to the Beatles not to 
Proko·,':ev. No matter how much you know that the depths 
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stirred in you by a Prokoviev violin concerto are more profound 
than those stirred by a Beatles lament yet you cannot say this. 
You cannot say this because the moment you state your 
preference you immediately challenge the personality of the 
person whose preference you do not share ... In a discussion I once 
had with two of the world's top pop singers one of them 
compared the value of their music to the value of Shakespeare. 
What kind of self-confident immodesty is abroad that 
encourages a pop singer to make such comparisons? And what 
language do we have with which to confront his claim? 
(Weskc;', 1966: 4). 
Wesker's cultural 'judgements' did not go unnoticed by some 
members of the Left who accused him of "playing the bourgeois game," 
"indoctrinating the working classes with 'Higher Forms of Art'," 
"imposing his own values on the underprivileged" and "operating 
with a bourgeois concept of culture" (Coppetiers, 1975). Wesker, 
however, saw himself as battling against what he perceived (with 
Leavis-like conviction) as the trade unions increasing collusion with 
capitalism and the mass culture industry and the increasing 
commodification of art in the age of mass culture.3 Moreover, since 
Wesker's anti-capitalist sentiments made him seem hostile to the Tory 
government's Minster of the Arts, Centre 42 found itself open to 
criticism from conservatives as welL He and Centre 42 thus fell victim 
3 Initially, Wesker's proposal for a Centre which would serve as "a cultural hub, 
which by its approach and work, will destroy the mystique and snobbery associated 
with the arts" received the endorsement of the trade unions whose support was 
considered crucial for making it a truly grassroots endeavor (Deller, 1961; 
Coppetiers, 1975). Within a short time however, Wesker and his organization 
found themselves involved in political battles and financial troubles which 
undermined the ability of the Centre to accomplish its original aims. For example, 
despite support from lo~al union groups, the TUC General Council failed to endorse 
Centre 42 as its sole cultural arm. Also, cooperation from the Arts Council was 
sporadic and their financial contributions remained minimal. In the end, the Centre 
increasingly found itself relying for funds on connections in the commercial sector or 
on members of the upper classes, the traditional patrons of the arts (Coppetiers, 
1975). The result was that, as Coppetiers suggests, "a project which had intended to 
enable artists and producers to own the means of their livelihood was increasingly 
being governed by the criterion of profit, with the producers as simple employees" 
(Coppetiers, 1975: 48). 
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to tensions in the post-war period between the restructuring of society, 
on the one hand, und the redefinition of culture on the other, leaving 
important questions about the role of art and the artist in society 
unresolved. 
Leavisism 
During the post-war period, Leavis and Scrutiny continued to 
have an impact in the British literary world and, increasingly, in the 
United States. Although Scrutiny's regular readership expanded as did 
the number of contributors, the inner circle of the 1930s began to 
disband, either as. a consequence of the war, due to commitments 
elsewhere, or in the case of Q. D. Leavis, when illness prevented her 
from continuing. The cultural community so essential to 'the critical 
revolution' thus began to weaken and two tendencies emerged in the 
journal during this period-one liberal and modern the other 
conservative and regressive (Hayman, 1976; Mulhern, 1981). More 
importantly however, the social and economic shifts that had occurred 
since the war provided a very different backdrop for the Leavises' 
efforts on behalf of standards in criticism and against the effects of mass 
culture and industrialisation. As a consequence, Leavis (and Scrutiny) 
found themselves in several paradoxical situations. 
First, in contrast to the 1930s when the Leavises had stood 
outside of the literary elite, they now found themselves a part of it, yet 
they continued to view it with hostility. The "rebellion of the Lower 
Middle Brows" (Stephen Spender'S swipe at the class background of the 
new literary elite), which they themselves had participated in, was felt 
to have been achieved by the middle of the 1950s. The novelists, poets 
and critics who became prominent in the 1950s no longer came 
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predominantly from the upper classes-the dominance of the 
Bloomsbury group and of the Auden-Spender line was overturned in 
favour of the celebration of "the values of little-British decency" and 
the "rise of provincialism"-both of which were at the heart of the 
Leavisite call for cultural continuity (see Bradbury, 1956; Green, 1959). 
In spite of this seeming victory however, Leavis was unimpressed by 
what he considered the mere replacement of one metropolitan literary 
clique for another. He criticised members of the new literary elite for 
their lack of rigour and failure to resist the discontinuities in standards 
of literature of the past with those of the present. To members of the 
literati, Leavis appeared to be attempting to slay a dragon that had 
already been slain. In their view, the challenge to the 'highbrow' 
culture of the old elite from the 'middlebrow' culture of a new elite 
had for all intents and purposes been accomplished. Furthermore, they 
questioned the idea that it was possible to judge contemporary 
literature by the standards of literature that had survived from the past. 
By the end of the decade, the Leavises and Scrutiny were already 
considered in certain literary circles a thing (albeit of value) of the past 
(Watson, 1977; Mulhern, 1981; Bradbury, 1988 and see Critical 
Quarterly, 1959; 245-257). 'The function of criticism' as defined by 
Leavis had served its purpose. As Mulhern suggests, 
[Leavis] had inherited the humanism of "the intellectual 
aristocracy" but not its patrician ease; he asserted a specific 
and normative Englishness but was still too much a 
"cosmopolitan" to settle for the gnawing, cheated chauvinism 
of Little England. Leavisian discourse in its high period-the 
Scrutiny years-cannot be assimilated either to the old, 
imperial literary culture or to its "provincial" successor: its 
distinctive shape was that of the transition between them 
(Mulhern, 1990: 262). 
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Leavis' insistence on a lead role for a university-educated 
intellectual vanguard also proved incongruous with post-war social 
realities. As early as 1943 in "Education and the University: A Sketch 
for an English School" Leavis had laid out his vision of an inter-
disciplinary liberal education programme for the English Tripos at 
Cambridge which would provide a training in "sensibility and 
intelligence together." The programme reiterated the importance of an 
elite who would "check and control the blind drive onwards of 
material and mechanical development, with its human consequences" 
(Leavis, 1943). However, by the 1940s and increasingly during the 
1950s, a campaign against the "blind drive onwards" was itself blind to 
the attitudes emerging in Britain. Both social and economic policy 
were being shaped, around the idea of social planning and economic 
efficiency for the new technological age (Ryder and Silver, 1977). In the 
context of a modernising, technologising sOciety, Leavis' continued 
concern for and defence of culture began to sound at best quixotic and 
at worst an Eliot-like form of elitism (the largely negative reaction to 
Leavis' critical response to the printed version of C. P. Snow's 1959 
lecture, The Two Cultures, is illustrative of the general attitude 
towards Leavis amongst many intellectuals at the time (see Hayman, 
1976: 111-118; this debate will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Four). 
Likewise, while Leavis continued to talk about the negative 
impact of mass culture, others-including many radicals who in the 
1930s would have shared this view-were beginning to reconsider 
aspects of it. As suggested earlier, the emergence of 'pop' culture in the 
1950s and 1960s had forced a reconsideration of their attitudes toward 
culture in general and mass culture in particular, and in the process, 
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arguments against mass culture began to get rearticulated. 
Organisations like the National Union of Teachers and government-
sponsored educational studies like the Nuffled Report (1958), the 
Crowther Report (1959) and the Pilkington Report (1962) began to 
include analysis and commentary on such themes as 'popular culture 
and personal responsibility,' 'the mass media' and 'television and the 
child' (Hall and Whannel, 1964). While most of the studies were 
conservative in tone, advising caution as to the value and effects of 
mass culture, they nevertheless acknowledged mass culture as a major 
influence in British society in general, and on young people in 
particular. In this context, many Leavisites, with their continued 
attention to notions like 'tradition,' 'cultural heritage' and 'minority 
culture,' began to sound defensive and nostalgic. Moreover, since their 
preoccupation with the erosion of cultural authority and their call for a 
minority culture were linked to the deleterious effects of mass culture 
on British society, when mass culture began to penetrate and be 
accepted in the lives of the majority of people, their claims in general 
began to carry less and less weight. 
In spite of growing antagonism towards Leavis during this 
period however, his ideas continued to inform the culture debates and 
influence the direction which they took. The textbook, Culture and 
Environment, which Leavis and Denys Thompson had written in 1933 
as a basis for training in discrimination in secondary schools 
continued to have a powerful impact on secondary school teachers 
with its conviction that literature was the central humanising 
experience and that critical discrimination should be seen as a morally 
educative experience (Mathieson, 1975: 138-139). His influence also 
continued to be felt within certain circles of the New Left. Figures like 
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Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams, for example, in attempting 
to theorise the relationship between politics and culture, relied on 
certain categories developed within Leavisian aesthetics and criticism 
(Hoggart, 1957; Williams, 1958; Watson, 1977; Mulhern, 1981). 
However, it was also within these same circles that Leavis' 
contribution to the practice of criticism was gradually perceived as no 
longer relevant to the concerns of contemporary cultural studies. 
Some of the reasons for this have been discussed above: his reluctance 
to accept the inevitability of mass culture; his call for an educated 
minority; and his criticism of contemporary literary culture. However, 
other reasons must be considered that arose from attempts within 
Leftist circles to construct a theory of culture and society in the post-war 
era and a literary criticism that was compatible with its agenda. 
The New Left 
The New Left, in addition to its interest in national and 
international economic and political issues, attempted to articulate a 
theory that dealt with culture and society. Like members of the British 
Left of the 1930s, its members turned their attention to exploring the 
relationship between culture, capitalism and class-though this time 
without the Soviet Union as a model and within the context of the 
welfare state. Like the Leftists of the 1930s, however, similar tensions 
and contradictions emerged in the construction of such a theory-and 
in turning theory into practice as Wesker's attempts suggest-
particularly since by the 1950s and increasingly in the 1960s, mass 
culture was something that all classes, including the working classes, 
were in a position to produce as well as to buy. 
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The New Left emerged in the mid-fifties at a time when events 
occurring nationally and internationally forced members of the Left to 
re-evaluate their political theories and allegiances. During this period, 
a space emerged for discussion and debate of Marxist theory in general, 
and the relationship between literature and society within a Marxian 
framework in particular. Some of the challenges which arose for the 
British New Left within these debates were: to theorise the relationship 
between class, culture and politics under capitalism; to explore the 
revolutionary potential (or lack thereof) of a mass culture in capitalist 
society; and to re-examine Marxism with respect to the function of 
literature (and art in general) in society. 
One of the main issues that had arisen within Marxist theory 
during this period centred around clarifying and refining Marx's 
distinction between the economic or material base and the 
superstructural phenomena of a given society. The aim was to better 
define the relationship between these two, and the question of the 
relative autonomy of superstructural phenomena like art, music and 
especially literature found its way into the culture debates in Britain as 
well. Whereas the Marxism that had informed the debates about 
literature in the 1930s had reflected the tendencies of that period 
toward a fairly simplistic, deterministic understanding of the 
base/superstructure relationship, by the 1960s this relationship was 
understood by the British New Left to be more complex, due in large 
part to the increasing availability of and interest in the writings of 
European Marxists. By the 1960s key works by European Marxists as 
diverse as Althusser, Gramsci, Lukacs, Goldmann, Adorno, Benjamin 
and Brecht began to have a decisive influence. 
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Two key figures, Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams, 
played a formative role in defining the direction taken by the culture 
debates within the Left in the 1950s and beyond in Britain. Initially, at 
least, they relied on categories from literary criticism of the Leavisian 
kind in theorising the relationship between literature and society. 
Hoggart's influential, The Uses of Literacy, which appeared in 1957 
brought Leavis' method of practical criticism out of a purely 'literary' 
culture and applied it to the culture of a community, and more 
specifically, the working class community in which Hoggart had been 
raised. Intended in part as a critique of the impact of mass culture on 
the working class way of life, the book was the first of a new trend in 
cultural and literary studies to emphasise personal experience and then 
to theorise that, i. e., "to treat social life as a literary text and to revise 
the valuation of that life then in genteel circulation" (Inglis, 1982: 163). 
Just as Leavis had advocated reading a literary text for the values and 
meanings it embodied, so Hoggart set out to 'read' his working class 
community for its lived culture, as enacted in the arrangements of 
everyday living. While some have seen his approach as ultimately 
one which superficialised and depoliticised proletarian culture along 
the lines of Orwell's, Road to Wigan Pier (Swingewood, 1977: 58-59), 
Hoggart's approach has also been identified as an important 
breakthrough in dispensing with the high culture/popular culture 
divide (Bennett, et. a1., 1981). For in providing a model for 'criticism' 
of cultural forms other than those traditionally associated with high 
culture, The Uses of Literacy "renamed the ordinary to make it once 
again the fabulous" (Inglis, 1982: 168) and in the process, problematised 
the very constitution of culture. Ironically, while it pointed to a role 
beyond the literary world for Leavisian criticism, it simultaneously 
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served as an indictment of traditional Leavisian criticism for limiting 
the cultural forms worthy of scrutiny. At the same time however, 
judged within the terms of a Marxist aesthetic theory, Hoggart's 
approach did not go far enough for it failed to locate the specific social 
and historical determinations of his working class 'text.' Thus, while 
his project to legitimate forms of working class culture was a radical 
departure from traditional literary criticism (and helped establish what 
would become the new movement in Cultural Studies), the task of 
situating literary culture within an explicitly Marxian framework 
remained. 
During this time, Raymond Williams had already begun what 
would develop into a lifelong 'dialogue' with Marxism.4 Within the 
climate of struggle and negotiation over the very definition(s) of 
culture he, along w:ith other participants in the culture debates, began 
searching for a theory of culture within which to situate and defend 
their claims (while Williams was undeniably one of the main figures 
during this period who attempted to discuss culture within a Marxist 
framework, he was part of a general trend amongst the British New 
Left to try to incorporate several (often divergent) strands of European 
Marxism into British social and cultural theory). Williams' book, 
Culture and Society, which appeared in 1958 was an important 
contribution to the discussions of culture and class that emerged in this 
4 Williams 'dialogue,'was largely with himself for much of the period of the 1940s 
and early 1950s (see Hoggart and Williams, 1960; Thompson, 1961 and Williams, 
1977). As far as members of the literary elite were concerned, they were turning 
away from Marxism and from the Continent as sources of inspiration or influence. It 
was with the emergence of the New Left in the mid-fifties that Williams found a 
home and it in tum found an unofficial leader of sorts. This is not to suggest that 
Williams' work was taken up uncritically by his supporters on the Left. E. P. 
Thompson, for example, in a review of, The Long Revolution, which Williams 
published in the early sixties, took him to task for understating the importance of 
the class struggle in his analysis of culture (see Thompson, 1961). 
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post-war context. In Britain, few other theories of literature and society 
emerged during this period to challenge those being developed by 
Williams and others via Marxist theory. The literary reviews and 
academic literary journals, for example, were not dedicated to 
developing explicit theories of literature. And Leavisism had always 
been by its very nature idiosyncratic, not grounded in any explicit 
theory or principle but instead based on individual responses to the 
language of literature. In contrast to the 1930s when a Leavisian 
aesthetic was deemed more rigorous than the predominant Marxist 
one-in spite of his refusal to ground his practice in any particular 
theory-in the 1960s the anti-theoretical nature of his criticism 
contributed to its increasingly marginalised status. Williams, by then a 
Marxist, sought to develop a version of a Marxist aesthetic theory to 
inform and critique the tradition of literary criticism in Britain. His 
interests were gradually taken up by certain Left intellectuals who 
viewed his attempt to 'socially situate' literature as an important 
contribution toward their post-war efforts to redefine the role of high 
culture, working class culture, mass culture and the 'tradition.' 
Williams, in conversation with Richard Hoggart in 1960, expressed the 
need for such redefinition in a tone which conveys a sense of personal 
urgency, 
... Getting the tradition right was getting myself right, and 
that meant changing both myself and the usual version of the 
tradition. I think this is one of the problems we're both 
conscious of; moving out of a working class home into an 
academic curriculum, absorbing it first and then later, trying to 
get the two experiences into relation (Hoggart and Williams, 
1960: 26). 
In order to initiate a change from the "usual version of the 
tradition," Williams turned to Marxist literary critics, Georg Lukacs and 
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Lucien Goldmann. Both Lukacs and later Goldmann used the notion 
of a "world vision"-which Goldmann defined as "the whole complex 
of ideas, aspirations and feelings which links together the members of a 
social group (a group which in most cases assumes the existence of a 
social class) and which opposes them to members of other social 
groups"-to evaluate literary texts (Goldmann, 1964: 17). According to 
Goldmann, the value of a literary work could be determined by an 
author's ability to successfully encapsulate the "collective group 
consciousness" of a particular historical moment within the internal 
structure of a text. Goldmann and Lukacs understood a particular 
historical moment to be defined by class struggle and both believed that 
a "world vision" was expressed only in "great" literature by those few 
"exceptional individuals who either actually achieve or come very 
near to achieving a completely integrated and coherent view of what 
they and the social class to which they belong are trying to do" 
(Goldmann, 1964: 17). 
Lukacs belleved in a rather mechanical correlation between 
literature and class/economic structures and considered great only 
those novels written prior to 1848, when the bourgeois writer was still 
a participant in the class struggle and not a reactionary opponent of the 
proletarian class. His critique of modernism was in part based on the 
belief that it reflected the decline of the bourgeoisie as a class engaged in 
struggle over material conditions. For Lukacs, only bourgeois realist 
writers like Balzac and Dickens succeeded in depicting 'types' in their 
novels-elements which synthesised "the general and the particular 
both in characters J.nd in situations" (Lukacs, 1950: 6). Goldmann was 
open to a broader historical range of great works and more aware than 
Lukacs of viewing the literary text itself rather than society as the 
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starting point in literary criticism. He believed that the notion of a 
homology of structures rather than a mere reflection of content 
between the social 'totality' and literary texts was the key to literary 
analysis (Goldman,)964: 89-102). 
For Williams, Lukacs and Goldmann provided a theory of 
literature that situated a novel or poem in a social context and that 
identified organising principles, similar to his structures of feeling, by 
which a particular world view operated in consciousness. 
Acknowledging the influence of Goldmann on his thinking, Williams 
said, 
... We should not then mainly study peripheral relations: 
correspondences of content and background; overtly social 
relations between writers and readers. We should study, in the 
greatest literature, the organising categories, the essential 
structt.!res, which give works their unity, their specific 
aesthetic character, their strictly literary quality; and which 
at the same time reveal to us the maximum possible 
consciousness of the social group-in real terms, the social 
class-which finally created them, in and through their 
individual authors (Williams, 1971: 13). 
In spite of Williams' early attempts to distance himself from 
traditional literary criticism however, only one notion distinguishes 
the above definition of literary criticism from Leavis' critical method-
the appeal to a social class consciousness. Phrases like "the greatest 
literature," "specific aesthetic character," and "strictly literary quality" 
are categories foun.d in Leavisian criticism. Moreover, neither Lukacs' 
nor Goldmann's literary criticism avoided one kind of 'elitism' often 
associated with Leavis' literary criticism in their preference for the 
'great' literature of the past and dismissal of much contemporary 
literature (Glucksmann, 1979) especially given that their methods (at 
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least in Britain) W2re never made accessible to or practised by more 
than a 'critical minority' (Watson, 1977; Widdowson, 1982). 
What made their theories so influential for Williams and the 
Left was that they implicitly called into question the legitimacy of 
Leavisian categories like continuity and tradition and replaced them 
with categories of historical materialism, in which change not 
constancy became key and social structure not tradition was made to 
inform critical analysis. Lukacs' and Goldmann's theories suggested an 
alternative to Leavis, for by stressing class consciousness and not 'a 
point of view ab9ye classes,' the notion of 'tradition,' was given a 
political and not, in their view as Leavis had perceived it, a 
metaphysical base. 
Mulhern has critiqued the use of the concept of 'tradition' in 
Leavisism from a Marxist perspective. Drawing on the work of Goran 
Therborn (Science, Class and Society, 1976) he claims that Leavis' 
criticism actually represented two distinct theoretical discourses-the 
romantic exploration of "national culture" (Volksgeist) and classical 
sociology-for which the object of attention was "the community of 
customs, values and beliefs that was taken to form the essential 
unifying principle of society" (Mulhern, 1981: 310). Mulhern's critique 
of both discourses is that they deem the ultimate foundations of the 
social order to be spiritual, not political, in nature. He suggests that in 
Leavisism these foundations were incarnated in 'tradition' and found 
their sanctuary in literature. 
But while it is true that Leavis expressed no political explication 
or implications for his use of 'tradition' as a category-hence opening 
himself up for dismissal and criticism by Marxists that its foundations 
were purely spiritual-notably absent from Mulhern's or Williams' 
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account of tradition is any mention of another group of Marxists, the 
Frankfurt School, who like Leavis, appealed to tradition in their 
critique of mass culture. While no attempt can be made here to 
elaborate on the complex and diverse aesthetic theories which came 
out of the Frankfurt School, it is worth noting certain aspects of their 
theories for they, like Leavis, believed in the importance of tradition as 
a force against the impact of the culture industry. As Jay states, 
... the Institut, for all its Marxist tendencies, valued 
tradition ... Adorno spoke of the traditional component in 
Schonberg's seemingly revolutionary music, and Benjamin 
considered tradition to be a part of an art work's 
aura ... Lowenthal referred to continuity as the "criterion of 
love" an observation that followed on the heels of 
Horkheimer's assertion ... that mass culture deprived man of his 
duree ... Tradition referred to the type of integrated experience 
the Institut members called Erfahrung, which was being 
destroyed by so-called progress (Jay, 1973: 215). 
The Frankfurt School's understanding of 'tradition' was 
embedded in a dialectical or 'immanent' critique of works of art, 
literature, music, etc .. Art, according to Adorno, " ... always was, and is, 
a force of protest of the humane against the pressure of domineering 
institutions, religious or otherwise, no less than it expresses objective 
substance." Furthermore, "a successful work, according to immanent 
criticism, is not one which resolves objective contradictions in a 
spurious harmony, but one which expresses the idea of harmony 
negatively by embodying the contradictions, pure and uncompromised, 
in its innermost structure" (Jay, 1973: 179). 'Negation' was a key 
concept in the Frankfurt School's aesthetic theory. It referred, in a 
work of art, to "the communication of the incommunicable" and 
constituted "the smashing of reified consciousness" (Adorno in Slater, 
1977: 134). The Frankfurt School's support for the avant-garde against 
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mass culture was based in part on this concept of 'negation'-for they 
believed that avant garde art succeeded in violating and disturbing 
people's consciousness, particularly the false consciousness 
manipulated and maintained by the culture industry. As Horkheimer 
claimed, "in giving downtrodden humans a shocking awareness of 
their own despair, the work of art professes a freedom which makes 
them foam at the mouth" (Slater, 1977: 134). 
Like Leavis, members of the Frankfurt School were pessimistic 
about the masses desire (or ability) not to be manipulated-having 
witnessed the rise of Fascism and Nazism in their native Germany. As 
Adorno wrote to Benjamin, 
... It is not bourgeois idealism if, in full knowledge and without 
mental prohibitions, we maintain our solidarity with the 
proletariat instead of making of our own necessity a virtue of 
the proletariat, as we are always tempted to do-the 
proletariat which itself experiences the same necessity and 
needs us for knowledge as much as we need the proletariat to 
make the revolution. I am convinced that the further 
development of the aesthetic debate which you have so 
magnificently inaugurated depends essentially on a true 
accounting of the relationship of the intellectuals to the 
working class (Adorno, 1977: 125). 
This was in response to Benjamin's Brechtian influenced belief 
in art as a form of production or praxis-a social force in its own right 
rather than simply a reflector or reformer of consciousness. In contrast 
to Adorno (and other members of the Frankfurt School), Benjamin 
had a more optimistic belief in the liberatory role of technology and 
mechanical reproduction in capitalist society (Benjamin, 1970). 
Moreover, Benjamin was more inclined than Adorno to think that 
mass cultural products could be (as Brecht suggested) "functionally 
transformed" or "subverted" both by and in the interests of the 
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proletariat (Adorno, 1977: 122; and see Slater, 1977: 138; Jay, 1984: 123-
126). 
It is interesting to consider how these differing tendencies 
within the Frankfurt School (regarding the role of the masses, of 
intellectuals, of mass culture, of high art, of theory and of praxis) were 
taken up by the New Left in Britain. Without wishing to 
over generalise what were, in fact, varied positions amongst members 
of the New Left during the 1950s and 1960s, the tendency amongst 
them was away from the Adorno /Leavis perspective and more towards 
a Brechtian/Benjamin one. As the ex-Trotskyite American journalist, 
Dwight McDonald observed following a 1959 talk at a Universites and 
Left Review forum in London, 
The Enemy looks very different from there [U. K.] than from 
here [U. S.]. From there, it is too little democracy; from here, 
too much. They see cultural lines as relics of a snobbish past, I 
see them as dikes against the corruption of Masscult and 
Midcult. They see standards as inhibiting, I see them as 
defining. They see tradition as deadening, I see it as 
nourishing. It may be that as an American I idealise the 
British situation. But I hope not as much as they idealise 
ours ... But what I was not prepared for was the reaction to my 
attacks on our mass culture. These were resented in the name of 
democracy. Hollywood to me was an instance of the 
exploitation rather than the satisfying of popular tastes. But 
to some of those who took the floor after my talk, Hollywood 
was a genuine expression of the masses. They seemed to think it 
snobbish of me to criticise our movies and television from a 
serious viewpoint. Since I had been criticising Hollywood for 
some thirty years, and always with the good conscience one has 
when one is attacking from the Left, this proletarian defence of 
our peculiar institution left me rather dazed (McDonald, 1962: 
64). 
Indeed, unlike many American radicals of that time (see 
Rosenberg and Manning White, 1957; McDonald, 1962), members of 
the British Left h?d begun to discuss in more optimistic terms the 
potential democratising effects of the mass media, e. g., commercially 
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produced films, television, radio and advertising (see New Left 
Review, No.7, 1961; Hoggart, 1962; Hall and Whannet 1964), though 
there were those who remained of the opinion that mass culture did 
not constitute a genuine expression of the 'masses.' As was the case 
with Williams' Marxist literary criticism, however, many of the Left's 
arguments in favour of mass culture during this period were often 
infused with Leavis-like language in their emphasis on "the 
development of a common culture" and "careful discrimination 
between what is good, what is bad, and what is potentially good [within 
television]" (New Left Review, No.7, 1961: 36, 37, 42). 50 while there 
was an increasing acceptance of the expansion of what might be 
considered culture, there was a continued sense of the importance of 
criticism, for example, 
Whether we are considering cool jazz or a classical symphony, 
Elizabethan drama or a television thriller, the important 
thing is not to categorise them in the pejorative sense but to 
determine whether they are good or bad of their kind (New 
Left Review, 1961: 35). 
Criticism was thus wedded to an emergent relativism as 
attempts to distinguish popular culture from mass culture, or these 
from high culture persisted, and the question of how to determine 
when something was 'authentic' or 'escapist/ 'good' or 'bad/ 'candy-
floss entertainment' or a 'living art form'-whether the subject was 
television, protest or folk songs, bear-baiting, literature or poetry-
remained unresolved (see 5hils, 1957; Kristot 1960; Weightman, 1960; 
Freeman, 1966; Kelsey, 1966; MacDiarmid, 1966; Reid, 1966). 
Despite the continuation of old unresolved paradoxes, however, 
the appearance of the new cultural critics in the 1950s and 1960s did 
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introduce new issu,es into the culture debates and provided important 
new insights into old issues. One of the most influential occurrences 
during this period was the inclusion of new members from working 
and lower middle class origins into the literary elite discussed above. 
Their very presence within the literary establishment challenged the 
incommensurability of cultures arguments that had been made in 
earlier debates for they demonstrated the possibility (or inevitability) of 
cultural interpenetration through history. Moreover, the fact that 
many of these writers wrote novels and produced plays about working 
class culture for non-working class sensibilities suggested a belief and a 
possibility that, in some cases and to some extent, common access to 
meanings between cultures could be achieved. And in defiance of an 
Eliot-like understanding of incommensurability, these critics 
contributed toward the reconstituting of an educated cultural elite that 
was not drawn along class lines guaranteed by inheritance or birth. 
Another influential contribution to the culture debates from 
within this group of cultural critics was the rehabilitation of mass 
culture. The move to defend the cultural products of a 'mass-think 
society' added a further impetus to the redefinition of the role and 
status of culture, for it suggested that to view cultures simply as dead or 
living representations of traditional 'ways of life' was not in step with 
the changing nature of social/cultural relationships in the 
technological-age of which Britain was firmly becoming a part. 
The influence of the new writers and cultural critics also found 
its way into the debates over education that dominated the post-war 
period, where the developments taking place reflected the process of 
change that British society as a whole was undergoing at the time. In 
the face of educational restructuring aimed at egalitarian institutional 
73 
and curricular reforms, 'New Lefe intellectuals looked to the 
educational system to provide the institutional context for the 
advancement of a socialist cultural agenda. Many members of the Left 
continued to support this view despite the fact that the Labour Party 
had turned increasingly away from advocating an idealised notion of 
schooling in a socialist society to the acceptance of the inevitability of 
occupational and social competition within a capitalist one (Lowe, 1988; 
Simon, 1990). The Labour Party, under pressure to gain significant 
electoral support, felt compelled to moderate its thinking on 
educational reform during this period. It sacrificed its more radical 
commitment to alter existent social class relations through educational 
restructuring for a policy based more on the old established system of 
division according to intelligence and aptitude. Thus, while it 
continued to support comprehensivisation it was, for reasons of 
political expediency, reluctant to abolish the grammar schools. A 
contradiction was soon evident between the idea of a popular 
proletarian culture emerging out of socialist reform in Britain and the 
reality of a growing mass culture tied to capitalism. 
Some amongst the new cultural critics, like Richard Hoggart 
and Arnold Wesker, attempted to address this contradiction by 
presenting a view of education, albeit with some circumspection, as a 
means for members of the working classes to have access to and 
appreciation of high culture and certain traditional forms of popular 
culture and oppose the mass or pop culture that threatened to overtake 
their sensibilities. In The Uses of Literacy, for example, Hoggart is both 
critical of the invasion of the "candy flossed world" on traditional 
working class culture and aware of the conflicts of the "uprooted and 
anxious" scholarship child. For others, however, particularly those 
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members of the reconstituted literary establishment who, it was 
suggested above, had used their education to hop social class fences, the 
notion that educational expansion would grant more students access to 
high culture was not a welcome one (viz. Kingsley Amis' famous 
remark, "more will mean worse"). 
The diverse sets of beliefs and ideologies expressed by the above 
critics with respect to class and culture reappeared within the field of 
education, and in particular, within English teaching, when in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, English educators began to reconsider the role of 
literature and language in their classrooms. Several of the themes that 
had appeared in the culture debates carried on into these debates, in 
which, in addition to culture, the themes of tradition, elitism and 
incommensurability re-emerged as salient. In the event, two sets of 
paradoxes arose in dialectical relationship to each other: (a) the attempt 
to introduce democratising strategies within a context of an educational 
system and a society still based on division; and (b) the struggle to 
define a role for class culture against a backdrop of changing 
communities and sensibilities. 
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Chapter Four 
Tradition versus Modernity: English Education 
and The Fall of Sensibility 
Tradition versus Modernity 
As the themes of culture, tradition, incommensurability and 
elitism found their way into debates over English education, a number 
of complex ideas related to these themes emerged as salient that were 
inchoately explored by educators and researchers alike. The function 
and status of the study of literature came into focus due to the 
emergence within English education of a growing critique of literature 
and literary criticism and their associations with high culture and 
elitism. Challenges came from educators themselves who began to 
view literary criticism as an inherently elitist practice aimed at a 
preordained and privileged minority. As Burgess and Martin state, 
[The] T2VOlt of many English teachers against this elitist view 
was the beginning of the opposition to the dominance of 
literary criticism in school literature teaching, and of the 
Great Tradition as the only source of books to read in the new 
common schools. Here, with reading levels ranging from 
illiterate to University entrance, there had to be debate about 
what texts should and could be read; and arising from this came 
questions about what should count as literature (Burgess & 
Martin, 1990: 12-13). 
Amongst the issues that educators considered during this period were: 
what status should be given to mass, pop, popular and working class 
cultural forms in English studies; what criteria entitled pupils to be 
included as members of an educated elite; and whether such an elite 
should be encouraged or maintained. 
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The particular complex of ideas which will be considered below, 
and the reconception of the English curriculum to which they 
contributed, were not, however, a mere product of developments 
within that particular discipline. They were also a reflection of the 
especially powerful social focusing that took place with respect to 
modernity itself during the late 1950s and early 1960s. When the 
Labour party took office in 1964, it increasingly began to champion the 
image of a 'techno-scientific' revolution in the context of a 
modernizing mixed economy. Under the banner of modernity, a 
planned economy and scientific progress were linked and attention was 
placed on functions and skills. Ryder and Silver explain the prevailing 
sentiment at the time: 
This was the era of Sputnik, the armaments race, advancing 
technology and the consumer revolution. No nation could afford 
to waste its resources. To keep abreast of her neighbours Britain 
needed both to foster her manpower and to develop her 
research potentia1...The argument about educational equality 
frequently turned into an argument about manpower. The 
country needed to recruit talent from a much wider base, to 
change attitudes and expectations, as well as to remove 
finanical and other obstacles in the path to personal and social 
improvement (Ryder and Silver, 1977: 232). 
This concern with efficiency and egalitarianism was shared by 
members of the Right and the Left in the post-war era. On the right, it 
set the tone for the emphasis on practical, managerial abilities and on 
the left, it challenged the popular themes in British socialism of 
working class traditions, solidarity and community cultures. The 
socialism of community became increasingly outflanked by the 
socialism of order and progress. At the same time, social scientists, 
economists and educators began to participate directly or indirectly 
with the State's attempt to promote a form of technological 
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functionalism which related increased economic opportunities and 
democratisation in British society with modernisation and efficiency. 
Within education, researchers strategically made links between the 
government's emphasis on efficiency, the continuing problems of 
social and educational inequality and institutional change (Bernstein, 
1974). As Karabel and Halsey report: 
The attack by British sociologists on inequality of educational 
opportunity was not only that it was unfair, but also that it was 
inefficient. And the historical context in which arguments 
about "matching ability and opportunity" were put forward 
was one of political and ideological struggle over the structure 
of British education (Karabel and Halsey, 1977: 12).1 
By the late 1950s, the idea that a modernised, technological society 
would provide a strong material base for the Welfare State and the 
establishment of a more egalitarian social structure became an 
important focus of debate in British society. 
It was within the context of this social debate, which set tradition 
against modernity, that the role of literature and of literary criticism 
came to be challenged. Participants of these debates began to question 
literary culture's historical role in Britain as the prime bearer of 
cultural traditions or the Cultural Tradition. Many involved in these 
debates began to call into question the very idea of literary culture and 
tradition as the main sources from which to examine and direct social 
1 It was during this period that social scientists like Michael Young, Richard 
Titmuss, David Glass, Jean Floud and others began to conduct studies with regard to 
such themes as the British worker, kinship networks, social mobility and marriage, 
education and inter-generational changes in status, neighbourhood and community 
life and socio-economic background and personality. Against the widely held belief 
that affluence had been equally distributed throughout society these studies 
pointed to the failure of the Welfare State to adequately address the continuing 
problems of inequality and the lack of social justice for the poor and working classes 
in Britain (Ryder and Silver, 1977). 
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and cultural life. As literary culture and tradition came to be associated 
with the established social order and its inherent inequality, the mass 
culture and scientific culture of the new technological age offered 
themselves as alternative cultural means to achieve more socially 
egalitarian ends. 
The function of tradition and literary culture was also 
reinterpreted from within the cultural debates themselves, as 
Raymond Williams and the New Left reconsidered them from within 
a Marxist account of social class consciousness. This particular view of 
cultural traditions highlighted their oppositional function; they were 
principally interpreted as sites from which to challenge the traditions 
of the dominant culture. Williams' and Richard Hoggart's accounts 
were the first to associate tradition with non-literary sources for the 
critical analysis of society, as part of their commitment to ensure that 
the working classes had the opportunity to bring their own cultural 
heritage to bear on experience without encountering prejudice. Their 
alternative accounts served a vital role during this period as sources of 
opposition to the well-established conservative position which sought 
to ensure the survival of the Cultural Tradition, located in a past 
which more often than not denied Britain's multi-(class) cultural 
reality. 
By the end of the 1950s, the function and status of literary 
culture were thus being challenged from within by English educators 
themselves and through an emergent Marxist critique of the function 
of tradition, and fr0m without by the increasing impact of mass culture 
and scientific culture and their associations with modernity and 
equality. It was in this context that the themes of culture, tradition, 
incommensurability and elitism began to be explored in educational 
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debates. In the event, the conceptualization of ~ulture began to 
undergo fundamental changes that would nave major im;;lications for 
its uptake within English education throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
Culture reconsidered from within: Left and Right response 
Common to both the radical and conservative theorisations of 
cultural traditions of this period was a tendency to assume their 
protective function. Thus the assertion of working class culture served 
as its protection against (as well as its opposition to) the dominant 
culture's hegemony, just as to assert the Cultural Tradition was seen as 
its protection against mass culture or a multi-cultural British Tradition. 
This almost exclusive emphasis on the protective role of traditions 
encouraged a view of cultural traditions that, regardless of political 
position, overlooked their intellectual, organic function, i. e., as the 
means by which individuals consciously or impassively maintain 
and/or transform their beliefs and practices both within their own and 
with respect to other cultural traditions. In downplaying the internal 
transformative abilities of all cultural traditions, dominant and 
subordinate alike, the issue of cultural change tended to be reduced to a 
question of political power, the assumption being that both cultural 
change and stabili~y were solely a by-product of class struggle. As a 
result, cultures came to be viewed more as ends in themselves than as 
ever-evolving organic structures. 
This emergent view of cultures as relatively impenetrable, 
established entities was also evident in the conceptualisation of the 
relationship between cultural traditions and the issue of 
incommensurability. Both the radical emphasis on strengthening 
subordinate cultures and conservative tendency toward reserving 
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access to high culture, resulted in their joint commitment to the idea of 
incommensurability. For radicals, any calls for cultural consensus or 
common standards were viewed as attempting to mask the hegemonic 
power of the dominant culture. Within this conception, support for 
egalitarianism went hand in hand with support for cultural relativism 
as the two came to be perceived as mutually dependent (the tendency 
to merge the two with respect to culture and language in education is 
explored in detail in the following chapter). Paradoxically, support for 
the equal/right to be heard' began to appear alongside support for the 
idea that cultures were different enough so as to make communication 
impossible. 
Conservative arguments, on the other hand, sought to protect 
British society with a Tradition that was not treated as the rightful 
possession of all members of British society. This exclusionary attitude 
offered no hope or desire for cultural consensus or common ground-
on the contrary, it explicitly refused to consider such an aim. 
Supporters of this position, moreover, flagrantly posited the continued 
need for an elite, deliberately conflating an educated elite with the 
upper classes (see Maude, 1971; Sparrow, 1971), thus supporting the 
preservation of a stratified social and educational system at a time 
when Britain was attempting to erode the inherent inequality of its 
social class system. 
When the idea that, in the face of both cultural stability and 
change, the function of a cultural tradition might entail some concept 
of an elite became a focus of educational debate, it was this 
conservative view that received most attention. In the debates over 
English education, where the issue of an educated elite reappeared, the 
idea was rejected as supporting the continuation of the hegemony of 
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the dominant culture. Although it had been the case, for example, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, that the 1930s' Marxists had seen themselves 
as something of a vanguard for the proletariat (even as they sought out 
writers and texts from amongst the working classes to represent their 
own culture), one of the overarching themes in the discussions over 
the content of English education in the post-war era became the 
association of a literature-based curriculum with an elitist approach to 
the teaching of English. Associating Leavis' call for a 'minority culture' 
with the most extreme conservative view, both literary criticism and 
Leavisism were singled out for attack on the grounds that they 
supported the preservation of high cultural forms and social class 
hierarchy, though, in contrast to Eliot, there is no evidence that Leavis 
himself equated an educated elite with membership in a particular 
social class. The Leavises had stressed the need for a critical minority 
culture to combat the influences of mass culture and to communicate 
the meanings of a culture through critical engagement with its signs.2 
The above ideas eventually began to have an impact on English 
teaching where the issues of culture and social class became linked to 
the development of relevant curriculum content. Educators and 
2 In the U.S. in the 1960s there was a similar reaction to W. E. B. DuBois' notion of 
'the talented tenth' by the Black Power Movement. The idea that only one tenth of 
the Black population slwuld be educated to occupy positions amongst 'the power 
elite' was seen as supporting the continuation of prejudice and racial inequality in 
America (James, 1992: 365-366). The point here is not to equate the circumstances 
that informed DuBois' and Leavis' call for an educated elite. DuBois was speaking 
as an educated Black man in the segregated south determined to combat racism and 
claim the right of all Blacks to participate as equals in the social, economic and 
political reconstruction of post-Civil War America (DuBois, 1989). Leavis, with 
the same sense of urgency (though arguably based on a less inhumane set of 
conditions), believed in the need to train an elite to defend civilization against the 
threat of mass culture. The point of the comparison is merely to suggest similarities 
in how the original intent of each of their proposals was taken up in different socio-
historical contexts. 
82 
researchers increasingly turned their attention to the school 
performances of pupils from different class backgrounds, as studies 
(e. g., Early Leaving Report, 1954.: ThE: Crowther Report, 1959; The 
Newsom Report, 1963) showed that in spite of structural changes that 
had improved access for working class pupils within the educational 
system, they continued to lag behind their middle class counterparts in 
academic outcome. As it became apparent that macrosociological 
approaches had failed to adequately account for differential academic 
achievement, more attention was focused on the social class 
production and ·:reproduction of knowledge in the classroom 
(Bernstein, 1958, 1965; Hoare, 1965; Lawton, 1968; Young, 1971). 
English educators, in particular, viewed it as their task to 
strengthen the class/cultural identities of their working class pupils 
(Shayer, 1972; Mathieson, 1975). For radical educators, following 
Wiliams' example, reaffirming the culture of their working class pupils 
was understood as a means toward the liberation of the working classes 
as a whole. Many radical educators in the 1960s and 1970s viewed 
literature and its related activities as reflecting and reproducing 
exclusively middle class values. For them, the task was thus to 
strengthen working class identity by, on the one hand, encouraging 
individual, critical expressivity and creativity (advocating the use of 
any text that originated from working class pupils themselves-usually 
in the form of personal narrative, oral or written), and, on the other, 
through the reading of social realist texts depicting working class life 
(see Searle, 1973; Rosen, 1974). While these efforts may have served a 
valuable function, it is nevertheless the case that, just as the Left Book 
Club had determined what constituted an authentic proletarian novel 
in the 1930s, it was often educators who decided what was and was not 
83 
socially relevant to their working class pupils. Their efforts in this 
regard were reminiscent of the literary Left of the 1930s who had 
attempted to both define and then to proclaim the liberatory effects of 
working class culture for the working classes themselves. 
More significantly, however, in presenting working class culture 
primarily as an end product, in this case, as a weapon with which to 
protect or liberate itself from middle class culture, radical educators 
unwittingly found themselves aligned with more conservative 
pronouncements about strengthening an individual's class identity as 
a way to reproduce existing class relations and maintain socio-cultural 
order. Explicit with conservative educators like G. H. Bantock, for 
example, was the idea that working class pupils were either not 
culturally able nor was it culturally desirable for them to engage with 
I great' literature. Bantock combined a view of culture consistent with 
that of Eliot (the theme of incommensurability is strongly evident in 
Bantock's discussions of education) with a belief in the importance of 
literature and literary criticism for maintaining a "high state of 
culture" in society. And although he recognized that to conflate the 
notion of a social class with that of an elite, as Eliot had, was 
unacceptable in the 1960s, his warning of the "too rapid assimilation of 
the culturally impoverished who have high I. Q.'s into sections of the 
community which carry a good deal of social and economic prestige" 
(Bantock, 1963: 181) came dangerously close to a blurring of distinction 
between the two. Bantock, and others like him, ironically preferred the 
same solution adv()Cated by many radical teachers-the development 
of a curriculum for working class pupils that reflected "the best that has 
been thought and said within their sphere" (Bantock, 1963: 201). The 
implicit or explicit acceptance of incommensurability in the 
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conservative and radical models of culture thus aligned the two 
agendas, for though they differed in terms of their desired outcome for 
working class pupils, in both models, culture and class were ascribed an 
inevitable and invariable unity and integrity. 
There were other educators, like David Holbrook, who viewed 
culture not as the static property of a particular class but as a means 
toward the liberation of the individual. This position, with its roots in 
Leavisism and located in an explicit critique of capitalism, advocated 
the democratisation of culture and critical judgment in the face of the 
growing influence of mass culture and technological modernity. One 
popular example of this view was the introduction in classrooms of the 
traditional cultural forms of the rural and industrial working classes as 
a means toward strengthening class identity amongst working class 
pupils. Drawing on a British folklorist tradition, people like A. L. Lloyd 
and Charles Parker, producer of the Radio Ballads, along with Ewan 
MacColl and Peggy Seeger, aimed to provide teachers with actual 
recordings of present-day workers "speaking in the vernacular" as well 
as folk songs of the past, not to oppose high culture but to counter the 
influence of pop and mass cultures alienating the working classes from 
their cultural roots (Parker, 1972: 18). The folklorists' critique of middle 
class, bourgeois cv.1ture, like Leavis', Wesker's or Hoggart's, was based 
more on its collusion with the mass media to /I control the culture of 
the working class" than for its association with high culture. Within 
this tradition, and in his own focus on cultural symbols like literature, 
songs, and rituals in the classroom, David Holbrook emphasized a 
more Leavis-like literary critical approach. Although generally 
supportive of the folklorists' interventions, Holbrook was concerned 
with the lack of discrimination in the folk song movement of Lloyd 
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and Parker which he claimed "seem[ed] to lapse into a false cult of 
commonness" and "[led] to the publication, side by side with the great 
folksongs of a good deal of rubbish by way of working men's songs and 
the resurrection of a good deal of bawdy stuff of poor quality" 
(Holbrook, 1961: 107-108; see also Harker, 1980). For Holbrook, 
although cultural relevance and authenticity were key, the textual 
source and the quality of such relevance remained paramount. 
These Leavis-like interventions were all motivated by a similar 
concern over the increasing influence of mass culture in British 
society. In many ways they shared the values of the type of British 
socialism which, with its emphasis on community and tradition, had 
been increasingly losing ground since the late 1950s. Critics of the 
'mass-think' society, like Wesker, Parker, Holbrook and Leavis himself, 
shared the radical aim of liberation, but they sought not so much the 
liberation of the class as the liberation of the individual. According to 
this view, the liberated individual was empowered through access to 
traditional culture, high or popular-but never modern, pop or mass 
culture-to become a new producer of a new cultural order, as 
Wesker's character Beatie in his play Roots exemplified, 
" ... The whole stinkin' commercial world insults us and we don't 
care a damn. Well, Ronnie's right-it's our own bloody fault. 
We want the third-rate-we got it! We got it! We got it! 
We ... D'you hear that? D'you hear it? Did you listen to me? 
I'm talking. Jenny, Frankie, Mother-I'm not quoting no 
more .... Listen to me someone. God in heaven, Ronnie! It does 
work, it's happening to me, I can feel it's happened, I'm 
beginning, on my own two feet-I'm beginning ... " (Wesker, 1964: 
148). 
The "stinkin' commercial world" to which Wesker refers was 
the world of mass culture which was believed by many in Britain in 
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the late 1950s and early 1960s as offering, along with scientific culture, 
an alternative means toward a more egalitarian society than 
'traditional' cultures could provide. The liberatory role that Leavis, 
Parker, Holbrook and Wesker were each in different ways concerned to 
preserve for popular or high culture came under threat, as the belief 
became increasingly widespread that the key to a more open and 
democratic society was to be found outside of art and literature and 
within the science and technology offered by modernity. 
Culture reconsidered from without: Leavis, Snow and iTwo Cultures' 
The challenge to literary culture by scientific culture-and the 
underlying movement in the intellectual field from tradition to 
modernity of which it was firmly a part-was exemplified by the 
Leavis-Snow 'Two Cultures' controversy. The 'debate' between Leavis 
and Snow is well known, although more for Snow's famous 'two 
cultures' dictum than for the other important and relevant themes 
which appear in their respective lectures. The debate-and the 
impassioned responses which it drew from leading intellectuals of the 
day-caught the spirit of the age. They signalled a country divided 
over the merits of modernity and uncertain as to the direction in 
which human society should be headed. On the one hand, there were 
those with Snow who were apparently willing to grant scientific 
culture and technology an influential and even dominant place in the 
country's future, while others, Leavis amongst them, were less 
optimistic and more critical of this 'cultural' shift. 
The views expressed by Snow and Leavis on tradition and 
modernity struck at an issue which was at the heart of the culture 
debates as they entered the 1960s and 1970s-the increasing tendency to 
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regard these as opposing and mutually exclusive ideals. Amongst 
those who responded publicly to the divergent views of Snow and 
Leavis, the majority elected to choose sides rather than debate the 
merits of their respective arguments. Moreover, since during this 
period it was increasingly common to associate modernity with 
Britain's future political and economic and even cultural success, the 
majority of those who responded to the controversy came out 
uncritically in favour of Snow (see 'Letters' in The Spectator. 1962. 
March 16, 329-333; March 23, 365-367).3 Although Leavis' position was 
vigourously and intelligently argued, the weight of public opinion and 
response fell decisively for Snow, for his views, whatever their 
ultimate merit, succeeded in capturing the spirit of the time. 
Snow's lecture combined a plea for the end of existing 
dichotomies, e. g., between science and literature, pure and applied 
science, with support for the popular economic and political policies of 
the day. While Snow's central argument was intended to call attention 
to the divisions between professions, throughout his lecture he called 
for a defining and essential role for science and scientists (including 
engineers, technicians, etc.) in Britain and in the future international 
community. 
To make his case for science, Snow appealed to popular, practical 
and political arguments. He presented science and technology as 
essentially value-neutral phenomena capable of ridding the world of 
poverty and instability-though not competition. Furthermore, in 
accordance with the then popular economic theory of human capital, 
3 The majority of responses to the debate appeared in The Specatator because the 
text of Leavis' Richmond lecture had been reprinted in a previous issue of this 
journal. 
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Snow called for the training of more scientists and engineers in higher 
education. Scientists (and linguists), according to Snow, were the 
country's best human exports on behalf of the scientific revolution; 
they were endowed with particular qualities that ensured their value as 
human, capital investments in foreign (especially third world) 
countries, 
[Scientists] are freer than most people from racial feeling; their 
own culture is in its human relations a democratic one. In their 
own internal climate, the breeze of the equality of man hits you 
in the face, sometimes rather roughly, just as it does in Norway 
(Snow, 1959: 51). 
Snow also stressed the need for superior knowledge and 
training in science and technology in order to ensure the continued 
competitiveness and dominance of the West. The West's fear of the 
imminent communist threat is implicit throughout his lecture and is 
explicitly addresseu in remarks like the following, 
For though I don't know how we can do what we need to do, or 
whether we shall do anything at all, I do know this: that if we 
don't do it, The Communist countries will in time. They will do 
it at great cost to themselves and others, but they will do it. If 
that is how it turns out then we shall have failed, both 
practically and morally. At best the West will have become an 
enclave in a different world-and this country will be the 
enclave of the enclave. Are we resigning ourselves to that? 
History is merciless to failure. In any case, if that happens, we 
shall not be writing the history (Snow, 1959: 53). 
In the final analysis, Snow's lecture, although clearly not 
considered so at th~ time, resembles a classic piece of Cold War political 
propaganda. Ultimately, his reason for wishing to reunite scientific 
and literary intellectuals appears to have been to ensure the West 
greater 'practical and moral' success over control of the scientific 
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revolution. The scientific and literary 'cultures' to which Snow made 
reference were to be in the service of Enlightenment ideology and Cold 
War politics; their function was to respond to and improve 
material! social conditions and not necessarily to examine them or 
attempt to understand their potential material! social consequences. 
For Leavis, an increased role for science, technology and science 
education was not a panacea for deteriorating social and cultural 
conditions. At the heart of Leavis' argument was his long-held belief 
in the importance of critical standards and practices for determining 
and affecting the state of culture. He considered Snow a "portent" and 
a sign of the times. For Leavis, Snow was typical of an increasing 
majority of the "educated public" who were invested with intellectual 
authority but incapable of evaluating or transcending the social and 
cultural conditions in which they lived. 
Throughout Leavis' response, he echoed the views of Adorno 
and other members of the Frankfurt School in expressing his concern 
for the negative effects of what Adorno had critically referred to as the 
'culture industry.' His critique of Snow was in reality an attack on this 
industry, particularly the mass media, which he believed was 
responsible for making a cultural authority of Snow through 
publication of his novels and through the appearance of his essays in 
.r·. 
the "quality" Sunday papers for which Leavis had contempt. Leavis 
pointed to the "empty phrases" and "cliches" in Snow's lecture which 
he declared "emerge spontaneously from the cultural world to which 
Snow belongs and register uncritically their assumptions, attitudes and 
ignorances" (Leavis, 1962: 37). According to Leavis, the culture 
industry was an example of the technological revolution stripped of 
instinct and intelligence, 
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For the supersession, in what should be the field of real 
spiritual and intellectual authority, of serious criteria by the 
power of creating publicity-values is a frightening 
manifestation of the way our civilisation is going. It is a 
concomitant of the technological revolution (Leavis, 1962: 17). 
The field of real spiritual and intellectual authority remained for 
Leavis the field of literature and literary criticism. He reiterated his 
desire for an "educated public" that would be trained to make value 
judgements and provide critical interpretation of literary texts 
concerned with the "salvation" and "felicity" promised by the scientific 
revolution. According to Leavis, Snow and his supporters embraced 
technological progress and higher standards of living without 'reading' 
them critically; and therefore, they were no longer inclined to 
acknowledge these (in certain manifestations) as insidious social and 
cultural consequences of the scientific revolution. 
While many who came to Snow's defence were very likely 
motivated by the abrasiveness of Leavis' judgements against Snow's 
abilities as a novel~st and essayist, it is nevertheless true that none of 
these defenders were critical of the positions taken up by Snow in his 
lecture. Few of the defences offered on Snow's behalf addressed his, in 
places, deliberate conflation of science and technology, for example. 
Moreover, his association of science with technological progress and 
these with continued Western dominance were taken for granted as 
unchallengeable assertions. 
The language of modernity to which Snow appealed-its value-
neutrality, its guarantees of higher standards of living for all and its 
promise to serve as a deterrent to nuclear war-convinced many in the 
waning years of the 1950s that to challenge progress was to revert to a 
belief in 'traditional culture.' And as one of Leavis' critics wished to 
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claim, there was evidence that such cultures had already begun to be 
hopelessly buried in the past, 
.. .If you, like the Bushmen, spend your life desperately trying 
to stay alive and are in fact dying out, however poignantly, 
because your marvelous skills are inadequate, then you are less 
alive and, horrible as it is, less human, progressively as social 
hope diminishes ... (,Letters,' 1962: 363). 
In this social and political climate, Leavis' call for a critical 
language with which to interpret the consequences of the scientific 
revolution on the state of culture was readily dismissed as encouraging 
social and cultural pessimism (i.e., a lack of "social hope" for the 
future), conservatism and, ultimately, wilful inertia. 
What is most significant in the Leavis-Snow controversy to the 
argument being developed in this thesis, however, is not the 'two 
cultures' assertion, but the very different conceptualisations of culture 
and tradition that informed their positions and the distinct models of 
culture that emerged from these. On the one hand, Leavis presented a 
view of cultures as embedded in traditions, based in convention and 
community. This is a view of culture where the relationship betweeen 
individual and community is viewed as organic, i. e., as constituting 
and constituted. The relationship between the individual and the 
culture is considered to be one of reciprocity and reflexivity-and 
culture is perceived as both a dynamic and a unifying entity. This 
understanding of culture assumes a deep-rooted relationship between 
meaning and form. Indeed, not only is it an assertion of their 
inseparability, in Leavis, it represented an underlying belief in the 
authority of form. In Leavis' world, a fault of style was a fault of being 
(this is what allows him to relate the quality of writing in Snow's 
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novels with an attack on his person). For this reason, aesthetic 
response, the recognition of the relationship between style and being, 
became of paramount importance. 
In Snow's representation of culture in the language of 
modernity, on the other hand, the authority of form has been 
completely rejected. With scientific culture, form has become a 
necessary but completely arbitrary representation of an objective world. 
This separation of meaning and form signifies a move away from 
concepts of organic relationships and stabilities at the level of the text 
as well as the individual and culture. Snow's emphasis is on the trans-
historical and the trans-national appeal of modernity, not the local 
solidarity of traditions. In the international culture of science, 
objectivity and rationality are presumed to offer freedom in opposition 
to cultural traditions which are perceived as binding. Snow's claim 
that scientists are "freer than most from racial feeling" is an assertion 
of the possibility of communicating from outside of a cultural 
tradition; it suggests a world in which the equality of humankind is 
achieved through objective knowledge and reason, not critical 
judgement or interpretation (thus linguists are also free according to 
Snow, presumably because they have 'objective' knowledge of 
language). With this Enlightenment model of scientific culture, the 
idea of culture as object or end product is re-enforced. Culture, like 
form, becomes something 'out there' in relationship to meaning. It is 
the surface reflection of an objective world, rather than a means of 
interpreting within and between distinctive worlds. 
Each of these views, and variations of them, appeared and were 
rearticulated in the debates over the relationship between culture, 
language and lite.cature that took place in the 1960s and 1970s in 
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English education. The extent to which these conflicting views 
contributed to the major paradigm shift from literature to language in 
English teaching during this same period is the focus of the next 
chapter. Their specific influence over developments regarding the 
status of literature and literary criticism and the 'death of sensibility' 
within the English ~urriculum will be described below. 
English Education 
The Death of Sensibility and the Culture of the Child 
It has been argued above that the omission of a concept of 
cultures as transforming, organic structures became a feature of English 
education as a result of developments both from within that discipline 
and from the wider social movement in British society toward a belief 
in the liberatory capacities of modernity. Within English teaching, 
radical and conservative educators worked with an understanding of 
cultures as relatively impermeable entities in order to protect working 
class pupils/culture from the hegemony of bourgeois culture or to 
preserve bourgeois culture for the middle classes only. From outside 
the discipline, the emergent discourse of modernity presented a view 
of the individual as detached from culture to ensure the freedom of the 
individual from the bonds of traditional knowledge. These two images 
-culture as protective totalities and the individual set free from 
culture-eventually became linked and, in combination, greatly 
influenced developments within English education-specifically, the 
rejection of literary criticism and aesthetics in favor of a pedagogic 
model which stressed 'lived experience/ privileging 
individual/ collective subjectivities and pupils' own textual 
productions, as well as the use of social realist and non-literary texts. 
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With regard to the activity of literary criticism, the shift to pupil-
centered, progressive pedagogy gave precedence to the creative 
individual as opposed to the text. As Shayer noted, "rather than testing 
the pupil against the text, the text [was] tested for its suitability, 
relevance, entertainment capacity, against the pupil and [would] be 
rejected if it fail[ed] to fulfil the functions required of it" (Shayer, 1972: 
171-172). Under these terms, any text, literary or non-literary, would be 
decided on primarily for its thematic content; it functioned more as a 
tool to engage adolescents in discussions of socially, politically or 
psychologically relevant issues-though as Abbs points out, the term 
'relevant' was never very carefully excavated (Abbs, 1989: 48). The 
relevance of mass culture, for example, tended to be embraced rather 
than interrogated by educators, as the impact of the media and of pop 
culture on their pupils became as socially real as any 'authentic' 
(working) class/cultural influences. Film, for example, it has been 
argued, was often used simply to illuminate the narrative of a literary 
text as part of an English class, 
The assumption here seems to be that works of art are 
transparent; that in them one meets characters just as one meets 
them in real life and without any need for techniques of 
criticism to understand them ... What I would like to question 
fundamentally is the notion that it is somehow easier, "less 
academic" for the CSE level student to study literary or 
cinematic texts in this way, starting as it were beyond the 
artefact, with a given meaning whose sources are never 
illuminated (Bazalgette, 1974: 11-13). 
Likewise, responses to literary texts were usually limited to recall of 
plot summaries elicited, as Abbs recalls, through questions like, "What 
is the story about?/' or extended to draw on pupils' own 'extra-textual' 
experiences, "What do you think about that view?" and "When did 
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you last ... argue with your parents?" (Abbs, 1989: 58). This priority of 
content over form suggested that, just as the individual and the culture 
could be understood separately, so could the sources of meaning of 
texts be found outside of the texts themselves. 
A focus on texts as complex organizations of meaning and form 
was not encouraged or emphasized-and traditional literary criticism, 
rather than being perceived as having the potential to serve a more 
political and 'relevant' function, was rejected as a possible method for 
mining the 'politics of experience' of working class pupils. The analysis 
of texts, as established through traditional literary criticism, was seen to 
position pupils as mere receivers of cultural artefacts and thus was 
thought negatively to position them and their culture in a primarily 
passive role. The notion that a literary work's meaning was 
intrinsically related to its structural form disappeared, and with it the 
belief in the value of developing pupils' aesthetic responses to a piece 
of literature or a work of art. Henry Louis Gates, Jr. has argued against a 
similar historical tendency in African-American criticism to separate 
meaning from form. As he notes, 
Form was merely a surface for a reflection of the world, the 
world here being an attitude toward race; form was a repository 
for the disposal of ideas; message was not only meaning but 
value; poetic discourse was taken to be literal, or once removed; 
language lost its capacity to be metaphorical in the eyes of the 
critic; the poem approached the essay, with referents 
immediately perceivable; literalness precluded the view of 
life as allegorical; and black critics forgot that writers 
approached things through words, not the other way around. 
The functional and didactic aspects of formal discourse assumed 
primacy in normative analysis. The confusion of realms was 
complete: the critic became social reformer, and literature 
became. an instrument for the social and ethical betterment of 
the black person (Gates, 1987: 30). 
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Gates traces this tendency in part to the borrowing by black critics 
of a Marxist base-superstructure-transformed into a race-
superstructure-model of cultural production. Rather than see only 
potential for black 'liberation' in this model, however, Gates considers 
the repressive elements involved in rendering black art essentially 
referential. Amongst other things, he suggests, it tends to devalue the 
diversity of 'the black experience' and denies black literature its status 
as a verbal art capable of sustaining sophisticated verbal analysis. 
Standing Gates' argument somewhat on its head, it is possible to relate 
his remarks to the tendency in English teaching to reconstitute an 
essentialized view of working class culture through social realist texts 
and, at the same ti~e, to claim the irrelevance of literary criticism and 
aesthetic judgements to any of the texts with which pupils engaged. 
Given the existence of such tendencies, English educators appear to 
have fallen into similar traps as some black critics in attempting to 
make visible and make better the culture of their working class pupils. 
For while English educators attempted to enunciate a socio-political 
function for literature and challenge traditional relationships between 
production/reception, reader/text and high/popular culture, they 
produced no accompanying alternative means for getting from the 
relevance/political function of literature to the analysis of specific texts. 
Popular or social realist texts were valued as enabling their readers to 
penetrate the economic and social conditions in which they were 
created without any evidence for what, in the reader-text or text-society 
relationship, might allow this to be so. The hypothetical reader, 
however much reconstituted as an active consumer, remained 
unarmed with the tools of critical textual analysis. 
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The prevailing understanding of cultures as primarily protective 
entities which individuals related to from a position of relative 
autonomy meant that within English education, culture came to refer 
to the individual or collective life experiences/identities of each pupil, 
SOCially positioning them with respect to social class as individuals, yet 
without an account of an immediate interpretive community. Within 
this construct, the individual child became a creative individual cut 
loose from the constraints of community. The tendency within the 
child-centered, progressive pedagogies that emerged in literature 
teaching to associate creativity and expressivity solely with individual 
production created a theoretical gap, as it were, between the culture and 
the child. In the process, creativity and sensibility-like the problem of 
"tradition and the individual talent"-become treated as separate and 
unrelated, foregoing Eliot's reminder that, 
No poet or artist has his complete meaning alone ... 'The emotion 
of art is impersonal. And the poet cannot reach this 
impersonality without surrendering himself wholly to the 
work to be done. And he is not likely to know what is to be done 
unless he lives in what is not merely the present, but the 
present moment of the past, unless he is conscious, not of what is 
dead, but of what is already living (Eliot, 1960: 4, 11). 
The individualising process that took place within English 
teaching, motivated, on the one hand, by the desire to empower the 
working classes, and on the other, by the promise of social progress 
offered by modernity, made form (the community, the culture) no 
longer necessary for meaning, and challenged the very idea of form as a 
signature of content. The theoretical separation of meaning and form 
that occurred in English teaching contributed to the dismissal of many 
of the aims and methods of literary criticism, particularly its aesthetic 
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dimension. The idea of sensibility as the formation of an aesthetic of 
being-through a text and in a context-with ethers within a culture 
was lost. The relationship between individual creativity, in which the 
pupil would participate in the active creation of a text through 
evaluative conversation, and the formation of a collective sensibility 
became obscured, as the tendency to contrast the active producer with 
the passive receiver established a false dichotomy between the two. 
Ultimately, the question of developing a 'politics' of experience 
or lived culture for the purpose of raising critical recognition came to 
be treated in English education as separate and unrelated to a training 
in an 'aesthetics' of experience or sensibility. The idea of forming a 
contemporary sensibility was not viewed as compatible with the 
struggles over hegemony and individual freedom on which English 
educators and British society were focused. Sensibility, without an 
explicit politics to speak through, became associated with high 
culture-the established, the refined and the 'dead'-rather than the 
popular, the changeable or the 'lived.' 
In the end, the forging of a relationship between the political and 
the aesthetic that would work in practice proved difficult to 
accomplish, and attempts to engage the dialectics of dichotomies such 
as reception and production, meaning and form, or active and passive 
consumption remained unresolved. Important questions that had 
been raised by English educators themselves, e. g., what should count 
as literature; what critical or analytical method(s) should be put to a 
text; and what, in any case, should count as a text, were set aside rather 
than studiously debated and many of the assumptions that informed 
their practices, particularly with regard to the relationships between 
reader and text and class and culture were left unexamined. 
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James Britton: personal growth through literature 
James Britton's approach to literature deserves special 
consideration for while it formed part of the 'personal growth' model 
discussed above, Britton shared Leavis' committment to claiming a 
particular role for literature in the formation of individual 
sensibilities. Where they differed, however, is where the individual 
empowerment model, in general, departed from the literary critical 
one, i. e., in the priority given to the individual over the text.4 
Britton adopted the idea of literary texts as 'structures of feeling' 
from Suzanne Langer's philosophical inquiries into the idea of 
language, including literary language, as a symbolizer of the inner 
structures of thought and emotions that were formed through the 
individual's experience of the world (Langer, 1957). For Britton, 
literature was one means by which pupils could engage their inner 
structures of feelings through linguistic expression. In order to 
elaborate this image, Britton borrowed from D. W. Harding the idea of 
literature as w~itten language in the 'spectator' role. Harding had 
developed the notion of the spectator in order to replace the existing 
model of the reader-text relationship as one of vicarious wish-
fulfillment or 'identification' with the characters or events in the text. 
He wished to claim instead the idea of reading as a social act, as 
4 Frances Christie, in a recent article, fails to note this important difference when 
she claims a "significant relationship" between Britton and the personal growth 
model and the Leavisite tradition (Christie, 1993: 95). Christie is also mistaken in 
suggesting that Britton and Leavis "were not primarily interested in language" (98). 
Britton's developmental model was informed by a profound interest in the role of 
language in learning (his model is discussed in detail in the chapter which follows) 
and Leavis' literary criticism presupposes engagement with the language poets and 
novelists (and critics) use in order to create (or derive) meaning in a literary text. 
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"affirming with the author a set of values" (Harding, 1962: 147), as he 
suggested, 
The more sophisticated l'E::?,der knows that he is in social 
communication of a special sort with the author, and he bears 
in mind that the represented participants are only part of a 
convention by which the author discusses and proposes an 
evaluation of possible human experiences (Harding, 1962: 147). 
Britton used the notion of spectator in his own model to suggest 
that through the process of detachment from their own or some 
fictionalized account of experience, pupils developed emotional and 
cognitive skills-that the act of reading or writing in the spectator role 
encouraged pupils to abstract and reflect upon the world and develop 
the ability to make value judgements in the face of their and other's 
experiences. 
However, with Britton, the notion of 'spectator/ taken up 
within a framework of child-centred pedagogy, ultimately championed 
the poet over the paem, rather than exploring the relationship between 
them. Pupils' own writings and experiences were foregrounded and 
the spectator role was interpreted primarily as one which pupils took 
up to contribute to their own individual growth rather than as a means 
for understanding a text as an order of socially organized meanings and 
form. In Britton and the personal growth model, the notion of 
'spectator' thus never took on the force or influence that it might have 
as a literary critical tool or guide for the reading or evaluating of texts. 
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Literature, Criticism and the Incommensurability of Cultures 
Further chapenges were made against literary criticism and 
Leavis' claim that his critical determinations regarding a literary text 
were derived from an 'overt' and 'collaborative,' "this is so, isn't it?"-
"yes, but," interplay of judgments. His critics underscored the implicit 
value system of traditional literary culture operating within such 
'open' exchanges and suggested that in the absence of a consensus of 
values amongst participants, Leavis and his literary critical method 
collapsed. As Perry Anderson wrote, 
The central idea of this epistemology-the interrogative 
statement-demands one crucial precondition; a shared stable 
system of beliefs and values. Without this, no loyal exchange 
and report is possible. If the basic formulation and outlook of 
readers diverges, their experiences will be incommensurable. 
Leavis's whole method presupposes, in fact, a morally and 
culturally unified audience. In its absence, his epistemology 
disintegrates (Anderson, 1968: 50). 
Educators in the 1960s and 1970s were not, of course, faced with a 
"morally and culturally unified" group of pupils. More significantly, 
however, conservative and radical educators alike accepted and 
advocated a notion of incommensurability which, on the one hand, 
constructed cultur~ as the fixed property of a particular social class, and 
on the other, conflated the terms 'incommensurable' and 
'incommunicable'. These educators, like Anderson, legitimately 
perceived incommensurability to be about social (or human) division 
and separation-the idea that there are, in Winch's words, 'limiting 
notions' (Winch, 1977: 183) which may preclude the possibility of cross-
cultural human dialogue. 
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It must be considered, however, that within actively productive, 
'organic' tribal societies, criticism, in the sense of dialogues of 
judgement, is virtually non-existent or limited because so much is 
common and shared (see Goody, 1977). Criticism then (of literature, 
art, music, etc.), would, against Anderson's claims, presuppose the 
non-organic, non-already agreed judgements within the social group. 
Under these conditions, criticism thus becomes an instrument for 
regaining, for the modern world, the no-longer-shared or stable 
dialogue of the organic community (as was Leavis' intent); it is the 
activity of acting as though there is a common basis for agreement or 
rational comparison, based on the belief in the existence of a rational 
order, in say, principles of relevance, or in some aspects of experience 
or degree of shared humanity. As a contributor to Essays in Criticism 
wrote: 
Criticism .. .is an attempt to reach agreement on the nature of a 
given, particular work; to question whether such agreement is 
possible is merely to take away the sense, not only of criticism 
but of literature. The "rules" of criticism are the rules of 
conversation: certain standards of intelligence and relevance 
are implicit in the undertaking, as well as a reasonable 
minimum of common experience. In the absence of these 
conditions, criticism, like conversation, is impossible (Dawson, 
1964: 7). 
For educators in the 1960s and 1970s, however, in the face of the 
prevailing argument that literary criticism required cultural consensus, 
and in a socio-political climate in which consensus was either deemed 
impossible or undesirable or both, two positions emerged in principle 
and in practice-literary criticism was either retained as an I elitist' 
practice or rejected as one. The idea that criticism might serve toward 
the creation of a new, dynamic, and pluralist cultural exchange was not 
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considered, since the necessary ::ondi:ions £Or the fandio!l. af criticism 
and the formation of a 'contemporary' sensibility were not perceived to 
exist. In a climate in which the focus was on relativism, and not 
'rationalist' conversation (in the hermeneutic sense), the notion of 
incommensurability was used to oppose the idea of criticism as 
discussion, i. e. argument and reason, that could absorb social class, 
ethnic or gendered positions (these points will be taken up and 
elaborated in Chapters Six and Seven). In the end, by demoting 
literature and attacking Leavis, the possibility of a dialogic, 
conversational literary criticism, less organized around a cultural 
canon and more around analytical conversation (leading to agreement 
or disagreement), was rejected. 
But while the changing function of criticism can be associated 
with certain post-war socio-political realities, Leavis himself (and some 
of his associates) also bore the responSibility. What had begun as an 
oppositional practice in training in discrimination and evaluation-
i.e., "a training for a greater awareness, for a sharper attention to subtle 
meanings" (Hall and Whannel, 1964: 37)-increasingly degenerated 
into a habit of making particularly autonomous decisions about what 
should and should not be allowed in the Great Tradition (Bateson, 
1964; Said, 1985). As a result, one of Leavis' key concerns-the 
formation of a contemporary sensibility-became associated with an 
imposed, pre-cultivated literary 'taste' rather than a collective, literary 
activity in percept~on and judgment.5 
5 Said suggests that French and American New Criticism suffered a similar 
transformation as did Leavisism over time. He underscores the original populist 
intention behind each of these schools of criticism in their desire to create and 
expand a community of responsive readers in order to compete for authority within 
mass culture. However, Said contends that with their uptake in the academy, ... "an 
interest in expanding the constituency lost out to a wish for abstract correctness and 
104 
While the specifically non-democratic aspects of literary 
criticism and the te.aching of literature were effectively replaced with 
more egalitarian-oriented 'personal growth' and 'social realist' models 
in English education, neither of these approaches addressed the 
question of the potential function of a training in literary criticism and 
aesthetic response within a more democratised educational system. 
The positions taken up by participants in the English educational 
debates with regard to culture and tradition actually militated against 
this as a possibility, for both representatives of the Left and the Right 
denied the transformative capacities of cultural traditions, relying on 
essentialist notions of class and culture to defend their positions. 
Paradoxically, their shared conceptualisation of culture actually served 
to protect traditional class/cultural boundaries which, in turn, lent 
support to the apparent undeniability of the incommensurability of 
cultures. 
There was, however, a discernible tension in the argument for 
incommensurability which partially originated from within the 
methodological rigor within a quasi-monastic order" (Said, 1985: 140). He 
attributes this to the tendency in modern universities toward the separation of 
diSciplines and the conditions this creates for the emergence of specialized forms of 
communication and of knowledge. An interesting earlier critique of the academy's 
influence over the function of criticism appears in Richard Ohmann's 1970 essay, 
Teaching and Studying Literature at the End of Ideology. Though Ohmann shares 
Said's concern with the relationship between the diminishing democratic function 
of criticism and its achieved prestige within the academy, he discusses this 
relationship in terms of the changing meaning of the notion of pluralism on which 
he believes (pOSitively) American New Criticism was established in the 1950s. For 
Ohmann and others studying and teaching literature during the 1960s, the measures 
taken by the universities against the student protest movement revealed the 
academy as a hostile environment for political action and social change. Their 
original belief-that through literature (and New Criticism) literary critics could 
serve a liberatory, humanist role in society-was rejected for, on the one hand, 
buying into the notion of academic freedom and on the other sustaining (by refusing 
to name) the ideology of bourgeois individualis:n· that informed their practice 
(Ohmann, 1970). For a current debate on these issues see the collection of essays in 
The New Historicism, 1989, ed. H. Aram Veeser. 
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socially egalitarian promises of modernity itself. On the one hand, the 
creative individual was presented as free or potentially free from the 
constraints of the interpretive community. This freedom vis a vis 
modernity was, moreover, offered as an antidote to the limiting 
boundaries of traditional societies. On the other hand, however, 
individuals and individual cultures were portrayed as so bound to 
particular sets of traditional values and beliefs as to make 
communication with others impossible or undesirable or both. This 
emergent contradiction between the belief in individual freedom and 
the acknowledgement of cultural constraints became a lasting and 
central feature of the debates in English education throughout the 
1970s. While the tension between these apparently contradictory aims 
was played out on the intellectual field of English education during 
this period as part of contemporary educational debates about the 
relationship between social class, language and culture, the origins of 
the controversy lie in the debates between tradition and modernity that 
had begun to take place several decades earlier. 
, 
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Chapter Five 
The Paradigm Shift in English Education: 
The Language Debates and the Fate of Culture 
Shifts in the nature of literature in the classroom were an 
important factor behind the frequently observed 'paradigm shift' in 
English teaching which made language and linguistics the focus of 
teachers' and researchers' attention by the 1960s and 1970s (see Inglis, 
1971; Shayer, 1972; Mathieson, 1975; Abbs, 1980; Allen, 1980; Ball, 1982; 
Catt, 1988; Burgess and Martin, 1990). The shift toward language was a 
significant part of the trend towards the child-centred, anti-elitist and 
progressive 'politics' of English teaching discussed in Chapter Four. 
The literature cited above variously suggests that the shift toward 
language either bypassed, rejected or resolved the complex issues of 
class and culture that had been raised in the culture debates with 
respect to literature. Amongst these authors, it is generally agreed that, 
like the 'politics of experience' agenda encountered in the personal 
growth and social realist approaches to literature, the language 
paradigm in English teaching was similarly organised around a shift 
away from the 'bearers of culture,' (teachers and texts), towards the 
'producers of culture,' (pupils, their talk and their writing). 
By stressing variety of language uses and relevant language 
situations as well as speech and linguistic variation, the renewed focus 
on language promised to help rid English teaching of the problems 
associated with literature and literary criticism, e. g., the dominance of 
textual analysis, the 'subjective' nature and 'inherent elitism' of the 
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consideration and roesponses given to literary works, and the perceived 
lack of relevance of literary ctitical language and 'higl~' culture to the 
lives of working class pupils. Instead, releva1~c2 cmd pers~nal creativity 
were stressed and 'culture' came to either refer simply to the 
individual pupil (the 'culture' of the child) or to the immediate 
environments which pupils inhabited (the 'culture' of the school, the 
community, etc.). 
Rather than dissolving the culture debates within English 
education, however, many of the issues regarding literature that were 
dismissed by educ,ators, including, the relationship between meaning 
and form, actually re-emerged in the language paradigm. The working 
concepts of culture and tradition that had influenced the shift toward 
language study and away from traditional literary criticism in English 
teaching reappeared to inform the debates over language, culture, and 
class that emerged during this period. The very issues that educators 
had hoped to escape in their rejection of Leavisism resurfaced in these 
debates, but this time the text under scrutiny was language itself. 
'Equality of Outco~e' and the Intelligence Debate 
One of the principal motives for the change in focus on language 
and communication during this period had been the question, touched 
on in previous chapters, of equality of outcome in education for pupils 
from divergent socio-cultural and socio-economic backgrounds. The 
acquisition of a greater knowledge about language by pupils and 
teachers alike was associated with, and even intrinsically linked to, the 
issue of outcome and the achievement of greater social and educational 
equality, with a particular emphasis on working class pupils. This 
concern over language and equality of outcome, moreover, merged 
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with another debate already taking place in Britain regarding the 
relationship between social class and intelligence or cognitive ability. 
The 'intelligence' debate in Britain centred around the question 
of whether intelligence was innate and inherited or whether it was 
principally determined by and/or affected by the environment. The 
principal figure representing the former view was the psychologist Sir 
Cyril Burt who cOIiducted numerous, well-publicised empirical studies 
which he offered as evidence for the belief that heredity and not 
environment was the major factor that determined varying levels of 
intelligence within and between different social classes. Although Burt 
admitted the environment as a minor factor in shaping or constraining 
cognitive development, the general findings of his research were that 
the major component of intelligence (which he defined as an innate, 
general, cognitive mental capacity) was connected to an individual's 
genetic constitution, that this was biologically inheritable, and that it 
was the differentb~. distribution of genotypes that accounted for lower 
performances on general intelligence tests amongst the working class 
population (Burt, 1937, 1943, 1955).1 
An alternative line of investigation emerged in the 1950s which 
challenged Burt's and others' privileging of heredity over 
environment as the explanation for pupils' educational success or 
1 Although this research has since been discredited (see Kamin, 1974; and see 
Eysenck and Kamin, 1981), it remains relevant to the present discussion beyond its 
historical significance insofar as in establishing the idea of a genetically-derived 
'innate,' universal, general intelligence, it contributed to the confusion that would 
later appear in the deficit-difference debate between a genetically-derived and a 
socially-derived cognHive inheritance. Bernstein's identification of different 
cognitive capacities between working class and middle class pupils, for example, 
was conflated by many with the geneticists' claim for different innate capacities. 
The result was that the meaning of the terms in the context of academic and 
educational debates over competence became practically indistinguishable. The 
issue of these debates will be taken up in more detail further on in this chapter. 
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failure. More sociological in orientation, it arose out of research in the 
area of post-war social mobility (see Glass, 1954) and was interested in 
the role of education in affecting more 'subtle' forms of social selection 
following its restructuring (see Himmelweit, 1954; Floud, 1956). This 
research called attention to social factors contributing to educational 
inequality such as family size and home conditions as well as 
psychological issues, for example, the kinds of motivation and 
aspirations that working class pupils and their families had with 
respect to their education, or that teachers encouraged in their working 
class pupils. Although the research did not go so far as to claim that 
the material and 'cultural' features of the home environment should 
be regarded as social determinants of intelligence (Floud, 1956: 143-144; 
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Halsey, 1958), in underlining the importance of environmental and 
behavioural factors, research of this kind began to successfully 
challenge the widely held view that innate ability was the sole relevant 
factor in educational outcome. 
It was from within this same tradition that the work of Basil 
Bernstein emerged in the 1950s. His work went even further, 
however, both in challenging Burt's assumptions about cognition and 
in relating the features of the home environment to educational 
attainment (see Bernstein, 1958, 1961). Bernstein suggested that the 
distinctive, socially-derived modes of cognitive functions, e. g., 
perception and reasoning, that obtained between social classes 
developed through and were sustained by the medium of language, 
It is proposed that forms of spoken language in the process of 
their learning, elicit, reinforce, and generalise distinct types of 
relationships with the environment and thus create particular 
dimensions of significance. Speech marks out what is 
relevant-affectively, cognitively and socially-and 
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experience is transformed by that which is made relevant 
(Bernstein, 1961: 288-289). 
Bernstein's focus on language offered a more penetrating 
interpretation than previous sociological studies for the relationship of 
the environment to measurements of intelligence. According to his 
theory, unequal outcomes on 1. Q. tests of verbal ability between social 
classes, for example, could not be explained solely through some 
general innate factor, nor seen simply as outcomes of problems of 
assimilation or attitude. They were, instead, a consequence of the 
distinctive forms of language which pupils acquired through 
socialisation within a particular family and/or class background. 
Bernstein thus foregrounded language as the key to environmental 
influences on cognitive performance. It was, he claimed, the principal 
means by which individual and social attitudes and behaviours were 
formed and made manifest. 
These early formulations of Bernstein's theory served two 
important functions. They contributed to the aim of work in the 
sociology of educdion to highlight how social factors intruded on 
educational processes and they provided sociological, linguistic and 
psychological insights into the function of language in the learning 
process. Their relationship to the language paradigm and Bernstein's 
relationship to the politics of the intellectual field of English education 
is explored more fully below. 
The Intellectual Field of English Education 
The language paradigm was informed in the field of education 
by several related areas of theoretical interest. At the centre of English 
teaching during this time was an interest in the role of language in 
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cognitive and emotional development, due in large part to the 
influences of James Britton and Harold Rosen both of whom were at 
the University of London, Institute of Education, which provided an 
important institutional site for the dissemination of new ideas to the 
teaching profession (Britton, 1967, 1970, 1970a; Barnes, Britton and 
Rosen, 1969). Bernstein's investigations into language and social class 
were also well known through the development of his sociolinguistic 
code theory at the Sociological Research Unit located at the Institute 
and the related empirical research that began to emerge during this 
period (see Lawton, 1968; and see Bernstein, 1972). Michael Halliday's 
Programme in Linguistics and English Teaching also contributed to the 
intellectual field although this work did not have the same influence 
in English education as did Britton's or Rosen's during this period. 
Meanwhile, also developing during this period of emergent 
focus on language in British education was the new, inter-disciplinary 
field of sociolinguistics, as work in the area of language and culture 
came to be known. In Britain, sociolinguistics came to the aid of the 
language paradigm through its contribution to several important inter-
related themes, some of which had already been present in the culture 
debates with regard to literary culture. These included: the notion of 
incommensurability, but with a shift in emphasis from culture to 
language; the relationship between language, culture and thought; and 
the question of the viability and or desirability of 'cross-cultural,' cross-
lingual' communication. 
While each of the above elements in theoretical development 
must be viewed as independent of one another-and, indeed, they 
occupied or were granted quite distinct positions-together they 
generated a major part of the intellectual field of English education in 
112 
the 1960s and 1970s. The ideas which they elaborated determined, in 
large part, the shape of the 'hngu3.ge deb?.tco' which supp~an~zd the 
culture debates as the site of contestation where matters of langl.r.age 
and culture were concerned and, taken as a whole, they contain the 
conceptual and the political framework on which the language 
paradigm was constructed. 
Many of the ideas about language which gained in currency 
during this time in English education actually drew on some of the 
same intellectual sources, for example, from cognitive psychology and 
linguistic or anthropological traditions. But the differences between 
the various elaborations of these-particularly in their regard for the 
impact of 'culture' on linguistic processes-were highly significant 
with respect to deeper and more enduring intellectual issues. 
The Language Debates -"Who can tell the dancer from the dance?" 
The Fateful Split between Competence and Performance 
Amongst the participants to the language debates, Britton and 
Bernstein both credit Langer and Cassirer, Sapir and Vygotsky with 
being important influences on the formation of their ideas (Britton, 
1970; Bernstein, 1971). Both Britton and Bernstein viewed language as 
a form of symbolic behaviour; as the medium by which ideas and 
beliefs as well as images and sensory data were transformed into verbal 
concepts. As Langer expressed it, "Language is conception and 
conception is the frame of perception" (Langer, 1957: 126). Also evident 
in their writings is Sapir's notion of the heuristic function of language, 
the capacity of language to interpenetrate with experience. Language, 
suggested Sapir, not only represented experience, it also discovered and 
interpreted meanings for its speakers that they had not derived from 
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first hand experiences (Sapir, 1949: 1-44). nut al~hough both Britton 
and Bernstein may have sht'.red th~ vicw of language as both a 
symboliser and moderator of experience, their interpretations of the 
significance of this view with regard to education differed considerably. 
Britton emphasised the creative and interpretative function of 
language in his work, seeing it as fundamental to pupils' cognitive and 
emotional development. He endorsed the idea, for example, that 
through talk and personal writing, pupils developed their natural 
capacities to extrapolate from personal experiences and construct 
patterned, mental models of the larger environment in which they 
lived and which were necessary for abstract, higher order thinking 
(Britton, 1970). Britton and the followers of the 'personal growth' 
model focused almost exclusively on the cognitive and affective modes 
of representation which projected onto experience and were 
transformed into (and by) language. Their concern was to develop the 
innate potential that all children shared for making sense or meaning 
out of their environments. The emphasis was on the creativity and 
imagination that individuals demonstrated in constructing, 
categorising and classifying their way towards an experienced world 
view. 
Although Britton acknowledged a social and cultural dimension 
to modes of representation, his developmental model effectively 
detached the social from the affective and cognitive domains. The 
social became, in essence, the 'world' or the 'environment' within 
which experiences happened; it was presented as autonomous and real, 
as something 'out there' within which experiences occurred. This 
positioning of the social as active yet apart in Britton involved a choice 
on his part to remain focused on what for him was most meaningful 
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and relevant-the relationship between 'structures of feelings' and 
symbolic forms. However, it can also be traced to the 'cognitive 
revolution' in psychology in the 1950s when interest shifted from 
behaviourist-inspired observations of overt responses to 
environmental stimuli to cognitive-oriented explorations of the 
unobservable mental processes that guided actions. One important 
result in education of this new interest in the workings of the mind 
was the influence of Chomskian linguistics which introduced a 
theoretical split between 'competence'-what an individual knew 
'inside'-and 'performance'-what an individual did 'outside' 
(Chomsky, 1965: 3-4; Bruner, 1986). One of the implications of this was 
that, in terms of a child's cognitive development, it was permissible, 
even desirable, to view the mind independently of the social world-
hence, while culture happened outside of the child's mind, cognitive 
and emotional development occurred inside. 
But what had been introduced as a theoretical split within 
linguistics between competence and performance was introduced 
within the intellectual field of English education to universalise, and 
in effect, de-socialise, innate (linguistic/cognitive) competencies. 
Competence was championed over performance as proof of all 
children's universal-understood as equal-potential for developing 
essential competencies. Competence became viewed not as genetically-
or socially-, but mentally-governed by an internal logic of the mind; 
and the development of various competencies was understood to occur 
naturally across stages of growth through similar mental operations 
and with similar results for all children.2 
2 The social was only reinstated in order to account for observable differences in 
individual performances, but the reasons given for socially-constituted differences 
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Against the geneticist account of innateness, Britton supported 
the view that all children could and did acquire the same capacity to 
represent both particular and universal aspects of experience because 
all were innately endowed with this capacity. From this, however, 
Britton and the personal growth model also assumed that meanings 
were the same for all children because of this shared capacity and 
because the 'world' in which meanings were generated was the same. 
In removing 'competence' from any social or cultural sources (and thus 
rescuing it from the geneticist account that paradoxically needed the 
social world to sustain its position), Britton and the personal growth 
model were left with the 'world' as the unifying source for the 
patterning of meanings and their linguistic (or non-linguistic) 
representations. In this account, however, although the mind was 
released from geneticist interpretations of innateness, there was no 
mechanism for differentiating between the mind's capacity for 
meaning-making and the actual meanings which were produced. 
Bernstein's work did raise the questions which Chomsky and 
developmental cognitive psychology left to one side. Bernstein 
attempted to demonstrate how the mind interacted with the social and 
cultural to generate both different orderings of meanings and different 
forms of language. For Bernstein, however much creativity and 
imagination entered into this process, it nevertheless was both 
generative of and generated by the social in all its forms, including 
language. 
were always external not internal to the individual child. Explanations were 
initially sought from research in the sociology of education, for its insights into the 
material and cultural conditions that contributed to unequal attainment amongst 
pupils. Later, the 'new sociology of education' emerged and the problem was seen 
more in ideological terms, as originating in social institutions (see Young, 1971). 
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For Bernstein, the importance of Sapir's heuristic view of 
language was not primarily, as it was for Britton, its suggestion that 
language had the power to discover meanings for its speakers. What 
was important for Bernstein was that Sapir revealed language as a 
shaper, for better or for worse, of our experiences in and of possible 
worlds. Sapir himself would not have agreed with Britton's posing of 
an objective 'world' within which the merger of experience and 
language occurred, freely and naturally, through the mind. The 
connection between language and culture was made by both Sapir and 
Bernstein in terms of constraint; the possibilities of language's 
discoveries were necessarily limited by the culture and vice versa. 
Sapir, for example, makes the following point in his account of the 
heuristic function of language which Britton omits, 
Language is at one and the same time helping and retarding us 
in our exploration of experience, and the details of these 
processes of help and hindrance are deposited in the subtler 
meanings of different cultures (Sapir, 1949: 8). 
Bernstein, moving beyond Sapir, argued that linguistic and 
cognitive development was subject to the influences of power and 
discursive regulation found within distinctive cultures, social groups 
and social structures. Bernstein, unlike Chomsky, sought to locate 
competence (reattached to performance) within the restraints of power 
relations and their resulting differential unequal positionings. 
Bernstein insisted on the idea of competence as simultaneously 
cognitively inscribed and socially constituted. This problematised the 
popular view that all children were 'equally/ because innately, 
competent by making competence a social not a mere cognitive aspect 
of the mind. The fact that the perception of the environment was 
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patterned along sociological and cultural lines meant that the 
acquisition of different orders of meaning was not necessarily 
equivalent or equaL Different perceptions and interpretations which 
pupils held of their worlds as well as the forms of language which 
these generated could be limiting or innovating, constraining or 
creative, depending on the social circumstances surrounding their 
production and/or reception. 
Britton's Vygotsky IBernstein's Vygotsky 
The attention given to Vygotsky by Britton and Bernstein was a 
natural extension of their interest in the ideas of Langer and Sapir 
discussed above, although their take up of Vygotsky was distinctive. 
Vygotsky, like Sapir, emphasised the interpenetration of language and 
the environment, but went further by actually describing how 
classifications of experiences were brought about in and by language. 
For Britton, Vygotsky contributed first a psychological and later a social 
dimension to his interest in the relationship between language, the 
environment and the development of thinking in children (Britton, 
1970, 1987). Vygotsky presented language as a regulatory device that 
assisted children in sorting and ordering their experiences of the world, 
enabling them to develop new forms of thought and more complex 
forms of behaviour. For Britton, Vygotsky's suggestion that a child's 
monologic use of language, 'speech for oneself,' served as a form of 
self-orientation with respect to the environment, assisting the 
internalisation of experiences (Vygotsky, 1962) supported the 
promotion of language for learning. In terms of the personal growth 
model, Vygotsky's observation that speech for oneself evolved into 
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'inner speech,' revealed how the transformation from language to 
thought was accomplished. 
In later writings, Britton focused more on Vygotsky's (and 
Luria's) articulation of the social nature of cognition, how socio-
cultural conditions generated tools or 'auxiliary symbols' for learning 
in individuals which influenced new forms of behaviour (see Luria 
and Vygotsky, 1992: 114-117). Britton interpreted this idea of the 
importance of the social conditions of learning as meaning that a 
child's consciousness was shaped in interaction with others, in 
Vygotsky's 'zone of proximal development'.3 In the liberal discourse of 
the personal growth modet however, social simply came to mean 
interactive, and the zone of proximal development was interpreted as a 
site of benign interactive processes. It constituted the discursive space 
in which a child's consciousness met a more mature adult 
consciousness, enabling the child to internalise gradually various 
forms of shared social behaviour. The zone was perceived as the 
'cognitive world' in which both particularistic and universal meanings 
both originated and took shape for the child. The adult mediated these 
'shared' meanings by both encouraging the expression of individual 
consciousness and by 'lending' consciousness to the child, helping the 
child become a member of a particular 'culture' or 'community.' For 
Britton, such communities were microcosms of the 'world;' they too 
were autonomous, objective environments within which interactive 
(social) learning took place, 
3 Britton's increased attention to the importance of the interactive element of 
language and learning was no doubt part of the general shift from sole focus on intra-
individual to interest in inter-individual learning that was brought about by a 
revision of Chomsky within education in the 1970s reported in Moon, 1988: 173-174. 
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Taking community in a micro sense, it is likely that we all live 
in a number of communities. As teachers, we are responsible for 
one of those-the classroom. It is clear we have a choice: we 
can operate so as to make that as rich an interactive learning 
community as we can, or we may continue to treat it as a captive 
audience for whatever instruction we choose to offer (Britton, 
1987: 26). 
In their reading of Vygotsky, Britton and the followers of the 
personal growth model continued to assume that the generation and 
patterning of meanings that occurred in interaction were transferable 
from the 'world' onto micro-contexts like the school and the family. 
Hence the source of pupils' and their adult mediators' meanings was 
never investigated beyond the immediate environment, (e. g., school-
based knowledge), or the individuals themselves. Neither was the 
asymmetry of the relationship between teacher and student within the 
zone addressed, rcither interactive learning was assumed to rid the 
classroom of the issue of the imbalance of power. Vygotsky was 
essentially recontextualised into a pedagogic theory that offered a 
rationalisation for language-based, interactive learning in the 
classroom. The zone demonstrated how children acquired the ability 
to regulate and refine their individual behaviour through language 
interactively with adults and/or peers-while the individual child 
remained the sole creator and innovator of his or her own meanings. 
For Bernstein, in contrast, Vygotsky's zone of ·proximal 
development woul~ not simply be viewed as a neutral (or potentially 
neutral) site for the creation or exchange of mutually-interpretable 
meanings. While Britton might have assumed thc.t the presence of 
nurturing adults (teachers, parents, etc.) was all that was necessary to 
ensure successful interactive communication, Bernstein emphasised 
the diverse cultural sources (and resources) of both the meaning 
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makers and the meanings that were made. Bernstein's understanding 
of consciousness as sociologically and culturally patterned would 
suggest that within the zone, conflict and/or strategic negotiation over 
meaning would naturally occur. 
Furthermore, for Bernstein, the zone would be the cognitive 
representation of a social world, hence the meanings as well as the 
'tools' that were employed or made available within it-the social 
context of learning-would be subject to the uneven social regulation 
and distribution of the content and framing of the knowledge to be 
acquired and/or 'transmitted. The regulation of experiences by 
language was mediated by adults transmitting, as it were, the 'codes' or 
organising principles of the social world(s) in which they themselves 
were located. Hence, adults were not simply enablers or facilitators but 
potentially shapers or, to greater and lesser extents, determiners of 
children's consciousness, for within the zone of proximal 
development, it was possible for an adult socialiser to bring meanings 
(and the rules for their articulation) that were not shared by the child 
and vice versa. 
Like Vygotsky, Bernstein perceived that words and meanings 
constituted and were constitutive of the historical and cultural basis of 
individual minds. Bernstein, however, raised the issue of the external 
(and internal) constraints on the generation and ratification of 
'legitimate' meanings in both micro and macro communicative 
contexts. For Bernstein, the fact that language was grounded in culture 
meant that it was necessarily subject to the influences of power and 
discursive regulation. Britton's Vygotsky, however, remained outside 
of Bernstein's view of culture as a site of contestation over meanings. 
For Britton, the zone of proximal development became a site of social 
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and discursive freedom; a cognitive space where the 'shared' meanings 
of a culture were discovered, articulated and made valid. Britton 
effectively neutralised social! cultural linguistic communication by 
suggesting that meanings were universally available in the 'world,' 
discovered rather than tacitly acquired, and openly exchanged and 
negotiated in interaction with others. 
Culture into mind won't go: the political positioning of Bernstein in 
the intellectual field 
In the end, English educators looked towards Britton and the 
personal growth model to define their agenda for the 1970s. 
Bernstein's conclusion that the educational process produced socially 
uneven products, due in part to different sets of sociolinguistic codes 
operating between pupils and schools, was not acceptable (or 
expressible) within the terms of the model. Instead, what was 
foregrounded was that, at the individual cognitive level, all pupils, 
regardless of class/ cultural background, were equally, because innately, 
competent. The model sought to activate the role of the learner (the 
reader, the writer, etc.), focusing on the process of acquisition rather 
than on the (disparate) products that resulted. But while there was 
much gained from this developmental approach, the tendency within 
the personal growth model to separate innate potential or competence 
and actual performance also did much to obscure and/or deny the role 
of class and culture in language and learning.4 
The separation of the individual from the social was also 
reproduced in the politics structuring the intellectual field of English 
4 For an informed account of the strengths and weaknesses of the personal growth 
model and its relationship to the development of the English curriculum see 
(Burgess, 1985, 1988, 1993). 
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that emerged in the 1970s- -and, consequcntiy, the fat::! of B2!"nstein's 
position within the language paradigr:l we-,s sealed.. Eis insistence on 
the presence of the social dimension in linguistic and cognitive 
processes was deemed irrelevant to personal growth and was 
incongruous with the radical politics of equality and the liberal politics 
of relativism that had been mapped on to the intellectual field of the 
culture debates and which were now reappearing in the language 
paradigm. 
The 'politics' of English teaching that coalesced in the 1970s 
around questions of language and culture came from a variety of 
political and intellectual sources from both inside and outside Britain. 
A 'radical' politic~ of equality developed within English education, 
exemplified in Harold Rosen's work, which represented working class 
language and culture as a source of creative expression and a means 
toward empowerment in the pedagogic context and beyond. In pursuit 
of a committed agenda to endorse the value of working class speech 
and find it a legitimate place in the classroom, however, Rosen and 
educators and researchers like him misrepresented the role and 
consequences of class and its relationship to language and culture. In 
attempting to politically interpret the personal growth model by 
welcoming linguistic diversity and multi-culturalism into the 
classroom, they simultaneously retained its inadequate account of the 
social dimension of language and cognition. 
The indirect influence of Chomsky is apparent in Rosen's 
assumption that all languages carried the potential to express similar 
meanings and that similar meanings could therefore potentially be 
expressed in any language. This idea was at the heart of Rosen's 
critique of Bernstein (see Rosen, 1972). Bernstein's suggestion that 
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'potential' and 'actual' were subject to visible and invisible forces at 
work in the social structure was unrealisable in Rosen's framework. 
Moreover, Rosen ignored Bernstein's point that the maintenance of a 
class system presupposed an unequal distribution of symbolic as well as 
material capital, including access to particular forms of language and 
the meanings attached to these. He also neglected to engage with the 
related point that one of the aims of a class system is to mask and/ or to 
restrict access to certain orientations to meaning and their linguistic 
realisations, particularly those in which a change in principles can 
occur, i. e., elaborated codes (Bernstein, 1972, 1972a). 
Rosen's contribution to the language debates must be seen in the 
context of the New Left politics discussed with respect to the culture 
debates in previous chapters. His position within the language 
paradigm essentially paralleled his position on literature within the 
culture debates-to value working class language (the culture of the 
dominated) more and middle class language (the dominant culture) 
less. Rosen's primary political agenda to reinstate popular, working 
class culture and the forms of its expression as a legitimate presence in 
the classroom, however much it achieved, discouraged a broader 
conceptualisation of the links between language, culture and the social 
structure. His and the personal growth model's belief in the value of 
working class pupils' expressive/interactive linguistic contributions to 
the pedagogic context was converted into the idea that their 
expressivity was the means towards their liberation from educational 
and social inequality. 
An important source of support for this position came from 
Labov's work in the 1970s on Black English Vernacular, reported most 
notably in 'The Logic of Nonstandard English' (Labov, 1972), one of the 
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cornerstones of sociolinguistics as applied to education. Labov's 
apparent demonstration of the underlying logical, grammatical 
structure in the speech of lower class black children articulated a 
'scientifically' constructed argument against the deficit theories that 
had achieved prominence at that time both in Britain and the U. S. and 
into which Bernstein's work had unwittingly been drawn for support. 
Labov's assertion that "the logic of standard English cannot be 
distinguished from the logic of any other dialect of English" (Labov, 
1972: 229) was congruent with the other ascendant strand of 
sociolinguistic theory that declared the potential equality of all 
languages, but with its intellectual roots in the work of Franz Boas not 
Chomsky. 
The idea that all languages or language varieties were different 
but equal (i. e., all could be used to express the same thing) was used to 
argue against thE: idea that became associated with the 'deficit 
hypothesis,' that languages or language varieties might differ in terms 
of what they were able to express (i. e., all were 'deficient' or inadequate 
for the expression of certain meanings) due to the cultural and 
historical uses to which they had been put or, as Bernstein would have 
it, to the different social bases of their production. But while these 
ideas raised crucial questions about the relationship between language, 
culture and cognition, rather than becoming the focus of serious 
consideration in education, they were set up through the exigencies of 
the cultural politic~ of the period merely in opposition to one another. 
Moreover, within the 'deficit-difference debates,' the 'different but 
equal' position became the only politically acceptable one for left and 
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liberal educators and researchers to support.s Labov concluded that 
verbal behaviour was determined not by cultural or verbal deprivation 
(inexpressible within a radical or a liberal, relativist position), but by 
the presence or absence of asymmetry or solidarity between speakers in 
a social situation (Labov, 1972: 212-213; and see Bernstein's critique of 
this hypothesis in Bernstein, 1990: 114-119). This supported Rosen's 
and the personal growth model's solution to educational inequality to 
be found in valuing working class language more and changing 
relations between teachers and students in the pedagogic context. 
However, it had the simultaneous effect of encouraging a disregard for 
Bernstein's related concern to locate the distinction between a potential 
and an actual use of language beyond the 'inequality' of a given social 
situation (as Labov had done) and within the schools and the social 
(class) structure itself, both of which acted selectively on legitimate 
meanings. Whereas in Labov and other sociolinguistic models, power 
is understood simply as the difference in weight between one speaker 
and another, for Bernstein, power may be locally enacted but it is 
socially generated. The social structure, according to Bernstein, worked 
S The extent to which the politics of this period influenced intellectual debate is 
also evident in the critique of sociolinguistics in general and Bernstein in particular 
published by the German linguist, Norbert Dittmar (Dittmar, 1976). Although 
Dittmar was critical of both the deficit and the difference models for advocating 
the integration of diversity in all its forms into capitalist society, his critique was 
most prominent for its apparent discrediting of Bernstein. In spite of evidence to 
the contrary, Dittmar identified Bernstein with the deficit hypothesis, failing to 
properly engage with Bernstein's attempts to link the class system with the unequal 
distribution of (discursive) power and control in society. In his critique, Dittmar 
missed two crucial and interrelated aspects of Bernstein's theory: the relationship 
between symbolic and economic power and the relationship between language, 
culture and thought. With regard to the latter, Dittmar rejected any significant 
relationship, appealing to Piaget and the idea of cognitive universals (Dittmar, 
1976: 14-15). Dittmar's unwillingness to engage with the full scope of Bernstein's 
ideas further represented the tendency in this area during this period for political 
agendas to obscure intellectual ones. Dittmar has subsequently apologised to 
Bernstein for this, claiming political pressures from the student movement in 
Germany (see Bernstein, 1996). 
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both materially and symbolically on the regulation or ordering of 
experiences, establishing (and d2limiting) the largely unconscious 
patterns of meaning that ruled individuals' responses to social, 
including pedagogic, situations. 
In the end, the personal growth model, in conjunction with the 
particular politically-motivated applications of sociolinguistics in 
education discussed above, established a definition of culture in 
English education as 'environmental,' as something 'out there' in the 
world, distinct from Bernstein's conception of culture as 'social,' as 
something simultaneously 'in here' in the mind. The notion of 
cognition as a social activity was loosely interpreted as shared 
behaviour and learning in interaction with others, both of which 
assumed similarity and equality of input as well as output, regardless of 
social/linguistic background. 
By developing the view in education of the social world as 
detached from the cognitive one-however much it appeared to 
honour difference over deficit-the crucial issue of meaning was 
eliminated from discussion, and with it serious consideration of the 
external/visible social processes at work on the internal/invisible 
development and structuring of human consciousness. The political 
exigencies of this period distracted attention from a more focused 
intellectual debate regarding language, culture and cognition in the 
context of the language paradigm. An explicit 'politics' of English 
teaching combined with the intellectual assumptions of the personal 
growth model to affect the recontextualisation of both Vygotsky and 
Bernstein within tl-·e context of education. 
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Sociolinguistics and the Language Paradigm 
In addition to Labov's work, the intellectual and political fields 
of English education influenced several other selections and 
interpretations from sociolinguistics during this period. As 
unresolved issues from the culture debates re-emerged within the 
language debates, the field of sociolinguistics provided an important 
site for the formation of concepts of language and of culture that would 
predominate in English education during the 1970s and beyond. 
Much of the early foundational work in the field of 
sociolinguistics (and Bernstein's work must be included here) set out to 
examine the relationship between the cognitive and the cultural 
dimensions of language with the aim of understanding the function of 
language in whole societies or subcultural groups within societies, 
including educational contexts (see Gumperz and Hymes, 1964; 
Fishman, 1968; Hymes, Cazden and John, 1971; Gumperz and Hymes, 
1972; Giglioli, 1972; Pride and Holmes, 1972). The more theoretical, 
exploratory phase of sociolinguistics which is reflected in the above-
cited anthologies, however, was supplanted, particularly in education, 
by a more applied phase which shifted attention away from some of the 
larger issues where matters of language, culture and cognition were 
concerned towards more immediate, pedagogically-oriented 
educational concer~.1.s. 
As previously discussed, one of the important aims of the shift 
toward language study and away from literary criticism was to end the 
perceived elitism and high-cultural bias of the latter. Two approaches, 
informed by sociolinguistics, were used by educators and researchers in 
an effort to realise this goal. One was to focus on patterns of language 
in terms of linguistic systems which were sought as descriptive proof of 
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the equal validity ·of all linguistic varieties including di2Jects and non-
standard forms. Language, in this cas~,~~:!1ded ~o b?: pei'ceived as an 
instrument or tool for the expression of ideas. The question of 
meaning was either not considered or was construed as socially 
neutral. This approach promoted the idea of linguistics as a science, as 
a technique for acquiring knowledge about language(s) rather than 
developing theories of language. The other approach was to focus on 
language in use. This involved a move away from the evaluation of 
socially 'correct' usages of grammatical forms towards the apparently 
value-neutral, functionally-driven 'appropriate' uses of language in 
different contexts. Here Hymes' notion of 'communicative 
competence' was an important point of reference as was Halliday's 
notion of 'register.' 
In the 'applied' sociolinguistic tradition in English education 
these approaches contributed to a formulation of a view of language 
and culture that was designed to avoid the question of evaluation. In 
focusing on linguistics as, on the one hand, a value-neutral science, 
and on the other, by adopting a relativist view of languages as well as 
cultures, the notion of incommensurability was reintroduced into the 
language debates as a justification for withholding judgement, aesthetic 
or otherwise, regarding language varieties, as the title page in a Rosen 
publication indicated, 
It seems hardly necessary to say that, since there is no place in 
linguistic discussion for aesthetic judgements, no such opinions 
have been expressed in the present book (Language and Class 
Workshop, 1974). 
In the language debates, incommensurability did not imply that 
different language::; were incommunicable, as it had with respect to 
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cultures, rather it was used to insist that all languages and language 
varieties were of equal value and, if called upon, could be put to the 
same use. 
Language in Use: Incommensurability Revisited 
The idea of the diversity and equality of all human languages 
was introduced by Franz Boas and continued by Leonard Bloomfield in 
what is generally referred to as American descriptivist or structural 
linguistics (see Hymes and Fought, 1975 for a comprehensive review of 
this school). One of the principal aims of this school of linguistics was 
to develop techniques for the careful description of languages in order 
to demonstrate their equivalence as linguistic systems. While Boas' 
interest in description included an explicit concern for the relationship 
between language and culture and the question of meaning, 
Bloomfield, a linguist not an anthropologist, dealt with the question of 
meaning more obliquely. Bloomfield perceived the relationship 
between meaning and linguistic form through a behaviourist model-
a particular context stimulated a speaker's utterance and a hearer's 
response-in which culture did not necessarily playa part (although 
the account of Bloomfield in Hymes and Fought downplays 
Bloomfield's behaviourism and stresses his relationship to Sapir and 
Boas, it is nevertheless true that Bloomfield's dominant influence in 
linguistics steered the American tradition toward description and not 
interpretation). Bloomfield speculated over both materialistic and 
mentalistic explanations for why one utterance/response was given 
over another (Bloomfield, 1934: 32-33), ultimately rejecting the latter, 
whilst contending that, in both, meaning was ultimately only definable 
in contexts of use (Bloomfield, 1934: 144), "We have described the 
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meaning of a linguistic form as the situation in which the speaker 
utters it and the response which it calls forth in the hearer (Bloomfield, 
1934: 139). 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the question of language, meaning and 
contexts of use was further explored in certain cognitivist theories of 
culture and language in the field of anthropology that formed a 
significant part of the intellectual profile of the period and had 
particular impact in the field of sociolinguistics (see Tyler, 1969). A 
working definition of culture was developed within cognitive 
anthropology by the anthropologist, Ward Goodenough, which viewed 
culture as whatever any individual needed to know in order to 
function as a member of a group (Goodenough, 1964). According to 
this view, culture did not exist independently beyond individual 
membership, as in the notion of a collective unconscious, nor was it 
simply material phenomena themselves, e. g., people, behaviour, 
events. Rather, culture was believed to exist in the minds of each 
individual member of a society, as a set of rules or organising 
principles for generating behaviour appropriate to his/her culture. 
Thus, 'appropriate' linguistic or cultural responses to a given situation 
were seen as displays of knowledge of the mental models or rules 
which 'competent:. native speakers possessed for perceiving and 
interpreting their own cultures. 
Goodenough's definition of culture was submerged in Dell 
Hymes' sociolinguistic work of this period in concepts like 
'communicative competence' and 'appropriateness.' Communicative 
competence assumed a 'knowing' subject who was able to use language 
appropriate to a given situation. It presented a view of competence 
that included not just the natural acquisition of the rules of grammar, 
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but the rules for its use in a variety of cultu!'al con"!:e~t&. "!'hs c~gnitivist 
idea of the socially competent individual rather than the features of 
his/her culture or language which permitted or constrained the 
acquisition of certain rules and not others. Hymes' representation of 
this theory provided a model for education that included the 'social' in 
the notion of competence and language use while at the same time 
suggesting that " ... attention to the social dimension is [thus] not 
restricted to occasions on which social factors seem to interfere with or 
restrict the grammar" (Hymes, 1972: 278). In this model, individuals 
from different cultures were not competent in the same way, as in the 
personal growth model, but they were, nevertheless, equally 
competent. 'Communicative competence' thus became a slogan for 
cultural and linguistic relativism. 
Although the idea of 'communicative competence' inserted a 
cultural account where mentalistic models of language use were 
concerned (for example, in Chomsky'S approach), the question of how, 
why or, indeed if individuals or groups within the same or different 
cultures come to inhabit different world views was avoided. Following 
a major tendency within the Bloomfieldian tradition, the aim was 
more often to describe rather than analyse variability of behaviour 
amongst pupils. In the process, a view of language as a mere tool 
which all pupils possessed for the expression of meanings derived 
from their particular cultures was generated in education, and cultures 
were simply described as the environments in which divergent 
meanings were acquired. As a result, crucial questions that Bernstein's 
theory raised remained unanswered, for example, what were the 
sources of cultural meanings; how and why were particular linguistic 
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selections made in contexts of use by individuals and social groups; and 
how interpretable were the different orientations to meanings that 
obtained between individuals and social groups, i. e., was successful 
cross-cultural, cross-lingual communication probable and, if so, how 
might it be accomplished. 
iThe picture of the universe changes from tongue to tongue': the Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis 
The different interpretations of incommensurability that were 
present in education-that cultures were incommunicable and that 
languages were equal-left the question of whether all languages or 
language varieties could or did express the same mea n in g s 
unresolved.6 Within the culture debates, educators had decided that 
cross-cultural consensus in literary criticism was impossible or 
undesirable or both. In the language debates, however, in embracing 
the difference model, they either avoided the question of whether 
linguistic differences, like cultural ones, implied the absence of the 
grounds for possible communication, e. g., "a reasonable minimum of 
common experience" or assumed (as in the culture debates) the absence 
of any potential common experience where linguistic differences were 
present. The lack of resolution of this critical issue is evident in the 
confused position that the field of sociolinguistics, in general, and the 
language paradigm, in particular, occupied in relation to the Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis. 
6 Hymes and Fought, however, indicate that neither Boas, Bloomfield, Sapir nor 
Whorf considered that languages could differ from each other without limit; that 
"each indeed saw the importance of linguistics as residing partly in the universal 
properties it warranted" and that there was a continuity from Boas to Chomsky in 
the assumption of a universal analytical method (Hymes and Fought, 1975: 969). 
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As discussed above, Sapir proposed that language functioned not 
only as a tool for representing experience but also as a way of shaping 
or even defining experience for its speakers. In foregrounding the 
relationship of language to culture, and ultimately thought itself, they 
suggested that individuals and/or whole cultures were limited or 
extended by their language with regards to possible interpretations of 
the 'universe.' The implication was that where language differed, so 
did orientations to meaning. As Whorf expressed it, 
We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which 
holds ,hat all observers are not led by the same physical 
evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their 
linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be 
calibrated (Whorf, 1956: v). 
Whorf's interest in linguistic relativity was not, as Hockett 
points out, primarily in the correlations found between a 'picture of 
the universe' and the lexical items that were available in any given 
language to express this picture (as in Boas' frequently cited example of 
the Eskimos' many words for snow). Rather, Whorf was interested in 
the 'thought worlds' that individuals carried around within them and 
by which they measured and understood what they could of the 
'universe.' As Hockett suggests, 
Whorf sought to dig deeper-to find correlations between the 
'themes' of a community's culture on the one hand and, on the 
other, the general grammatical and semantic tenor of the 
associated language. More specifically, he sought evidence for 
instances in which the state of affairs in a language was either 
(a) symptomatic of underlying cultural themes, or perhaps even 
(b) causally responsible for the choice of one course of action 
rather than another in given circumstances (Hockett, 1954: 108-
109). 
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Alternative interpretations of Sapir's and Whorf's writings 
appeared in sociolinguistics and in education during the 1970s. 
Although their hypothesis was generally discredited in its most 
deterministic form, it left a mark on formulations of language and 
culture that appeared (and continue to appear) in educational and 
other contexts. Sapir's writings were evident in theories of pedagogy 
where they were appealed to in support of heuristic models of the role 
of language in the classroom, although as shown above in relation to 
Britton, these tended to be only partial readings of his ideas, and Whorf 
in particular was relevant to Bernstein's elaboration of his code theory. 
In a later period, Gumperz' work on 'inter-ethnic 
communication' (Gumperz, 1982) indirectly appealed to a number of 
explicit and implicit assumptions in the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: that 
linguistic differences reflected cultural differences; that individuals' 
and cultures' 'world-views' were incommensurable; and that, 
therefore, where language variation occurred, the potential for 
incommunicability existed. Gumperz' suggestion that instances of 
failures to communicate between speakers of divergent linguistic 
backgrounds were often the result of their misreadings or intentional 
uses of culturally-specific communicative strategies supported these 
assumptions. 
In order to draw this conclusion, however, Gumperz relied on 
an essentialised view of culture(s) that simultaneously downplayed 
variation within class/cultural groups. This view further suggested 
that individuals were often, if not always, trapped in their cultures 
through language and vice versa; they become viewed, to use Howard 
Giles' famous phrase, as 'sociolinguistic automata'. Moreover, it 
created the assumption that individuals were not capable of 
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interactively 'reading' their own and others' cultures through a process 
of translation or negotiation of social and cultural conventions into 
mutually-oriented. or orienting communication. While this may 
sometimes be the case, in the 'inter-ethnic' communication model, 
cultural differences became a taken-for-granted fact rather than a 
potentially salient factor in problematic or unsuccessful linguistic 
interactions. 
A similar critique (with respect to class) has been made of 
Bernstein's elaboration of Whorf, and there is a reading of Bernstein, 
like Whorf, which suggests that individuals or cultures are captives of 
the patterns of meanings implied by their language. However, unlike 
Whorf, Bernstein's theory does contain a 'get out' clause; it offers a 
dynamic rather than static account of the relationship between 
language, culture and thought. Underlying Bernstein's view that 
patterns of meanings and their linguistic realisations originate in the 
social structure (where 'thought worlds' collide) is the idea that 
language has a social/material as well as a social/symbolic base. What 
is reflected in and refracted through language is, according to Bernstein, 
the social order and individuals' relationship to and within it. Where 
this relationship remains dynamic, albeit subject to constraint, 
individuals are always potentially aware of their and others' 
social/linguistic behaviour. For Bernstein, the social runs through the 
mind-and it is therefore the changes to the social/material or 
social/symbolic base of linguistic production/reception which provide 
the key to the changes in the 'thought worlds' which individuals and 
cultures may and do inhabit. 
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Culture, Language and Action 
Another claim for language study in English education was 
embodied in the work of Michael Halliday. The presence of the 
Hallidayan model of language in the intellectual field of English 
education, while it did not occupy as influential a position as either 
the Britton or Rosen models, nevertheless joined with them in 
discouraging attempts to reach a broader understanding of culture and 
its relationship to language. Despite Halliday's efforts to give his 
linguistic descriptions a social basis, his model of language, discussed 
below, supported a view of culture as functioning practically to solve 
the problems of modern living, inadvertently supporting the trend 
toward modernity described in Chapters Three and Four and 
contributing to the absence of any 'sociology of culture' within the 
language paradigm. 
To whatever extent the concepts introduced through the newly 
developing language of sociolinguistics were taken up in Britain as part 
of the emergent language paradigm, Halliday himself did not share the 
cognitivist view that language functions were essentially subjective 
and based on individual competence. Halliday's intellectual genealogy 
can be traced to a rather different intellectual tradition (and has been by 
Halliday himself) through the functionalist anthropologist Bronislaw 
Malinowski and the influential British linguist J. R. Firth. According 
to their approach, the unity of language and culture is achieved in 
practical action not in reflective thought or in the symbolic ordering of 
experience. As Malinowski suggested, "In its primitive uses, language 
functions as a link in concerted human activity .. .!t is a mode of action 
and not an instrument of reflection ... It is only in certain very special 
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uses among a civilised community and only in its highest uses that 
language is employed to frame and express thought" (Malinowski, 
1923: 312). Language was seen by Malinowski and Firth as primarily a 
mode of social action, to speak was 'to do' (rather than 'to know' or 'to 
reflect'); its main function was pragmatic and speech was its most 
important form c£ expression? Furthermore, the meaning of any 
particular utterance was seen to reside in its function in a given 
'context of situation' (Malinowski, 1923; Firth, 1957). But unlike the 
cognitivist model, 'appropriate' linguistic or cultural responses, rather 
than perceived as displays of a speaker's knowledge of and/or 
reflection upon a set of mental rules, were viewed as modes of human 
behaviour. 
The model of language and culture which Halliday introduced 
into the English curriculum was located firmly within this 
'functionalist' tradition.8 According to Halliday, speakers behaved 
linguistically in a given context based on an objective range of socially 
available options; these options comprised the set of alternative, 
function-oriented 'meaning potential' (also referred to as 'registers') 
that speakers had available to them and which were themselves the 
realisation of a higher-level semiotic system (alternately referred to by 
Halliday as a 'social semiotic,' a 'behaviour potential,' a 'social system' 
and, following Malinowski, the 'context of culture'). Halliday viewed 
7 A different account o~.language as action was identified, of course, by J. L. Austin in 
'How To Do Things With Words' and subsequently elaborated in the Speech Act 
Theory of J. Searle. 
8 'Functionalist' in Halliday's linguistic theory is not to be confused with 
functionalism as a mode of explanation in social theory. However, there are 
underlying similarities between Halliday's social concept of communication and 
Malinowski's. As Malinowski is considered a founding figure of functionalism, there 
may be more than an accidental congruence between Halliday's linguistics and 
Malinowski's social theory. 
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this range of semantic options as a realisation of a larger semiotic 
system which ultimately determined what one could do (as opposed to 
being a manifestation of what one knew as in the cognitivist model). 
For Halliday, as for Malinowski and Firth, meaning was doing, not 
thinking and the determination of available meanings in a given 
"context of situation" (as well as the linguistic realisation of these 
meanings) was an outcome of social not cognitive processes. Hence if, 
for cognitivists, culture was the knowledge one carried around in ones 
head, for Halliday, culture was the immediate social milieu in which 
meanings were learned and exchanged through function-oriented 
social/linguistic behaviour (Halliday, 1978, 1984). 
In addition to Firth and Malinowski, Halliday has 
acknowledged a great debt to Basil Bernstein for his formulation of the 
relationship between social structure, meaning and lexico-grammar 
(see Halliday, 1969-70, 1971, 1973, 1978). Bernstein's concept of codes 
provided Halliday with a sociological theory for his linguistics at the 
same time that Halliday supplied Bernstein with a linguistic theory 
that was compatible with the sociological account of language he was 
developing at that time (for Bernstein's application of Halliday see 
Bernstein, 1971: 1-20, 1973). But while the collaboration between 
Bernstein and Halliday appeared on the surface to be based on a 
compatibility and convergence of their intellectual agendas, there are 
nonetheless important differences in their consideration of social and 
cultural processes and the role or function of language. These 
differences have gone unrecognised and yet had important 
implications for the different reception of their work in the educational 
field during the 1970s in particular. These differences become apparent 
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through a closer investigation of Halliday's use of the term register 
versus Bernstein's emphasis on the concept of code. 
Register 
As suggested above, for Halliday, register was always conceived 
in terms of language doing; it was considered as both a pragmatic 
response to and a function of a given social context. To this end, the 
notion of register was seen as an important development within the 
newly emerging linguistic paradigm. It provided a way in for teachers 
to focus on what pupils did with their own language in social 
interaction; it highlighted relevant language situations and the 
connections between languages and lived communities. 
Halliday made use of the notion of register in his linguistic 
theory to emphasise the relationship between language use and 
situated activity; and to suggest that what we say is often to a 
considerable extent determined by situational factors. The term, as 
initially developed in Halliday (see Halliday, McIntosh and Strevens, 
1964), was largely a descriptive device. It suggested the possibility of the 
creation of taxonomies of language use, linking appropriate varieties of 
language identifiable by lexical and grammatical features to particular 
contexts of situation. Three intersecting, classificatory concepts were 
also introduced, 'field,' 'mode' and 'style' (later, 'tenor') which served a 
further descriptive function. These three descriptive categories served 
to better define and identify situational registers of language use by 
highlighting specific aspects of language use that operated in a range of 
social contexts. 
In relating r!:'gister to social context, Halliday wished to establish 
a relationship between language function, i. e., the demands made on 
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language by individuals based on soci!ll: personal 01' l!1.aterial needs in 
particular social situations-and th= brm taken by the grammatical 
system of language; to view grammar as a "theory of human 
experience" as well as a principle of social action (Halliday, 1993: 7-8). 
Register or 'meaning potential' was a way of regarding the range of 
available options within the linguistic system which produced and 
were produced by the demands of 'experience' understood as 
accumulated social situations. The importance of register for Halliday 
was to show that function in combination with context was intrinsic to 
the nature of linguistic structure (Halliday, 1970). 
A gradual 'upgrading' of the term 'register' occurred, however, 
which reveals a transformation of Halliday's own theory and, in 
particular, his increasing attention to and interpretation of the 'social' 
aspect of sociolinguistics, due in large part to his association and 
collaboration with Bernstein (see Hasan, 1973). 'Register' came to be 
defined principally in terms of meaning-of semantic choices rather 
than syntactic, lexical or phonological patterns-and meaning emerged 
as central to Halliday's' social' theory of language, 
A register can be defined as the configuration of semantic 
resources that the member of a culture typically associates 
with a situation type. It is a meaning potential that is 
accessible in a given social context (Halliday, 1978: 111). 
For Halliday, however, and unlike Bernstein, meaning 
remained associated primarily with doing, with social action or 
function. This was based on his assertion that the function of language 
is the same thing as its meaning, and that an utterance can only be said 
to be meaningful when it contributes to (or functions towards) the 
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maintenance of forms of socially appropriate and interpretable 
behaviours or 'life patterns.' As Malinowski wrote, 
The meaning of a word is not mysteriously contained in it but is 
rather an active effect of the sound uttered within the context 
of situation. The utterance of sound is a significant act 
indispensable in all forms of concerted human action. It is a 
type of behaviour strictly comparable to the handling of a tool, 
the wielding of a weapon, the performance of a ritual or the 
concluding of a contract. The use of words is in all these forms of 
human activity an indispensable correlate of manual and 
bodily behaviour (Malinowski, 1931: 622). 
So for Malinowski a magic ritual, for example, would be 
observed and interpreted in terms of its effects and not as the symbol of 
some powerful moral/ aesthetic elements of human nature. Halliday 
reiterated Malinowski's view that social functions and their linguistic 
realisations are ultimately deduced from utilitarian needs and that 
utterances primarily serve an instrumental function (like "handling a 
tool," etc.). The notion of register was intended to reflect this 
relationship between meaning and behaviour, or meaning as a form of 
social behaviour. For Halliday, the options or choices ('meaning 
potential') available in the language system were ultimately 
interpretable as rw:;ponses to the perceived demands of a particular 
social situation. They were the means to an end; in making a 
particular choice, an individual 'acted upon' whatever desires or needs 
had been induced by the context of situation. Thus, for Halliday, 
'learning to mean' was learning to make the appropriate 
social/linguistic choices, learning to I do' the right thing in order to 
achieve certain proscribed ends. 
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Halliday, Bernstein and the 'social' 
Halliday's concern with meaning became further elaborated, as 
suggested above, through his contact with Bernstein and the latter's 
sociological investigations into social/linguistic codes. For Halliday, 
Bernstein's code theory offered an explanation for the meanings 'opted' 
for in particular social situations, ... "codes act as determinants of 
register, operating on the selection of meanings within situation 
types," and "the code is actualised in language through register, the 
clustering of semantic features according to situation type" (Halliday, 
1978: 67-68). But although Halliday appropriated the concept of 'code' 
from Bernstein, it does not and, it will be argued, cannot perform the 
same for each of them due to fundamental differences in their 
respective theoretical approaches. In particular, Halliday's self-
professed location within the Firthian tradition distances him from 
Bernstein in several critical ways. 
For Halliday, and unlike Bernstein, the individual predates the 
social and the social is derived from, insofar as it exists at all, the 
aggregation of individuals. Halliday'S individuals use language to 
fulfil their immediate needs and desires and it is through or on 
account of such behaviour that they are considered as 'social' beings. 
Individuals thus become 'socially situated' when, through some type 
of action, the fulfilment of some utilitarian need or desire is attempted 
or achieved. This is perfectly exemplified in Halliday's studies of the 
child, Nigel, 'learning how to mean,' in which Halliday derives sets of 
supposedly 'social"functions from Nigel's 'individual' functions which 
are organised around his achievement of particular ends (Halliday, 
1975). 
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For Bernstein, however, society predates the individual. 
Bernstein, in the tradition of Durkheim, maintains the existence of a 
collective moral consciousness which forms the basis of particular 
forms of social action. Social action in this sense, however, is not 
primarily viewed as it is in Halliday as a pragmatic response to a 
particular social situation, or as the purveyor of ever-possible 
extensions of meanings which the language system can be seen to 
accommodate. Rather, it is understood as the symbolic representation 
of a distinctive belief and value system which both operates on and 
legitima tes the action taken. 
Bernstein's concern is, therefore, to identify the formal 
underlying principles or, in his terminology, 'codes' found across 
diverse social ar,d cultural contexts which govern individual 
behaviour-principles which are linked to the differential distribution 
of power and principles of control operating on and within the social 
structure. For this reason, Bernstein's code theory, especially but not 
exclusively as elaborated through the principles of classification and 
framing, works to reduce categories and their combinations and 
relationships against Halliday's tendency to multiply them. This is 
clearly apparent in Bernstein's identification of what he calls 'critical 
socialising contexts,' which were reformulated from Halliday's earlier 
elaboration of six or seven functions of language. What had served for 
Halliday as essentially categories of language varieties (which were 
understood as functional varieties arising out of the needs or demands 
of a child) were transformed by Bernstein into four and finally two-
the 'regulative' and the 'instructional/-socialising contexts. For 
Bernstein, however, these contexts were not merely illustrations of 
categories or patterns of language use as they were for Halliday, they 
144 
were considered crucial empirical sites to test the theory itself, for 
according to Bernstein, it was the regulative context which positioned 
individuals in the moral system and the instructional context which 
gave (and denied) access to specialised competencies (Bernstein, 1990). 
With Halliday, however, 'critical socialising contexts' were 
dissolved into empirical 'situations.' He did not provide an exemplar 
of the formal principles at work in the regulatory context, but instead 
converted it into something quite different-a formally disconnected, 
inert object of description. Halliday presented the regulatory context as 
a site which, through the repetition of a language of rules and 
instructions, taught a child how language can be used to control 
behaviour (Halliday, 1969-70). For Bernstein, however, the regulatory 
context was important because it located the child within a particular 
moral system. It was the repetition, not of a particular use of language, 
but of a set of tacitly acquired principles of the social ordering of 
experience that made the regulatory context a critical socialiser. 
Halliday's theory can, in the end, only account for the observable 
patterns which lie at the surface of discourse and which emerge in the 
choices that individuals make from the range of possibilities within 
the language system. Bernstein's code theory, on the other hand, offers 
an account of the generative social and symbolic basis of discursive 
practices. In attempting to use Bernstein's theory, Halliday fatally 
forces 'code' to the surface. As a result, code becomes simply an 
explanation in Halliday's work, of the way in which chunks of 
meaning or "clusters of semantic features" are organised within a 
particular "situation type."9 'Code,' like the 'context of culture' lying 
9 There is a similar tendency at work in Halliday's re-interpretation of the concepts 
'field,' 'mode' and 'tenor' which, like register, underwent a transformation within 
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beyond the social context, never amounts to more than a descriptive 
backdrop; it is untheorisable within a functionalist perspective which 
lacks a notion of a pre-existing external social system. It is for this 
reason that any imperatives bearing on an individual from without, 
moral imperatives for instance, can find no place in Halliday's 
framework. He can have no account of moral action other than a 
utilitarian one such as that argued against by Durkheim, proposed by 
Bentham and the utilitarian liberals. 
Halliday's dependence upon perpetual description is further 
served by a necessary removal of what links the individual to the 
social-the cognitive in all its cultural variants-and its replacement 
with a 'social situation' and a 'situation type' which may be endlessly 
added to depending on the particular society in which a social situation 
is found. This further distances him from Bernstein who includes the 
mind and cognitive processes in his sociolinguistic theory. Unlike 
Halliday, who explicitly rejected an intra-organism model such as that 
proposed by Hymes and the cognitive anthropological tradition 
(Halliday, 1978: 37-38), Bernstein, as discussed above, shared with 
Hymes an early interest in the ideas of Sapir and Whorf regarding the 
his own theory. Initially, the terms 'field,' 'mode' and 'style' appeared as 
descriptive devices for elaborating different aspects of language in use. Thus, 'field' 
represented 'language activity in a situation,' 'mode' was the 'medium of the 
language activity' and 'style' referred to 'relations amongst participants' 
(Halliday, McIntosh and Strevens, 1964). When Halliday reintroduces these 
concepts at a later date, however (see Halliday, 1978), 'field' is characterised as 
'type of social action,' 'mode' ~s 'symbolic organisation' and 'style' (now 'tenor') has 
moved from the third to the second dimension of register classification. More 
importantly, these concepts which began as descriptive devices, in the later 
formulations are claimed by Halliday to be generative aspects of a situation. As 
with register, Halliday attempts to transform the capacity of these terms to 
conceptualise rather than merely describe, by simply claiming that they serve an 
analytic function. However, there is no evidence of any shift in the function they 
serve as socio-linguistic concepts; both in theory and in practice they remain purely 
descriptive. 
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inter-relations of language and culture and in which there is an 
interest in and inclusion of the mind that is notably absent in Halliday. 
Halliday's avoidance of the cognitive (by relegating it to the field 
of psycho linguistics ) was inherited from both Malinowski and Firth. 
Though Malinowski was inconsistent and indecisive in his regard for 
the relationship between language and thought (see Henson, 1974; 
Sampson, 1980: 223-226), he ultimately preferred to give consideration 
to the active effect of the word. It is worth noting that while 
Malinowski developed his theory from observations of the speech of 
pre-literate communities, Halliday focused primarily on the speech of 
young children. For both of them, it would seem, the 'elementary' 
structures observed in both forms of language served as better 
exemplars of their belief that the primary use of language was to make 
things happen or, as Malinowski suggested, to serve as "a handle to acts 
and objects and not a definition of them" (Malinowski, 1923: 322). 
Firth was even more explicit in his determination to avoid 
questions of the mind. He proposed a 'monist' approach in opposition 
to a 'dualist' explanation of meaning which subsumed the mind 
within the notion of a "whole man/' 
As we know so little about the mind and as our study is 
essentially social, I shall cease to respect the duality of mind 
and body, thought and word, and be satisfied with the whole 
man, thinking and acting as a whole, in association with his 
fellows (Firth, 1957: 19). 
For Firth, "wholeness" was built into "the body" which, he claimed, 
was "constantly taking part in activities directed to the conservation of 
the pattern of life" (Firth, 1957: 143). According to Firth, it was only 
through the description of such activities that linguists could account 
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for meaning, 1/ a thoroughgoing contextual technique does not 
emphasise the relation between the terms of an historical process or of 
a mental process, but the interrelations of the terms of the actual 
observable context itself" (Firth, 1957: 19). 
In their consideration of the relationship between thought and 
language, both Firth and Malinowski emphatically rejected the 
Durkheimian model of a collective consciousness (Malinowski, 1935; 
Firth, 1957: 179-181). Meaning was to be analysed in view of linguistic, 
not social, facts. According to Firth, the analysis of meaning should 
consist of, 
a serial contextualisation of our facts, context within context, 
each one being a function, an organ of the bigger context, and all 
contexts finding a place in what might be called the context of 
culture (Firth, 1957: 32). 
In the end, however, Firth's 'monist' view left him (and later 
Halliday) with nothing other than the 'context of situation' (or the 
even more elusive 'context of culture') to account for meaning (see 
discussion in Lyons, 1966). Hence Halliday'S ever-expanding 'social 
semiotic' heads increasingly upwards to ever more vague notions of 
some totality of all possible situations (similar to the totality of 
domains described by Fishman in Pride and Holmes, 1972: 18-19). 
Halliday's conception of the social system is a transposition of a 
systemic linguistic model-linguistic not sociological in origin-based 
on a model of language systems as comprised of levels of realisation. 
His orientation to meaning, despite his association with Bernstein, 
remains tied to functionalist, systemic grammar-and doubt has even 
been cast on the potential for systemic grammar to adequately account 
for meaning (see Sampson, 1980; Lyons, 1981). 
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Sampson has suggested that within systemic grammar greater 
attention is placed on naming the range of options open to the speaker 
than in specifying how these choices are realised as utterances. He 
notes that systems are ... "identified in terms of the analyst's intuitive 
feelings for semantic relationships; and the rules for realising given 
syntactic choices are left relatively informal, whereas the systems of 
choices and their interrelationships are made very explicit and formal" 
(Sampson, 1980: 230). For systemic grammarians then, and Halliday 
proves no exception, the emphasis is on the identification of formal 
rules within the linguistic system, not the social order. So what starts 
out as a principle of order in Bernstein's code theory ends up, in 
Halliday's work, as mere inert social objects, arranged in some 
variously described hierarchical array. 
Halliday's emphasis on the instrumental and away from the 
symbolic aspect of language contributed to the growing tendency 
within the English curriculum to perceive the social and the cultural as 
mere 'environments' within which language practices occurred. 
Although Halliday may have acknowledged and emphasised social 
class and regional dialects, hence socially or culturally locating his 
speakers, as demonstrated above, the 'socio' linguistic behaviour of 
Halliday's social actors was not motivated by their location in a 
symbolic system b~t rather by pragmatic self-interest;. it was culture as 
practical and functional, as a place to get things done. Sahlins, in a 
forceful critique of the functionalist school of anthropology, has 
pointed to its tendency to reduce culture to "an epiphenomenon of 
purposeful 'decision-making' processes" (Sahlins, 1976: 86). And as he 
suggests, 
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... the effect of Malinowski's J.es01u.:iJ~1 o£ c:..:LJ.l'c;~ ,:CL" . .l'C;:-:.: to 
biological function, particularly of the symbolic to the 
instrumental, is a final solution to the culture problem. For it 
becomes explicit that culture does not warrant any special 
understanding, that is, as distinct from a biological 
explanation. In this event, culture disappears (Sahlins, 1976: 
87). 
By the 1980s, though not exclusively due to Hallidayan 
linguistics, culture had indeed 'disappeared' as an issue in English 
teaching. By this time, critical questions regarding the relationship 
between language and culture and its implications for learning, ceased 
to have repercussions as a debate, i. e., as conflicting values.10 The 
assertions about culture and language that had been offered by both 
Leavis and Bernstein had been rendered illegitimate by the politics of 
the intellectual field of English education, first with regards to 
literature and then to language. 
The preoccupation, in the relativist climate, with the idea of the 
incommensurability of cultures and of languages problematised an 
idea that can be found in both Leavis' and Bernstein's interest in the 
role of language irL culture-the undeniability of evaluation. Both, in 
different ways, implied that 'sensibilities,' or patterns of meaning, were 
formed and reformed through language, which served to shape, 
maintain and/or extend the boundaries of 'thought worlds' and the 
social! symbolic order. For both, changes in meaning had the potential 
to occur when members of a culture entered into some (linguistic) 
relationship-through a text and in a context-other than one with 
10 The same was not true in the universities or in the emerging field of Cultural 
Studies where the culture debates were continued. Eventually the issues raised in 
these debates did re-enter English in some form through Media Studies which 
became an established part of the field of English teaching, but by this time the 
idea of literature as a central armature for these discussions had disappeared. 
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which they were already certain or familiar. Although Bernstein may 
have located the source of any ultimate change in language and culture 
in the material base (as suggested earlier, his 'get out' clause was found 
in the relationship between macro and micro, social and linguistic 
organisation) as opposed to Leavis who identified solely with the 
symbolic, both understood the important role that conflicting values, a 
prerequisite of critical evaluation, played in both sustaining and 
altering 'cultured' meanings. While Leavis himself may have failed to 
extend the circle of engaged critics wide enough and while Bernstein's 
theory may have suggested that speakers of a particular language 
variety were overly constrained by it, their approaches to language and 
culture suggest the possibility, at least, of the transcendence of linguistic 
constraints, not the maintenance of linguistic orderliness. 
The 'disappearance' of Leavis and Bernstein from the 
intellectual field vf English education solidified certain tendencies 
within it with regard to efforts to conceptualise language and culture 
for pedagogic purposes. The political and pedagogic agenda that 
characterised the ppst-war period through the 1970s prioritised the 
empowerment of working class pupils by emphasising their 
class/ cultural forms of expression, but, in so doing, it overlooked the 
fact of cultural mixing and downplayed the possibility of 'cross-
cultural' communication. The stress on relativism, difference and 
incommensurability that distinguished this period made the possibility 
or probability of the commensurability of cultures inconceivable. The 
variety of intellectual traditions that informed the conceptualisations 
of language and culture in English education were recontextualised 
during this period to fulfil a political/pedagogical agenda rather than 
being mined for their recognition of the complexities of the 
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relationship between language, culture and thought. As a result, the 
possibility of c()~municating through similarities and across 
differences remained inadequately explored. 
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Chapter Six 
Unity in Diversity 
This chapter considers the possibility of transcending the 
persistent polarities and contradictions that surfaced in the culture and 
language debates in the context of English education and that continue 
to appear in contemporary debates about language, culture and identity. 
To this end, it explores some of the theoretical and philosophical 
assumptions with respect to language, culture and the 'quest for 
commensurability' that underlie the debates that took place within 
English education in Britain. 
Many of the ideas that came to fruition in the culture and 
language debates had had a long gestation period through work in the 
philosophy of language and in cultural anthropology. The influence of 
Franz Boas has already been mentioned in the preceding chapter. His 
pioneering work on the linguistic classification of Native American 
languages helped to establish a scientific account of dialects and 'non-
standard' linguistic varieties which complemented folkloristic 
accounts and, more importantly, that came to be the primary source of 
the argument in the educational field that all languages and dialects 
were 'equally valid.' Of equal relevance and importance, however, are 
the ideas on language and culture expressed by the three German 
thinkers, J. G. Hamann, J. G. Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt, all 
of whom directly or indirectly informed the contributions of Boas, 
Sapir and Whorf (Brown, 1967; Penn, 1972; Hymes and Fought, 1975). 
Although other than in Hymes' customarily scholarly studies, the debt 
to these authors has remained largely unconscious in the field of 
educational sociolinguistics (although see Hewitt, 1989), an 
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examination of their ideas provides a much needed landscape on 
which to locate the positions of key participants of the language and 
culture debates in the 1960s and 1970s in British education and 
contribute insight into a number of important underlying intellectual 
issues. 
What most distinguished Hamann, Herder and von Humboldt 
from their contemporaries, and makes their writings particularly 
relevant to current debates about culture and cognition, was their 
recognition of the role of language in structuring experience. 
Eighteenth century rationalist and empiricist accounts of knowledge, 
including, importantly, the influential Kant, for the most part ignored 
the function of language in cognition. At the start of the eighteenth 
century the two views with respect to language that prevailed were that 
language had been given to humans by God and/ or that it was the 
invention of human reason. Rationalists like Leibniz, for example, 
believed in the possibility of a logically perfect language (Apel, 1977; 
Toulmin, 1990), continually refashioned by reason to reflect the basic 
God-given structure of reality, while Locke, from a more empiricist 
point of view, had suggested that language was created by humans in 
order to turn the invisible ideas located inside their minds into visible 
words of exchange. According to Locke, language was the result of a 
rational social coatract, created by rational human beings who 
invented words in order to communicate their thoughts to each other, 
The comfort and advantage of society not being to be had 
without communication of thoughts, it was necessary that man 
should find out some external visible signs, whereof those 
invisible ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be 
made known to others (Locke, quoted in Brown, 1967: 25). 
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Hamann, however, astonishingly before his time, insisted that 
thought and language were one and the same cognitive process; that 
language was inseparable from the world because it was the vehicle of 
human's perceptions of themselves and of the natural world. It is 
surprising that this idea is so often associated with the 'linguistic turn' 
in philosophy of the twentieth century and rarely attributed to 
Hamann, even though as early as 1784, Hamann had argued his views 
in his Metacritique against Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 
Therefore, if it still remains a chief question, how the ability 
to think is possible-the ability to think right and left, before 
and without, with and beyond experience, then it needs no 
deduction to prove the genealogical priority of language and its 
heraldry over the seven holy functions of logical propositions 
and inferences. Not only does the whole ability to think rest 
upon language ... but language is also the central point of reason's 
misunderstanding of itself ... (Hamann, 1784: 216). 
Hamann would spend his entire life arguing for the 
inseparability of language and thought, and many aspects of his 
thinking on this subject would be echoed subsequently in both 
Herder's and von Humboldt's writings. All three proposed extremely 
creative and innovCttive ideas about the relationship between language, 
culture and thought so very long before the present, although they also 
diverged from each other significantly on many points. The relevance 
of their important, though often unrecognised, contributions to 
contemporary debates on this theme will be evident in the discussion 
below. 
Before discussing the distinctive contributions of Hamann, 
Herder and von Humboldt, however, it is important to consider their 
origins within the schools of empiricist and rationalist thought that 
characterised eighteenth century Enlightenment philosophy, since all 
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three retained aspects of empiricist and/or rationalist thought in their 
writings. Hamann, for example, embraced empiricism, and especially 
Hume, for its privileging of sense experience. And Kant, as well as the 
rationalist Leibniz, contributed to the development of Herder's 
thinking and understanding of the relationship between language, 
culture and history, despite his critique of Kant (his former teacher) 
and his opposition to certain forms of rationalist thinking. The 
influence of Kant is also evident in von Humboldt and contributed to 
important differences in his development of many of Herder's ideas. 
The World Brought into Being 
The debate between rationalists and empiricists was over 
epistemology; how human beings come to 'know' the world, whether 
all humans 'know' the same world or know the world in the same 
way. Rationalists held that knowledge of the world was based on the 
inner subjective world of the mind, that it was innate. They believed 
in the possibility of objective knowledge, uncontaminated by the point 
of view of any observer and derivable from reason alone. Empiricists, 
on the other hand, believed that the world was brought into being 
experientially, through sensory data. For empiricists like Locke and 
Hume, for example, things in the world were copied by the mind in 
order to form first simple and then complex ideas. Locke identified 
two stages in this process of perception. The first 'appearances' in the 
mind he referred to as 'ideas of sensation,' the raw materials of 
p' 
experience, which were followed by what he called 'ideas of reflection.' 
Locke, however, conceded that there were certain ideas that were not 
contained in the existence of things and that were in principle 
unobservable. He thus ended up approximating a more rationalist 
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position by assuming the mind's ability to derive ideas from itself. 
Hume, on the other hand, accepted that absolute certainty of reality was 
impossible and restricted his theory of knowledge to the evidence 
offered by observation alone. He identified the elementary data of 
experience as 'impressions' and suggested that the passing from 
impressions to 'ideas,' (in Humes's view the weaker moment of 
reflection), was determined not by reason, but as a result of habit or an 
act of faith, 
... when I am convinced of any principle, it is only an idea 
which strikes more strongly upon me. When I give the 
preference to one set of arguments above another, I do nothing 
but decide from my feeling concerning the superiority of their 
influence ... all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are 
derived from nothing but custom, and belief is more properly an 
act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our nature 
(Hume, in Copleston, 1985: 290). 
For empiricists, then, the foundations of knowledge were to be 
found in immediate intuitions, sensory data that were so 'directly 
given' that they were completely independent of the process of 
thinking.! The empiricist mind was an observer and collector of 
records of facts or appearances; it relied on faith in its own individual 
perceptions that the knowledge that it acquired represented actual 
reality. Moreover, the empiricist mind was unlimited in terms of the 
ideas it could support. Given the right experience, any logically 
possible thoughts or concepts, however complex, could be held in the 
mind (Hundert, 1989). 
1 Yolton, however, argues that for Locke, ideas, perceptions and thoughts were 
considered cognitive counterparts, responses or translations of physical stimuli, not 
simply images or representations of the world mirrored through a glass eye (Yolton, 
1990). 
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Rationalists, on the other hand, located the foundations of 
knowledge in basic unchanging concepts which defined the character of 
thought. The rationalist mind was the realisation of a universe that 
existed through an immutable and transcendental Substance analogous 
to God. It relied on faith, not in its own individual perceptions, but in 
some other transcendental source, most often understood to be God, 
that it was not being deceived by what it saw. 
Kant attempted to unify these points by asserting that the basis of 
all human knowledge was certainly received from the outside world, 
as the empiricists had claimed, but that human beings themselves 
organised this data through the imposition of a priori forms and 
categories. The world of experience, the phenomenal world of 
appearance, was thus not simply the construction of human beings nor 
was it unconstrained by complexities, as the empiricists has suggested. 
It was rather the outcome of innate, conceptual categories that 
established the necessary conditions of possible experience. 
Kant belie-.;;ed in pure reason, but unlike the rationalists, he 
believed that the mind required the senses to give content to innate 
categories. In spite of Kant's attempt to synthesise sensibility and 
understanding, however, the world that he brought into being 
remained essentially the phenomenal world only, as it had for the 
empiricists. Because for Kant reality was relative to consciousness, 
(all our thoughts are only about things as they appear in the mind), in 
order to answer the question of how we come to know things as they 
are, e. g., where do colour, shape or texture come from, he posited the 
existence of a no~menal world, the world of things-in-themselves-
but this was a world that humans could never know because the world 
was accessible to them only through innate categories of the mind and 
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the perceptions which these engendered unveiled a reality that was 
necessarily separate and distinct from the world of things-in-
themselves. 
So although Kant explored foundations of human knowledge 
that were neither solely innate nor experiential, he underemphasised 
the role of an active, creative and unconstrained perceiving mind. 
Moreover, as Edward Hundert suggests, Kant was more interested in 
the contribution of thoughts to things, he emphasised the mind's 
participation in the world rather than the world's participation in the 
mind, 
The Kantian direction of Kant's philosophy arises from the 
direction of Kant's reasoning. Kant began with self-conscious 
experience and 'deduced' the external world-he built his 
system from thoughts to things. Kant's 'I' became the active 
subject of experience (in contrast to a mere Cartesian 'thinking 
object'), but, even in providing the regal activity of bestowing 
concepts on that which it knows, it was still an observational 
'1', a passive spectator in the world. Kant's 'I' merely has 
knowledge, 'facts' about a dead world of objects which we come 
to know as round or square, black or white, sweet or sour 
(Hundert, 1989: 38, original italics). 
It was this image of humans as passive and constrained spectators that 
was rejected by Hamann and Herder. They refused to embrace Kant's 
idea of reason as an innate and independent activity and insisted on a 
view of reason as creative energy, evolving out of human 
relationships, in relationship to God, and most importantly, structured 
in and by language. Against Kant's attempt at a synthesis of experience 
and the understanding within the mind, Hamann and Herder insisted 
on a unity within language of the perceptive and reflective processes of 
the mind. 
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The Ubiquity of Language 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the rational and divine 
origins of language began to be widely challenged by different 
variations of an expressivist theory of language which claimed that 
language was primarily instinctual and emotional, not rational and 
social, in character. Thinkers as diverse as Condillac and Rousseau in 
France, Blackwell in England and Vico in Italy embraced the view that 
language was the expression of human passions and sensory images, 
that it sprang from sensual or biological needs, from the impulsive, 
natural cries of human beings, and was not a mere operation of the 
intellect (Abrams, 1958; Brown, 1967; Berlin, 1976).2 They all 
understood language to embody the feelings and passions of a people. 
The general view was that the earliest sounds of individuals gave rise 
to songs and these to speech, and that images produced metaphors 
which were elaborated in myth, poetry and the language of the 'folk.' 
The privileging of primitive speech, of the everyday language of 
the people and of poetry over prose for reflecting 'human nature' is a 
constant theme echoed in Hamann and Herder. Hamann referred to 
poetry as "the mother tongue of the human race; even as the garden is 
older than the ploughed field, painting than script; as song is more 
ancient than declamation; parables older than reasoning; barter than 
trade ... (Hamann, 1762: 141). Because poetry, drama, and the 
'vernacular' were amongst the 'first-born' expressions of every culture, 
they were deemed the most authentic linguistic products of the nations 
2 Amongst this group, Vico in particular would develop many of the same ideas 
about language and culture that Hamann and Herder would, although there is little 
evidence that they read each others work. For a discussion of the important 
contributions of Vico to the themes being discussed in this chapter, see Berlin, 1976. 
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in which they were sung, spoken or written. Through engagement 
with the active, sensual aspects of nature, poets produced, in Hamann's 
words (alluding to Shakespeare), the "rolling thunder of eloquence" 
and "its companion, the single-syllabled lightening flash" (Hamann, 
1762: 146). But in contrast to other expressivist theorists, Hamann and 
Herder each in different ways reclaimed for reason a direct relationship 
to such 'natural language' forms. They rejected the idea that reason 
was only to be found in the abstract words of philosophers and looked 
to the 'intuitive reason' of poetry and the vernacular in order to 
uncover the 'truths' or essences of things. 
For Hamann, in particular, any form of abstraction was the 
'castration' of thought (O'Flaherty, 1988: 147-149), while intuition 
endowed it with spirit. For Hamann, language was the text of nature, 
of creation, thus he believed that all knowledge must have a sexual, 
life-affirming cO::-.£l.ponent. Equating sexuality with intuitive 
knowledge and castration with abstraction, Hamann suggested that to 
attempt to reform language in the light of reason was to "diminish its 
strength and manhood," to render it sterile and colourless, lacking the 
capacity to address itself to the whole of human nature (O'Flaherty, 
1988: 31-40). The rationalists were attempting to destroy nature by 
denying the senses and the passions, according to Hamann, who wrote 
in response,.. the pudenda of our organisms are so closely united to the 
secret depths of our heart and brain that a total rupture of this natural 
union is impossible (Hamann, quoted in Berlin, 1993: 62). Hamann, 
furthermore, linked sexuality with faith in God. Therefore, any 
attempt to contain language, and hence the spirit, in the name of 
reason was to blaspheme against God, for it was in nature, including 
language, that God was revealed. 
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Reason is language, logos. On this marrowbone I gnaw, and shall gnaw 
myself to death on it. J. G. Hamann 
Hamann argued against reason as an independent activity that 
took place inside the mind and preceded language. Instead, he 
maintained that reason and language were inseparable, " ... without a 
word, no reason-no world" (Hamann, 1783: 248). Hamann believed, 
in opposition to the Enlightenment belief in a separate faculty of 
reason, whether innately or experientially derived, that it was in 
language, especially in such symbolic forms as myth and poetry, that 
humans interactively, in communication with one another, both 
perceived their own experiences and reflected upon them. 
For Hamann, like the empiricists, knowledge of the world was 
derived from the world through the accumulation of past beliefs, of 
history and tradition, "Sense experience and knowledge of reason both 
rest upon relationships of things, of their qualities, with the tools of 
our receptivity, as upon the relationships of our conceptions. It is pure 
idealism to separate believing and sense-experiencing from thinking" 
(Hamann, 1787: 257). Hume especially appealed to Hamann for his 
insistence that b~lief was the unifying force behind all sensory 
experience. But Hamann added to Hume's empiricism the idea that 
belief was rendered through symbols, especially language. For 
Hamann, reason, and the faith upon which it was built, depended on 
symbolism. And whereas Locke had united reason and experience in 
the metaphoric 'tabula rasa' of the mind, Hamann joined both of these 
in language, in the word and ultimately in God, 
Every phenomenon of nature was a word-the sign, symbol and 
pledge of a new inexpressible, but all the more intimate union, 
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communication and community of divine energy and ideas. 
Everything that man heard in the beginning, saw with his 
eyes, contemplated, and his hands touched was a living word. 
With this word in his mouth and in his heart, the origin of 
language was as natural, as near, and as easy as child's play 
(Hamann, quoted in O'Flaherty, 1952: 38). 
While Hamann asserted the spiritual origins of language, he 
rejected the idea that God provided human beings with a fully-formed 
language prior to the development of human reason. Indeed, he 
rejected the idea that nature was modelled on some divine plan and 
dismissed the idea that human beings could ever totally mirror or 
reach a complete understanding of God's divine purpose, "Heaven be 
thanked that there is a Being high above the stars that can say of 
himself: I am that I am-let everything under the moon be mutable 
and capricious" (Hamann, quoted in O'Flaherty, 1952: 40). For 
Hamann, the only thing that humans could and should do was seek to 
illuminate God's purpose by understanding themselves through 
understanding others. Such understanding, however, was acquired 
through engagement in the particularities and mutability of human 
experience, especially language, it was not given directly by God or 
revealed through abstract concepts or appeals to universal, necessary 
truths. 
While Hamann believed that language was provided by God, he 
insisted that it was shaped by and evolved out of the "natural 
mentality" of the people (Penn, 1973: 50-51). Thus he stressed the 
active and creative role of language in establishing traditions and 
affirming or reforming beliefs. For Hamann, the task of the people, 
particularly the poetic geniuses amongst them, was to work on and 
interfere with language through the creation of new phrases or new 
combinations of symbols or sense-units. This was not the same as the 
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rationalist tendency to invent new words, i. e., abstract symbols, in an 
attempt to perfect language to make it a more precise instrument of 
thought, as Leibniz had suggested. Hamann believed that only poetic 
language, the text of nature, was capable of interpreting and 
reinterpreting nature precisely because it embodied the apparent 
contradictions in nature (while affirming God's existence) and did not 
attempt to dissolve them in some mathematico-Iogico harmony 
(O'Flaherty, 1952: 26-29). 
Language was the means by which humans grasped God's 
image, through their "experience of the presence of things" (Smith, 
1960: 71), but for Hamann, only God could finally reconcile the 
contradictory elements of experience (O'Flaherty, 1988). He therefore 
dismissed the possibility or desirability of seeking universal truths in 
experience since, "Here on earth we live on fragments. Our thoughts 
are fragments. Our knowledge itself is patchwork." (Hamann, 1758: 
161) and "all events of world history are silhouettes of more 
mysterious actions and disclosed miracles" (Hamann, quoted in Smith, 
1960: 93). Hamann, however, did believe that human beings could and 
should strive to move beyond the individual or cultural particularities 
which shaped them, but he insisted that the most that humans could 
hope to realise collectively or universally was a closer relationship to 
God. And this they could achieve by engaging in an unfettered and 
sensual relationship with the natural world and by reading the bible. 
For it was in nature, in language (especially the Word of God), and in 
communion with others where God spoke to human beings in a 
language that was simultaneously 'poetic,' 'living' and 'divine' and 
where God's invisible harmony was revealed (Smith, 1960; O'Flaherty, 
1988). As Berlin comments, 
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... Hamann's constantly repeated point is that revelation is 
direct contact between one spirit and another, God and 
ourselves. What we see, hear, understand, is directly given. 
Yet we are not mere passive receptacles, as Locke had taught; 
our active and creative powers are empirical attributes that 
different men or societies have in different degrees and kinds, 
so that no generalisations can be guaranteed to hold for too long. 
Hamann boldly turns Humean scepticism into an affirmation of 
belief-in empirical knowledge-that is its own guarantee; the 
ultimate datum, for which it makes no sense to ask for some 
general rationale (Berlin, 1993: 34). 
It must be remembered, however, despite Hamann's belief in 
empirical knowledge as the "ultimate datum," unlike Hume, he never 
denied the importance of reason. Hamann's empiricist orientation did 
not lead him to exclude the role of reason in all cognition. His 
complaint against the Enlightenment, and Kant in particular, was not 
that reason was emphasised at the expense of emotions. What 
Hamann insisted upon was the existence of a different mode of reason, 
one that, as O'Flaherty suggests, was 'intuitive' rather than 'abstract' 
and that ... "[had] as its basis a dialectical rather than a formal logic" ... 
(O'Flaherty, 1988: xiv). For Hamann, that dialectic involved language 
and experience, and above all, God. It was this reformulation of reason 
and its inextricable link to language that would be taken up by Herder. 
Man, endowed with mind-a characteristic peculiar to himself alone-
has by his very first act of spontaneous reflection invented language. 
J. G. Herder 
Hamann's influence, particularly his idea of the inseparability of 
language and reason, is clearly evident in much of Herder's writings. 
One of Herder's most important elaborations of this idea came in his 
prize-winning response to the question of the 'origin of language' in a 
competition presented by the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin in 
1770. Herder's essay challenged the very idea of raising the question of 
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language's origins; he responded to the essay question only indirectly, 
considering what for him was the more relevant question, the nature 
and use of language, not its origins (Clark, 1955: 130-132). 
Herder sought to demonstrate that as language and reason were 
one, and that as 'to reason' was 'to be human', then 'to speak,' 'to 
think' and 'to be human' must be all one and the same activity-and 
language, therefore, had no distinctive 'origin.' He directed his 
argument against two of the dominant theories of language of his 
day-the divine origin theory as proposed by Suss milch and the 
expressivist theories proposed by Condillac and Rousseau. Sussmilch 
had held that language was a gift from God, but not in the same co-
active way that Hamann had understood this. Sussmilch suggested 
that God had intervened to solve the puzzle of how humans might 
reason without language whilst needing language in order to reason. 
He concluded that, "no man could have invented language for 
himself, because the invention of language requires reason, 
consequently, language must have already existed before the mind was 
used" (Sussmilch, quoted in Herder, 1770: 137). Herder challenged 
Sussmilch's separation of language and thought by asking how 
humans could have received language from God if they were not 
already endowed with reason which assumed the use of the mind. 
Herder credited God not with the gift of language but with "the 
creation of a human mind capable of forming and creating language by 
its own powers" (Herder, 1770: 176).3 Herder's argument against 
3 Hamann accused Herder of siding with the rationalists in trying to understand 
humans apart from God. For Hamann, the perceptive and reflective capacities of 
the mind symbolised the dual nature of natural (but not abstract) language, its 
capacity to differentiate on the basis of real objects and real relations. This 
'duality in unity,' as O'Flaherty refers to it, of natural language further symbolised 
for Hamann the dual nature, human and divine, of the origins of language. For 
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Condillac and Rou.sseau. was primaily 'ivith their identification of the 
origins of human language in the earliest natural sounds and outcries 
of emotion of human beings. Herder objected to Condillac's claim that 
these early sounds were somehow transformed into a human language 
simply through the emergence of associations and agreed conventions 
between individuals, and he criticised Rousseau for trying to solve 
Sussmilch's paradox by locating the origins of language in feelings and 
desires alone. Herder accepted that emotive sounds formed a part of 
human language but to associate them with the origins of human 
language was wrong-"these sounds are not the main thread of 
human speech, not its roots, but the sap which vitalises them" (Herder, 
1770: 119)-because, according to Herder, from the beginning language 
was inextricably tied to reason, 
We may develop, refine and organise these cries as we will, but 
if reason and the understanding do not intervene to enable us to 
make conscious use of the sounds, I do not see how a human 
language could ever evolve. Children utter emotional sounds 
like animals, but is not the language they learn from man of a 
very different kind? (Herder, 1770: 125). 
Herder believed that as God had provided animals with 
heightened instincts and senses which humans had been deprived of, 
so humans had been granted other powers to take their place. Thus 
humans, even the smallest child, had the capacity for thought and for 
conscious reflection along with the 'powers' to realise these capacities. 
These 'powers,' the organisation of the intellect, the mind, in Herder's 
words, "the entire economy of man's perceptive, cognitive, and 
Herder to attempt to disassociate God from language was therefore, according to 
Hamann, not only irreligious but also false (O'Flaherty, 1952). 
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volitional nature," (Herder, 1770: 131) were what constituted a 
distinctly human (as opposed to animal) nature, and it was in human 
languageL "the corollary of a reflective mind," (Barnard, 1965: 56) that 
these God-given powers were revealed. 
The Power of Thought: 'Besonnenheit' and 'Kraft' 
For Herder, as for Hamann, reason was both product and 
process, both being and becoming, performed by living human beings 
who were metaphysically and physically a whole. Reason was not 
some disconnected faculty of the mind, as Kant and his followers had 
claimed, on the contrary, it represented the organic unity of the mind. 
One of Herder's main arguments with Kant was that he made reason 
or 'the understanding' a separate faculty of the mind and one that 
constrained the possibilities of thought rather than supplied humans 
with reasoning powers (Clark, 1955: 396-412). Although both Kant and 
Herder attempted to synthesise metaphysical and empirical elements 
within an organic model derived from the biological sciences, Herder 
identified language, not a priori categories, (mere "metaphysical 
abstractions" as far as Herder was concerned) as structuring 
consciousness. This difference was a crucial one for Herder, for as he 
attempted to demonstrate, language was active and transforming while 
'the understanding' was passive and limiting. 
Herder's reference to the mind as an organic 'totality of powers' 
is best understood in relation to two metaphysical/psychological 
concepts that feature in his writings, the German terms, Besonnenheit 
and Kraft. As Ch:.:k has commented, for Herder, "man is not man 
unless and until he possesses the psychological state of Besonennheit, 
or reflection, a result of the disposition of his psychic powers or forces 
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of Kraft ... " (Clark, 1955: 133). Herder used the concept Besonnenheit to 
denote the innate possession of a creative and reflective mind 
perceived as an interactive, organic whole. Unlike Locke who 
understood the empirical moment as perception followed by reflection, 
Herder viewed experience (the linguistic moment) as the simultaneous 
moment of perception and reflection-a single creative process 
(Barnard, 1965: 32-33)-and the act of a perceiving mind. Reflection 
was formed by experience, it was an assemblage of the experiences and 
observations of the mind. 
The illustrative moment of Besonnenheit was likened by Herder 
to a human "stepping into the universe" and an ocean of sensations 
rushing in, amongst these the sense of hearing, which out of all of the 
five senses, Herder regarded as "the proper gateway to the mind and 
the bond of association of other senses"-and the one that was 
instrumental in the invention of human language (Herder, 1770: 145-
146).4 
Herder's understanding of the 'monistic' nature of this 
experience was similar to Hamann's proposition of a 'duality in unity' 
in natural language, but Herder appealed to the concept of Kraft instead 
of God, introducing the idea of an internal, metaphysical principle of 
development which stimulated this activity. The term Kraft was the 
Middle High Geqnan translation of the medieval term 'vis' meaning 
faculty or power. Herder appropriated the term from its use in the 
4 It has been recognised by several scholars that Herder's emphasis on the oral and 
auditory aspect of language anticipated developments in modem linguistics (see 
Sapir, 1909; Barnard, 1969; Mueller-Vollmer, 1990). Mueller-Vollmer contends that 
Herder was the precursor to Saussure in pointing out the linearity of the auditory 
sign. He suggests that Herder related the syntagmatic sequel of speech sounds to an 
inner sense of time which allowed the mind 'to abstract' and 'to speak' simultan-
eously (Mueller-Vollmer, 1990). 
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biological sciences, where it referred to the plurality of physiological 
forces operating within the human body, and gave it a metaphysical 
function. Krafte came to signify the totality of interacting human 
mental energies or forces, the interplay of which, for Herder, 
constituted all movement and growth. This energy-basic mechanical 
and biological forces, the latter including the psychological-was, 
according to Herder, organised and unified in the personalities of 
human individuals, as well as whole cultures (Clark, 1942). The 
activity of Krafte was central to Herder's understanding of human 
language and human culture. Krafte were for Herder the psychic 
energies-the ultimate Kraft being God-that 'powered' human 
consciousness. 
To illustrate how Kraft operated, Herder drew on the organic 
metaphors that were prevalent in German Romantic thought in the 
eighteenth century and which were themselves an outcome of 
advances in the biological sciences (Abrams, 1958; Brown, 1967). He 
was particularly influenced by the rationalist Leibniz who, in 
opposition to the9-rthodox mechanical view of the universe as simply 
the sum of its parts, presented the world as an organism, "a whole 
unfolding its multiple aspects, where the parts were not merely 
constitutive elements, but individual entities existing in their own 
right" (Barnard, 1965: 11). Leibniz perceived the universe as a 
community of 'monads' (analogous to souls) each of which developed 
according to its own constitution as far as it could toward the reflection 
of the whole (Scruton, 1982; Copleston, 1985). Each monad was "a 
perpetual living mirror of the universe" (Leibniz, quoted in Abrams, 
1958: 202), and a reflection of a pre-existing harmony that was already 
completely formed in the mind of God. Although their ultimate end 
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was predetermined, Leibniz nevertheless proposed a pluralism 
inherent in monads; they were endlessly developing from within, 
continually 'becoming' and changing their inner state (Barnard, 1965). 
But because this internal development could not be altered (for it too 
was prearranged by God) monads could never have any contact with 
each other, as Leibniz stated, "they have no openings (windows) 
through which anything could either enter or depart" (Leibniz, quoted 
in Barnard, 1965: 11). 
From Leibniz' rationalist perspective, the lack of interaction 
between monads made any changes in perception due to an internal 
principle; reason alone was made responsible for both perception and 
reflection. All ideas were latently present in the mind and they mostly 
remained in the subconscious as 'petite perceptions' until, in some 
monads (including"some human beings, sometimes) they became clear 
enough to emerge into consciousness through memory or feeling, this 
he referred to as 'apperception' or reflection (Copleston, 1985: 295-319). 
Herder, in contrast, provided an empirical, historical and linguistic 
account of the movement of ideas from the subconscious to the 
consciously reflective mind. He understood moments of 
'apperception' as demonstrations of Kraft, the internal activity of the 
perceiving mind in interaction with external experience, not of the 
mind in interaction with itself as Leibniz had suggested. As Barnard 
notes, for Herder, " ... consciousness, that is to say, is not innate, but 
rather a function of development. It is the result of the peculiar 
manner in which the growing self receives, and reacts to, the stimuli of 
its environment (Barnard, 1965: 43, original italics). Crucial to Herder's 
understanding of this process was the necessary role that language 
played as the external medium of consciousness. For Herder, 
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'apperception' came about through consciously isolating one quality in 
the wave of sense impressions which struck the mind as a 
'distinguishing quality,' 
Thus man exhibits reflection not only by recognising clearly or 
distinctly the qualities of objects that are before his mind, but 
also by realising the characteristics that distinguish one from 
another. This first act of apperception renders a clear concept: 
it is the first judgement of the mind (Herder, 1770: 135). 
For Herder, language, thought and meaning thus arose 
simultaneously as. manifestations of the same mental energy, Kraft. 
The essence of language was not the creation of external sounds, but 
the "internal genesis" of word symbols (Herder, 1770: 140)-this was for 
Herder the essential characteristic of language, its function as the 
'dictionary of the soul.' 
Furthermore, while Leibniz had suggested that organisms were 
virtually unaffected and therefore unalterable by any external 
influence, Herder rejected this rationalist conclusion. Herder 
interpreted the pluralism and multiplicity inherent in each individual 
organism as necessarily interactive. Thought, language and meaning, 
were by their very nature oriented towards an 'other,' 
... the first human thought prepares communication with other 
beings; whatever I grasp directly assumes the form of both an 
identifying symbol for myself and a communicating symbol for 
others (Herder, 1770: 141). 
So at the same time that Herder celebrated the creative and unique 
manifestations of Kraft in each individual or culture, he viewed 
individuals and cultures as naturally tending toward and desirous of 
an inter-connectedness with one another and with nature. 
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This tendency towards inter-connectedness, moreover, brought 
with it the possibility of individual and cultural transformation. For 
Herder Kraft was simultaneously guided by a principle of active growth 
and of change-change that was organised from within the mind but 
always in conjunction with the natural world. Herder's notion of 
organic growth and transformation thus assumed an ever emergent 
and mutable subj.e~t; it was modelled on the biological principle of 
palingenesis, of death and rebirth, of regeneration and resurrection, 
One activity is increased by another; builds upon, or evolves 
from, the foregoing ... Such a chain runs through the life of man 
until death. We are always growing out of childhood, however 
old we may be, are always in motion, restless, and dissatisfied. 
The essence of life is never fruition, but continuous becoming, and 
we have never been men until we have lived our life to the 
end ... (Herder, quoted in Barnard, 1969: 28). 
But while Herder's individuals and cultures were governed by 
principles of development immanent to them, "Is the whole tree not 
already contained in the seed?/' as he expressed it, at the same time he 
perceived a commonality, a unity in the individuality and diversity of 
humankind. For Herder, Kraft was a unifying as well as an organising 
and trans formative principle; there was, he believed, an underlying 
harmony in all languages, cultures and, indeed, individual souls-all 
were perceived as involved in a continual cycle of moving towards 
perfection, dying and experiencing rebirth. Herder's harmony, 
however, was not pre-existing in the sense that Leibniz understood it. 
Like Hamann, Herder viewed God as ultimately independent of 
human history. This meant that human development always 
remained open-ended (Morton, 1989) simultaneously determined by 
and determining of a given historical and geographical setting 
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(Barnard, 1965). Like Leibniz' monads, each individual and each 
culture developed toward the reflection of a whole, but as Barnard 
points out, Herder's 'souls' had windows, they sought a unity in 
,,' 
communication with one another whilst retaining their diversity at 
the same time. Herder's unity was therefore a unity in diversity, a 
totality of ever evolving cultural fragments and historical particulars, 
and just as the individual was never fully formed, but endlessly 
becoming, so it was with the history of cultures and, indeed, language 
itself. 
Despite Herder's stress on unity in diversity, however, his belief 
that human languages and cultures were always 'locally grown,' i. e., 
they developed in a particular time and a particular place out of 
particular 'environmental' conditions, makes him one of the earliest 
thinkers to advance a notion of linguistic and cultural relativism, 
suggesting an incongruity in his thinking. He wrote, for example, in 
Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man, 
Of a thing that lies without the sphere of our perception we 
know nothing: the story of a king of Siam who considered ice 
and snow as non-entities, is in a thousand instances applicable 
to every man. The ideas of every indigenous nation are thus 
confined to its own region: if it profess to understand words 
expressing things utterly foreign to it, we have reason to remain 
long in doubt of the reality of the understanding (Herder, 1784-
91: 194). 
The apparent "paradoxical thesis" of unity in diversity has been 
recently linked explicitly to Herder and criticised for being both 
contradictory and socially irresponsible by Robert Young, 
Herder, therefore, speaks with forked tongue: offering on the 
one hand rootedness, the organic unity of a people and their 
local, traditional culture, but also on the other hand the 
cultural education of the human race whereby the 
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achievements of one culture are grafted onto another ... (Young, 
1995: 42). 
Young claims that although Herder claimed to recognise cultural 
expansion, by venerating the local and the traditional, he established a 
notion of relativism that appeared to support liberalism and fascism 
alike. Young maintains that Herder's notion of unity in diversity is 
therefore weak and even politically suspect. 
It is the case that Herder's notion of 'unity in diversity' 
contains a dynamic tension that on the one hand appears to encourage 
a politically malleable form of cultural relativism; however, a closer 
examination of Herder's ideas challenges such a reading. For while 
Herder does not attempt to actually resolve the paradoxes he sets up, he 
does attempt, as Morton suggests, to "prevent[s] the paradox from 
lapsing into contradiction" (Morton, 1982: 53). When understood in 
relation to his philosophy of language, to his understanding of the 
relationship between language, culture and thought, and to his notion 
of Kraft, Herder's attempts to reconcile the particular and the universal 
can be seen directly to address the paradoxical nature of the 
incommensurability /relativism thesis. 
Herder's idea of 'unity in diversity' is particularly relevant to 
the language and culture debates discussed in previous chapters, in 
relation to what emerged within these debates as the seemingly 
unresolvable paradox between a belief in cultural conservation, on the 
one hand, and cultural interpenetration, on the other. The difficulty in 
holding these two views constant influenced (and continues to 
influence) the shape of the culture and language debates and the 
positioning of par~icipants within them. For example, with regard to 
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notions of working class culture, it became mutually advantageous for 
radicals and conservatives to support a view of cultural conservation, 
creating clear contradictions for radical educators whose aim was social 
liberation (see pp. 83-85). Similarly, Leavis' commitment to cultural 
tradition was negatively interpreted as solely a commitment to 
conservation, although th~ idea of interpenetration was intrinsic to his 
understanding of the function of a literary tradition. 
As described above, for Herder, individuals and cultures were 
constantly developing in interaction with others, they were therefore 
not eternally imprisoned within their languages or their cultures. At 
the same time that Herder emphasised the historical and linguistic 
character of 'world views,' he simultaneously acknowledged the 
existence of standards of mutuality amongst divergent linguistic and 
cultural groups which would in the end lead to Humanitat, the 
ultimate recogniti~m of unity in diversity. Although Herder did 
believe it to be undesirable and 'unnatural' for people to be forcibly 
uprooted from their 'native environments,' he did not assume that 
cultures or individuals were incapable of interaction, extension or 
growth.5 
5 Many of Herder's interpreters have overlooked or undervalued his understanding 
of humankind as an inter-relational whole and some have accused him of taking a 
separatist, nationalist line which supported fascist and racist attitudes (see 
Collingwood, 1946: 88-93; Young, 1995: 36-43). These critics are led to this conclusion 
because of Herder'S acceptance of the diverse origins of human experiences, or 
polygenesis, and its association with extremism and racism. Critics miss the fact 
that Herder understood the concept of polygenesis in association with palingenesis, 
the recurrence of historical events over time (see Fink, 1982). His observance of the 
natural historical occu~rence of cultural mixing, for example, actually led him to 
reject the category of race, as he expressed it, ... In short there are neither four or five 
races, nor exclusive varieties on this Earth. Complexions run into each other: forms 
follow the genetic character: and upon the whole, are all at last but shades of the 
same great picture extending through all ages, and over all parts of the Earth. They 
belong not, therefore, so properly to systematic natural history, as to the physico-
geographical history of man (Herder, 1784-91: 166). Herder's appeal to the idea of 
the incommensurability of cultures was in order to denounce the Enlightenment 
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For Herder, Humanitat represented ultimate human freedom 
and justice (Knoll, 1982); the same qualities that were vital for the 
activity of continual becoming. Humanitat was not achieved through 
the progressive unfolding of humankind toward some ultimate truth, 
but through the interwoven histories of individual nations and 
cultures. Cultural and linguistic traditions were not simply the 
reflection of a fixed set of accumulated practices or beliefs, they were the 
outcome of a continuous 'living dialogue,' a continuous process of 
becoming which, like the human organism, by its very nature merged 
the new with the old and the old with the new. As he stated in On 
Diligence in the Study of Several Learned Languages, 
As long as we keep our native language on our tongue, we will 
penetrate so much more deeply the distinctiveness of each 
language. Here we will find gaps, there superfluity i-here 
riches, there a desert; and we will be able to enrich the poverty 
of the one with the treasures of the other (Herder, 1764: 33). 
The themes of interaction, transformation and continuous 
becoming that appear repeatedly in his writings suggest that all 
individuals and cultures are always only partially formed; moreover, 
their existence is always simultaneously influencing and being 
influenced by a particular historical moment. Herder's idea of history 
as transformation through interpenetration is crucial to the 
understanding of culture and of the relationship between thought and 
language presented here. The notion of 'interpenetration' must, 
however, be distinguished from the current organic metaphor of 
notion of the progressive perfectibility of man through history. It must be seen as 
part of his reaction to the 18th century autocratic state that scattered, exiled and 
alienated its citizens from their homelands and from themselves. 
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'hybridity' (see Hall, 1992; Bhabha, 1994). It is not concerned with the 
identification of new cultural crossbreeds as such; rather it indicates the 
activities of evolution and synthesis brought about through particular 
existing world views structured in and by language. The fact that 
cultural evolution already implies cultural mixing means that to 
contrast cultural hybridity with cultural homogeneity is to make an 
unnecessary and, indeed, erroneous distinction. The notion of 
interpenetration introduced here acknowledges, as Herder did, that 
cultures, like humans and other biological organisms, are always 
evolving even when they appear to be standing still. 
Cultural transmission was, moreover, not merely a reproductive 
event for Herder, although this played an important role in the 
development of national identities. It necessarily involved continual 
evaluation (Barnard, 1969) in the form of an intra-cultural and/or 
inter-cultural 'dialectic.' Cultural and linguistic conservation and 
interpenetration are inextricably linked through the act of evaluation, 
understood as a part of the constitutive activity of the mind which 
contributes both to an individual's self-creation and self-expansion. As 
Herder wrote, 
The mind nobly expands, when it is able to emerge from the 
narrow circle which climate and education have drawn around 
it, and learns from other nations at least what may be 
dispensed with by man. How much, that we have been 
accustomed to consider as absolutely necessary, do we find 
others live without, and consequently perceive to be by no 
means indispensable! Numberless ideas, which we have often 
admitted as the most general principles of the human 
understanding, disappear, in this place and that, with the 
climate, as the land vanishes like a mist from the eye of the 
navigator. What one nation holds indispensable to the circle of 
its thoughts, has never entered into the mind of a second, and by 
a third .has been deemed injurious. Thus we wander over the 
Earth in a labyrinth of human fancies: but the question is: 
where is the central point of the labyrinth; to which all our 
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wanderings may be traced, as refracted rays to the Sun? 
(Herder, 1784-91: 201). 
While Herder does not say so himself in the above passage, it is 
deducible from his ideas that the central point of the labyrinth is 
language itself; it is the means to reconcile the tension between 
maintaining an individual cultural perspective while endeavouring to 
"incorporate and even combine with others." Language 
simultaneously structures meamng and carries the potential to 
transform meanings; it is the medium whereby both diversity and 
unity are realised. Different languages and cultures are an outward 
sign of different experiences shaped by local features of the 
environment-and consciousness is a function of the interaction of 
reason/language with a given experience. But the fact that individuals 
perceive the world from a particular cultural and linguistic perspective, 
does not imply the impossibility of achieving unity. It simply implies 
that any unity will always be partial and impermanent and that it will 
not be a unity of 'perfect parts' but a unity of particulars always capable 
of being united, at times in harmony and other times in struggle. 
Herder held, as Leibniz had done, that it was possible for the whole to 
appear differently for each individual and still be a whole. Herder's 
unity was thus not perceived as the sum total of the necessarily 
continuous and coherent parts of an objective world. Different 
languages and cultures do not combine to form the 'cognitive totality' 
of any knowable 'world.' Theirs is a unity comprised of fragments of 
knowledge of an ultimately unknowable world. Alexander Nehamas, 
in his study of Nietzsche, suggests a similar view (without reference to 
Herder) of what he refers to as Nietzsche's 'perspectivism,' 
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Perspectival approaches to the world are ... not disjoint from one 
another. Each approach is capable of correcting itself, and 
many can incorporate new material and even combine with 
others to form broader systems of practices and inquiries. What 
is not possible is that at some point we can incorporate "all" the 
material there is into a single approach or that we can occupy 
"every" possible point of view (Nehamas, 1985: 51). 
Nehamas' account of perspectivism captures the reading of 
Herder's diversity in unity suggested here. Rather than proposing a 
variety of distinct and incommensurable cultures which, like Leibniz's 
monads, are 'windowless' in relation to one another and thus 
incapable of reinterpreting or re-evaluating themselves through 
others, perspectival approaches to the world assume, as Herder did, 
that cultures and languages are conjoined in history, 
What is true of one people, holds equally true with regard to 
the connexion of several together: they are joined as time and 
place unites them; they act upon one another, as the 
combination of active powers directs (Herder, 1784-91: 393). 
This suggests their potentiality, at least, to intersect, overlap and have 
an effect on one another. However, it does not suggest an image of 
collections of fragmented or decentered individuals or cultures. It 
assumes cultured and centred selves who, while linguistically, 
culturally and historically constituted, have the potential to explore 
and expand the boundaries of this constitution; a process of identity 
expansion, involving both cultural conservation and interpenetration. 
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There is no doubt; thought, free from the bonds of speech, would 
appear to us as more pure and more of a whole. W. von Humboldt 
The paradox with regard to cultural relativism which, as 
argued above, Herder's notion of unity in diversity begins to resolve, 
was also present in the language and culture debates with respect to 
linguistic relativity. As previously stated, a major issue in 20th century 
educational debates was whether languages from differing class 
cultures varied with respect to patterns of meanings and, if so, were 
incommensurable. The idea that individuals were 'products' of the 
patterns of meanings actualised in their languages was either used or 
refused, depending on the frequently overlapping political or 
pedagogical purposes for which such claims were made. The 
prevailing tendency, paradoxically proposed by both advocates of 
change and of the status quo, was to accept the 'facts' of linguistic 
relativity and incommensurability. This led both radical and 
conservative educators to discourage 'cross-cultural' dialogue between 
speakers or between speakers and texts, promoting instead the creation 
of texts by individual pupils or choosing texts from within an 
individual's relevant 'cultural' milieu. It has been argued thus far that 
this solution remained incomplete for, despite its value to pupils 
whose personal experiences had remained outside of their educational 
ones, it stressed diversity without unity with respect to the question of 
incommensurabili ty. That is, the 'expressivist' strand that 
predominated in English education due to the influences of Britton 
and Rosen can be traced to Herder's relativism and romanticism (see 
Taylor, 1975: 13-29 for an account of Herder's contribution to 
expressivism), but without the benefit of his universalism. 
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The issue of incommensurability as it appeared implicitly in 
Bernstein's approach to language and thought, however, is traceable to 
the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt who developed many of Herder's 
ideas about language into the nineteenth century. In Bernstein's work, 
Herder's paradox reappeared, but instead of collapsing within relativist 
or romanticist solutions, in Bernstein the paradox became formalised, 
thereby maintaining its paradoxical nature. The formalisation of the 
paradox in Bernstein's work, while it occurred in part as a consequence 
of the particular social/political conditions surrounding its uptake in 
the educational debates must, however, also be seen as arising from the 
particular development of Herder's ideas by von Humboldt whose 
influence over modern linguistics and sociolinguistics (including 
Bernstein) historically had a greater impact than Herder's. 
Von Humboldt reasserted Herder's belief in the inter-
relationship between sense impressions, mental activity and the 
emergent sounds of a language, and of the relationship between 
language, culture and thought. Von Humboldt, however, developed 
these ideas in distinctive ways, particularly with regard to the question 
of linguistic relativity. He reasserted Herder's organic model of 
language, stressing language as an activity, or energeia, and not a dead 
product, or ergon. Herder had expressed a similar idea with his use of 
the concept of Kr.Fft, the mental activity which allowed for the 
organisation, transformation and unification of sense impressions and 
ideas. But while for Herder, this activity suggested the possibility of 
continual becoming, von Humboldt saw this activity as having two 
separate stages, the first in which language organised itself according to 
its own internal dynamic, and the second in which the structure of a 
language took a final shape (Brown, 1967; Aarsleff, 1988), at which 
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point an individual's or c'.llt-are's ment2.! 2.:ti·.rHy "!:J~':c:n2 contained by 
the constraints of its co-ordinates. Unlike Hamann and Herder who 
were primarily interested in how a language's word formations and 
sounds symbolised a nation's spirit, von Humboldt emphasised the 
relationship between the formation of this spirit and the grammatical 
structure of a language. Von Humboldt thus shifted the focus from the 
play of words within a language, to language as a completely organised 
structure within which the 'plays of thought' occurred. While for 
Hamann and Herder, a grammar was an entirely artificial product, the 
imposition of a system on what was for them the natural outcome of 
the flow of passions and sense experience, for von Humboldt, a 
grammar provided the necessary structural blueprint of a language 
(Mueller-Volmer, 1990); it was the key to a nation's underlying spirit, 
This partly fixed and partly fluid content of language 
engenders a special relationship between it and the speaking 
generation. There is generated a stock of words and a system of 
rules whereby it grows, in the course of millennia, into an 
independent force ... the thought once embodied in the language 
becomes an object for the soul, and to that extent exerts thereon 
an effect that is alien to it...the two opposing views here 
stated,. that language belongs to or is foreign to the soul, 
depends or does not depend on it, are in actuality combined 
there and constitute the peculiarity of its nature ... nowhere, not 
even in writing, does it have a permanent abode; its 'dead' part 
must always be regenerated in thinking, come to life in speech 
and understanding ... but this act of regeneration consists, 
precisely in likewise making an object of it; it thereby 
undergoes on each occasion the full impact of the individual, 
but this impact is already governed by what language is doing 
and has done (von Humboldt, 1836: 62, original italics). 
In highlighting language's paradoxical nature, von Humboldt 
raised the question of the possibilities for, in his words, the "power of 
the individual" to exert his or her freedom over "the might of 
language." Hamar:.n and Herder had, like von Humboldt, understood 
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that language constructed the 'world-view' of its native speakers, as 
Hamann had said, "without a word, no reason-no world." However, 
they viewed this relationship as more phenomenological in kind; they 
emphasised the interpretive, dialogic nature of the formation and 
exchange of cultulal meanings, emphatically rejecting any suggestion 
of language as similar to Kant's categories of the mind. Moreover, 
their understanding of language as structuring experience contained 
relativist assumptions, although as argued above, this was coupled, 
particularly in Herder, with a simultaneous belief in the universal-ist 
means toward an open and interconnected perspectivalist end. 
Von Humboldt, on the other hand, viewed the structuring of 
language over experience more in Kantian terms, making language 
similar to a Kantian a priori category of the mind. For von Humboldt, 
it was the particular grammatical structure, operating like a Kantian 
category, which once established in anyone language, constrained the 
possibilities of thought for the speakers of that language. And just as 
Kant had presumed his categories to be innate, von Humboldt 
suggested the existence of an innate power of "human linguisticality," 
which revealed itself in the semiotic system of a given language.6 But 
von Humboldt went even further to suggest the possibility of an ideal 
language in which this inner mental activity combined most 
appropriately with an outer sound form to represent the phenomenal 
world; he believed that this process of synthesis was achieved in its 
,. 
most perfect state when the inner power matched the outer form 
(Mueller-Volmer, 1990). Von Humboldt's belief, informed by Kant, 
6 Humboldt's inner form of language, that "constant and unvarying factor that 
underlies and gave life and significance to each particular new linguistic act," was 
taken up by Chomsky and developed into the notion of a fixed generative rule (see 
Chomsky, 1964: 56-61). 
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that language mediated the subject and the objective world led him to 
compare grammatical systems and to conclude that some languages 
mediated this relationship better than others, and that it was these 
languages that best allowed the human mind to develop 'richer and 
loftier' ideas, 
But mental activity does not simply aim at its own internal 
enhancement. In following this path it is also necessarily 
driven outward to erect a scientific edifice in the form of a 
world-view, and again to work creatively from this standpoint. 
This too we have taken into consideration, and it has 
unmistakenly emerged that such an enlargement of man's 
outlook prospers best, or rather solely, under the guidance of 
the most perfect linguistic form (von Humboldt, 1836: 216, 
original italics). 
Von Humboldt's belief in a perfect linguistic form was an 
outcome of his perception that all of the languages of the world fit to 
form the totality of the objective world. Like Leibniz, Kant or Herder, 
though each in their different ways, von Humboldt sought to 'reunite' 
the diversity in humankind with its universal nature (Cassirer, 1955: 
155-163). However, in attempting to describe universal harmony 
through linguisticality, von Humboldt's 'human linguisticality' 
diverged from Herder's 'diversity in unity' in two crucial ways. First, 
as noted above, he 'de-relativised' the mental dispositions of different 
nations and/or linguistic groups, and second, he reinstated Leibniz' 
monads, as symbolised in languages, as windowless. For like Lebniz' 
monads, von Humboldt's languages were pluralistic within 
themselves but not in relation to other distinctive language groups. 
Thus, although for von Humboldt, linguisticality was a universal, 
innate capacity, he believed that individual language groups developed 
exclusively and independently of one another, each one according to 
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the mental capacities of its speakers and the system of rules which 
these generated, 
The proper evolution of language is in natural accord with that 
of the intellectual capacity as such. For since the need to think 
awakens language in man, the successful advance of thought 
must also necessarily call for what emanates purely from the 
concept of language. Yet were even a nation endowed with such 
a language to lapse, for some reason, into mental torpor and 
weakness, it would always be able to extricate itself more 
easily from this state by means of its language (von Humboldt, 
1836: 1,':'4, original italics). 
Von Humboldt did recognise the fact of cultural interpenetration, but 
he believed that no matter how great the influence of another culture 
or civilisation on a particular nation, that nation's language would 
never be able to change its original quality. Thus any expansion or 
transformation of a nation's mental activity from without would have 
to be mediated by something other than language. Von Humboldt 
thus raised the question of the possibility of new meanings being 
generated or discovered from outside of language itself, although he 
appears to have viewed this primarily as a compensatory act for 
languages incapable of extricating themselves from within, 
Conversely, the intellectual capacity must find means for 
advancement from its own resources, if accompanied by a 
language that deviates from this correct and natural line of 
development. Through its self-created means it will then react 
upon the language, not indeed creatively, since such creations 
can only be the work of the language's own vital impulse, but by 
building itself into the language, lending a meaning and 
allowing an application to the form of the latter, which that 
tongue itself had not imparted and to which it had not been led 
(von Humboldt, 1836: 144). 
Von Humboldt's interpretation of the idea of an inseparable 
connection between a nation's language and its mental capacity 
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introduced a contrast th?.t h~~ LS:: ;;~~~~,;;-:1_ ::'Y'. I~~~:::::-"': :-.' ~-:!:amann's 
understanding of language between purely regular forms and deviant 
forms, for von Humboldt assumed an ideal grammatical system that 
would approximate most the objective world and correspond to the 
highest and clearest of thinking. This difference in their thinking was 
a crucial one, for it revealed the distinctive philosophical bases that 
underlie their beliefs about the relationship between culture, language 
and thought. Moreover, this difference also suggests an heretofore 
unrecognised intellectual point of origin for the conflicting 
interpretations of this relationship that emerged in the language and 
culture debates. For although the conflicts that were present in the 
debates over the English curriculum are generally perceived as warring 
educational and socio-political discourses, they must also be interpreted 
as the persistence of debate over the same philosophical issues that 
motivated Hamann, Herder and von Humboldt in the 18th century 
which have been described above. This recognition of the relevant 
philosophical origins of the educational debates will serve in the final 
chapter as a useful point of reference to re-address the seemingly 
intractable contradictions and polarities of positionings that appear and 
continue to appear when the issues of language, culture and identity 
become the focus of attention. 
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Chapter Seven 
The key to the labyrinth: 
the language and culture debates revisited 
The paradox lost in the politics of culture 
This thesis has argued that the conceptual themes with respect to 
language, culture and social class that comprised the intellectual field 
of English education in the 1960s and 1970s, encouraged educators to 
downplay the mcbility,. variation and flexibility found within and 
between cultures and languages and/ or to interpret these primarily 
through theories of pluralism or resistance. Radical educators tended 
to emphasise working class culture and language as representations of 
distinctive and uniform 'ways of life' that were under threat (see pp. 85-
87). This tendency to treat working class culture as an 'endangered' 
species, however, was perhaps a forlorn attempt to preserve from 
without what, in any case, could only be preserved from within. It 
overlooked the fact that working class culture (like all cultures) was a 
continually evolviI)g culture that was both shaped by and shaping the 
social and cultural landscape of post-war Britain. One of the 
consequences of such 'strategic essentialism' (see Rattansi, 1994: 74-77; 
Fusco, 1995: 27) in response to a legitimate fear that post-war reforms 
would leave many working and lower middle class pupils still without 
a voice, was the elision of the idea that many of these pupils might 
forge 'multi'-identities in the context of a more democratic and 
pluralist educational system. 
That this was at least possible in post-war Britain had already 
been suggested by ... the movement from within the working and lower 
middle classes that occurred in the 1950s, exemplified by the 'new 
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literary elite' identified in Chapter Three and their readership. 
Although the aims of these writers differed-some of them used their 
vantage point or position for personal social mobility, others to voice 
their opposition to bourgeois culture, and still others to build bridges 
between cultures-. all were engaged in an interactive and evaluative 
activity, in this case, literary production and dissemination, that 
contributed to the social and cultural transformation of post-war 
society. These writers were all engaged in the type of internally- and 
externally-directed cultural confrontations that, where they are free to 
occur in multicultural societies, can and do contribute to changes in 
existing patterns of relationships and understandings between 
individuals and cultures, as Habermas suggests, 
In multicultural societies the coexistence of forms of life with 
equal r.~ghts means ensuring every citizen the opportunity to 
grow up within the world of a cultural heritage and to have his 
or her children grow up in it without suffering discrimination 
because of it. It means the opportunity to confront this and 
every other culture and to perpetuate it in its conventional form 
or transform it; as well as the opportunity to turn away from its 
commands with indifference or break with it self-critically and 
then live spurred on by having made a conscious break with 
tradition, or even with divided identity (Habermas, 1994: 131-
132). 
Within the educational system, however, despite the emphasis 
on class culture, pupils were actually treated as individuals who were 
free from the constraints of community. As argued at length in 
Chapter Four, the desire to empower working class pupils in the 
pedagogic context meant that pupils' subjectivities had to be deemed 
free of any social or cultural constraints on cognition. The various 
interpretations of linguistic relativity theories that gained purchase in 
educational contexts were used to argue that all languages were 
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cognitively equivalent. The idea of cultural constraints upon language 
and/ or cognition, caught up in the politically-charged deficit/difference 
debates, was deemed unacceptable to those eager to maintain an image 
of the pupil as the sole creator of meaning. For this reason, Bernstein's 
approach to language and subjectivity was rejected, for it suggested that 
just as pupils spoke a language/culture so language/ culture also 'spoke' 
pupils. The idea that the 'voice' of a child was deeply embedded in a 
cultural tradition that was simultaneously creative and constraining 
was not readily acknowledged. 
And yet, despite the belief held by educators in the 
individuality /universality of meaning and its implication-the 
potential for pupils to overcome their diversity and establish a unity 
with other cultural meanings-the implicit assumption was that 
pupils from different social class backgrounds could have no basis for 
agreement over the meanings of texts. Without sufficient insight into 
the relationship between language, culture and cognition of the type 
that Herder provides and the seeds of which were present in different 
forms in both Leavis and Bernstein, English educators were not able to 
associate pupils' creative, cognitive powers with the activity of 
communicating thr~ugh their cultural! class locations in dialogue with 
texts (and other readers) to explore divergent, complex organisations of 
meaning and form. The version of the incommensurability argument 
that silently informed the educational debates assumed the 
impossibility and/or undesirability of critical reflection and evaluation 
of cultures and cultural forms other than (and even including) an 
individual's own. This was one of the main motivations behind the 
avoidance of high cultural texts and literary criticism for working class 
and lower middle class pupils in particular. 
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Incommensurability and aesthetic experience 
The outcome of the notion of incommensurability that 
informed educational debates was that the baby of critical reflection was 
thrown out with the bath water of traditional literary criticism. Neither 
the hermeneutic nor the emancipatory element of the aesthetic 
function of literature/language was considered relevant in the 
struggles over legitimacy where competing values and traditions were 
concerned. In turning texts, including literary works, into material for 
the type of social realist approaches to literature described in Chapter 
Four, educators, located in a political field in which leftist ideas were in 
the ascendant, downplayed the critical, interpretative approach to the 
analysis of texts. A critical hermeneutic approach to texts became 
outflanked by an ultimately Marxist view of aesthetics/culture which 
relegated these to the superstructural domain, outside of the forces of 
production and therefore related only indirectly to the issue of 
liberation. Shierry Weber has commented on Marxists' relationship to 
aesthetics in generd, 
When Marx in his historical materialism reformulated the 
problem of liberation in terms of social conflict and the social 
organisation of the means of production, the role of reason and 
consciousness in attaining freedom became even more ambiguous 
and the aesthetic came to be seen as a derivative phenomenon 
without a major role in the struggle for liberation (Weber, 1977: 
80). 
But if the particular variety of Marxism that dominated the 
British left viewed aesthetics as a derivative phenomenon, other 
Marxist approaches have provided an alternative view of aesthetic 
experience, while·· keeping liberation as their aim. Adorno, for 
example, although aware that the aesthetic could be caught up in 
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existing conditions of oppression, as in a work of high culture which 
reinforced the preservation of traditional class divisions, nevertheless 
believed that the aesthetic experience also contained a moment of 
transcendence over existing conditions by expressing the idea of 
harmony 'negatively,' thereby contributing to a critique of the status 
quo. He and other members of the Frankfurt School claimed the 
potential radical function of aesthetics in a class society, exploring the 
dialectical relationship between such traditional dichotomies as subject 
and object, reason and nature, the individual and the universal 
(Weber, 1977). This potential, however, was not substantially explored 
by radical educators who, by and large, continued to view aesthetics, 
and its elaboration in literary criticism, as a bourgeois, liberal and non-
liberatory practice. 
An alternative understanding of the relationship between 
aesthetic phenomena, historical conditions and liberation is also found 
in Herder, who extended aesthetics into the process of language 
acquisition and cognition, on the one hand, and into the processes of 
social history on the other (Frank, 1988). Herder stressed the function 
of literary works to interpret a nation's sensibility; a nation's poets 
played with words, expressions and their structures, making them 
capable of arousing the senses, reuniting form and content. Likewise, 
he saw literary works from other cultures as the key to penetrate their 
spirit, translating them into the reader's own, striving towards a unity 
of meaning in diversity. But for Herder the act of translation was not 
principally meant to expropriate meanings from another culture, it was 
to serve positively as a means toward strengthening an individual's 
own cultural/self-realisation (see pp. 176-178). Moreover, for Herder, 
cultural meanings were never merely reproduced, whether inter-
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culturally or intra-culturally, they were always historically constituted 
and constituting. Thus literary texts from the past could serve as a site 
for self-reflection and evaluation for modern readers, as for example 
with modern interpretations of mythological tales, 
Let the ancient images and stories be applied to more recent 
events. One informs them with a new poetic sense, changes 
them here and there in order to achieve a new purpose; as 
master of the house and owner, one composes and separates, goes 
forward and turns aside, steps back or stands still, to make use 
of everything only as household goods, to satisfy ones needs, 
comfort and adornment, as one sees fit as it fits the fashion of 
the day (Herder, 1767b: 229). 
The Czech aesthetician, Jan Mukarovsky, who like Herder, 
understood art as a social fact, subject to innovation and change rather 
than a function of timeless laws or universals, echoes Herder's 
understanding of the reader-text relationship in the following passage, 
About the novel which has absorbed the reader there have 
accumulated not one but many realities. The deeper the work 
has absorbed the reader, the greater is the area of current and 
vitally important realities of the reader to which the work 
attaches a material relationship. The change which the 
material relationship of the work-the sign-has undergone is 
thus simultaneously its weakening and its strengthening. It is 
weaken:ed in the sense that the work does not refer to the 
reality which it directly depicts, and strengthened in that the 
work of art as a sign acquires an indirect (figurative) tie with 
realities which are vitally important to the entire universe of 
the perceiver as a collection of values. Thus the work of art 
acquires the ability to refer to a reality which is totally 
different from the one which it depicts, and to systems of 
values other than the one from which it arose and on which it 
is founded (Mukarovsky, [1936] 1970: 75). 
Both Mukarovsky and Herder suggest that aesthetic experience 
and self-reflection should be viewed as concurrent activities. Like 
Herder's interpretation of Leibniz' monadology, the relationship 
between the reader and text is perceived as reciprocal and reflective, in 
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which access to meanings, shared or otherwise, results from the 
interaction itself. More recently, Richard Rorty has expressed the view 
that literature is the easiest means to enter into other cultural worlds 
(Rorty, 1989). He sees literature and the practice of literary criticism as a 
means for human beings to resolve moral contradictions-both within 
themselves and between themselves and other cultures-and, in the 
process, gain a developing self-awareness of their own socialisation. 
The dialectical relationship that obtains between readers and texts, 
Rorty defines as the attempt to play 'final vocabularies' against one 
another, 
... nothing can serve as a criticism of a final vocabulary save 
another final vocabulary; there is no answer to a redescription 
save a re-re-description. Since there is nothing beyond 
vocabularies which serve as a criterion of choice between them, 
criticism is a matter of looking on this picture and on that, not 
of comparing both pictures with the original. Nothing can serve 
as criticism of a person save another person, or of a culture save 
an alternative culture-for persons and cultures are, for us, 
incarni:!Zzd vocabularies. So our doubts about our own characters 
or our own culture can be resolved or assuaged only by enlarging 
our acquaintance. The easiest way of doing that is to read 
books ... (Rorty, 1989: 80). 
In each of these accounts, political and philosophical differences 
aside, the aesthetic function, including norms and values, is treated as 
primarily social and historical, not moral and transcendental. And yet, 
although aesthetics is not viewed as functioning toward the revelation 
of universal moral truths, it is seen as aiming at some type of synthesis 
or unity wherein cognitive associations are made, conjoining different 
perspectives and contributing to sensual! intellectual evolution. In this 
view, cultural traditions as laid down in literature do not have a mere 
reproductive or reifying effect. Rather, they provide a means for 
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under.:::C'.nding more "oem!: o~:::s Cv\TIl IJreEznt, in dialogue with the past 
or with another culture. 
In English education, however, the connection between literary 
criticism and cognition fatally left culture and history to one side. 
Although Britton clearly believed in the transformative potential of 
literature and language in relation to cognition, his focus on the 
individual downplayed how literature and language functioned 
culturally and historically. Radical educators, on the other hand, in 
rightfully challenging educational practices that excluded alternative 
voices and promoted the maintenance of the status quo, reduced the 
cultural and historical function of language and literature to their 
hegemonic and reproductive capacities. The politicisation of the 
notion of tradition led to its being viewed solely within the context of 
class conflict in which essentialised notions of culture obtained. 
Tradition thus came to be seen as a stagnant force that had either to be 
empowered or defeated rather than as an evolving totality of cultural 
fragments and historical particulars, represented in and through 
language, which served as an important discursive site for the 
generation, transmission and interpretation of meanings. 
The idea of the aesthetic function as a linguistically-mediated 
activity suggests, h<?wever, that it does have an essential role to play in 
a language-based curriculum, as a source for the exploration of the 
relationship between meaning and form, on the one hand, and 
language, culture and cognition, on the other, as Habermas indicates, 
If aesthetic experience is incorporated into the context of 
individual life-histories, if it is utilised to illuminate a 
situation and to throw light on individual life-problems-if it 
at all communicates its impulses to a collective life form-then 
art enters into a language game which is no longer that of 
aesthetic criticism, but belongs, rather, to everyday 
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communicative practice. It then no longer affects only our 
evaluative language or only renews the interpretation of needs 
that colour our perceptions; rather, it reaches into our cognitive 
interpretations and normative expectations and transforms the 
totality in which these moments are related to each other 
(Habermas, 1985: 202). 
In the English classroom, however, the idea of aesthetic 
experience as a communicative practice that could serve as an 
important discursive means toward the critical interpretation of 
culture(s) was eclipsed, as educators' concentrated their efforts on 
proving the equal (cognitive) validity of pupils' (and texts') linguistic 
varieties. But just as these efforts to demonstrate the universality of 
meaning proved a double-edged sword, creating a theoretical gap 
between the culture and the child, the emphasis on hegemonic 
struggles over linguistic and educational rights likewise established a 
gap between pedagogic strategies oriented toward addressing material 
social! educational inequality, on the one hand, and the forms of 
communicative interaction that playa role in these strategies, on the 
other. In their attempts to address both the material and linguistic 
inequalities experienced by their working class pupils, educators 
simultaneously endorsed the separation of the socio-political world 
from the cognitive one. Consequently, the idea that language-in the 
form of dialogic conversation and critical reflection over texts or other 
communicative practices-was itself a medium for the transformation 
of meanings and forms of solidarity 'in the world' was, paradoxically, 
not incorporated into the language paradigm. 
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Language: the key to the labyrinth? 
The issue of how or to what extent linguistically-mediated 
activities-whether literary critical ones or everyday communicative 
practices-can serve as the means for the generation, expansion and 
transformation of meanings both within the same culture and across 
diverse cultures is a fundamental one for educators, and of particular 
relevance to the debates within English education. As discussed in 
previous chapters, where culturally competing, contradictory or simply 
divergent language games were present, English educators tended to try 
to resolve questions of conflict and/or difference by appealing to 
relativistic arguments about language and culture, on the one hand, 
and to the universality of meaning, on the other. The relativist 
argument within English education was constructed around a belief in 
the incommensurability of cultures which ultimately led to the 
rejection of literary criticism as a discursive practice in multi-(class) 
cultural contexts and discouraged the development of an hermeneutic 
approach to textual analysis organised around a more democratic and 
pluralist exchange of meanings. The universalist argument was, 
following Chomsky, constructed around support for the universal 
aspects of language and cognition, in effect denying any relationship 
between culture and cognition. Support for universalism also 
appeared under a different guise and to different degrees in the claims 
made by Leavis and other, mainly conservative, literary and cultural 
critics to the 'Tru:h' contained in the 'Great Tradition'. Although 
Leavis' original call for a 'point of view above classes' was largely a 
reaction to the ubiquity of Marxist literary criticism in the 1930s, it was 
also an appeal to a universal human culture, similar to that found in 
Herder's notion of Humanitat. 
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In the previous chapter, it was argued lha~ i-Icrder's notion of 
'unity in diversity~ suggests a way towards reconciling some of the 
polarities and paradoxes that characterised the debates in English 
education. More recent philosophical debates centred around 
hermeneutics have also elaborated positions which, like Herder's, both 
challenge and extend the terms of the relativism/universalism 
dichotomy (Gadamer, 1975, Habermas, 1971, 1979, 1984; and see Rorty, 
1980, 1982, 1989, 1991). These attempts to go "beyond objectivism and 
relativism," as Richard Bernstein has characterised them (Bernstein, 
1991), while offering no ultimate solutions, suggest further ways of 
considering the role of language and culture in creating and 
constraining the possibility of change or exchange of meanings, 
particularly where multi-identities emerge and converge. 
Critical theory, hermeneutics and the 'quest for commensurability' 
The view posed by Hamann and developed by Herder and von 
Humboldt-of the inseparability of language and reason-serves as the 
starting point for the role of critical hermeneutics in English education 
considered here, in particular, the idea elaborated by Herder that 
language/reflection serves as both an identifying and a communicating 
symbolic activity. Herder suggested that language, by its very nature, 
tended toward inter-connectedness with others; it was inherently 
dialogic, constituted and constituting in human history. Cultural and 
linguistic traditions were, for Herder, the perpetual outcomes of this 
'living dialogue.' Therefore, the idea that individuals or cultures could 
evolve or be transformed from within culturally and historically 
embedded 'world views' was in no way contradictory. Within this 
conceptualisation, the 'quest for commensurability,' or, as it has been 
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defined in this thesis, the search for an open, dialogic means to 
communicate across difference, is neither denied in the face of 
diversity nor does it rely on an appeal to cognitive universals. The 
reading of Herder offered here thus seems to suggest the theoretical 
possibility of escaping the communicative dead-end of relativism 
whilst maintaining the inevitability of cultural, historical and 
linguistic diversity. In the recent philosophical debates over 
hermeneutics citeJ above, however, some of this assumption, or 
aspects of it, are challenged on philosophical as well as political 
grounds. While no attempt can be made here to do justice to the full 
scope of these debates, they nevertheless provide valuable insights into 
the foci of this thesis: language, culture and the issue of 
commensurability. 
Within these debates, the German philosopher, Hans Georg 
Gadamer, most approximates Herder's position by emphasising the 
non-contradictory relationship between history, tradition and critical 
reflection. Echoing both Hamann and Herder, he insists on the 
'linguisticality of all understanding'-everything that is, according to 
Gadamer, reflects itself in the mirror of language, 
The fact that it is in the midst of a linguistic world and 
through the mediation of an experience pre-formed by language 
that we grow up in our world, does not remove the possibilities 
of critique. On the contrary, the possibility of going beyond our 
conventions and beyond all those experiences that are 
schematised in advance, opens up before us once we find 
ourselves, in our conversation with others, faced with opposed 
thinkers, with new critical problems, with new experiences ... In 
reality, we owe this to the linguistic virtuality of our reason 
and language does not, therefore, present an obstacle to reason 
(Gadamer, 1975: 495). 
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Like Herder, Gadamer views human consciousness as endlessly 
becoming, though subject to the effects of history and culture. This he 
describes as 'effective historical consciousness' (Gadamer, 1975: 267-274). 
According to Gada.mer, the task of effective historical consciousness is 
the 'fusion of horizons,' his metaphor for the interpretive 
understanding that occurs between individuals and texts, as well as 
between individuals and cultures. Horizons, i. e., beliefs, values and 
practices, are constituted in the present through a process of 
distinguishing-lito acquire a horizon means that one learns to look 
beyond what is close at hand-not in order to look away from it, but to 
see it better within a larger whole and in truer proportion" (Gadamer, 
1975: 272). As Thomas McCarthy points out, I/[Gadamer] is not saying 
that we ought to relate the meanings to be understood to our own 
situation, but that we cannot understand without doing so-this 
relation belongs to the very structure of Verstehen [understanding]" 
(McCarthy, 1978: 414 n. 39). For Gadamer, then, acts of interpretation 
and understanding are essentially the same (Mueller-Volmer, 1986: 37-
43). Horizons serve as the means by which individuals locate 
themselves in a world, and simultaneously, they open individuals up 
to new worlds, representing the inter-connectedness of the past and 
present, one individual! culture and another, 
Just as the individual is never simply an individual, because he 
is always involved with others, so too the closed horizon that 
is supposed to enclose a culture is an abstraction. The historical 
movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never 
utterly bound to anyone standpoint, and hence can never have a 
truly closed horizon. The horizon is, rather, something into 
which we move and that moves with us. Horizons change for a 
person who is moving. Thus the horizon of the past, out of 
which all human life lives and which exists in the form of 
tradition, is always in motion (Gadamer, 1975: 271). 
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The fusion of horizons that is accomplished throughout history, 
however, is always tied, according to Gadamer, to preconceptions and 
prejudgements. As historically situated, the 'linguisticality of all 
understanding' is always based on taken for granted prejudices and 
preconceptions. The task of effective historical consciousness is thus 
never ending, for its aim is not to uncover the correct interpretation, 
but to effect understanding across difference. This does not, however, 
imply the communicative/interpretive dead end of relativism. 
Gadamer maintains that the idea of prejudice as having only negative 
value, i. e., as working against critical reflection and understanding, is 
an unfortunate outcome of the modern enlightenment's creation of an 
unconditional antithesis between reason and tradition (Gadamer, 1975: 
235-253). In opposition to this enlightenment belief, Gadamer argues 
for a view of prejudices as conditions of understanding. For it is in the 
interpretive process of understanding that individuals gradually come 
to self-conscious awareness of the fore-meanings and prejudices that 
constitute their 'world views' against the 'newness' of other views. 
It is, thus, in the dialogical encounter itself, the hermeneutic 
moment of reflection, that unity in diversity is accomplished, 
To reach an understanding with one's partner in a dialogue is 
not merely a matter of total self-expression and the successful 
assertion of one's own point of view, but a transformation into a 
communion, in which we do not remain what we were 
(Gadamer, 1975: 341). 
A unity amongst diverse ideas is potentially revealed or achieved in 
the process of experience that emerges with "one's partner in a 
dialogue," including a text. And it is this unity of ideas which, 
according to Richard Bernstein, is Gadamer's notion of truth-"what 
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can be argumentatively validated by the community of interpreters 
who open themselves up to what tradition says to us" (Bernstein, 1991: 
154). 
Gadamer's hermeneutics suggests that while there is no escaping 
the effects of culture and history, this does not imply the impossibility 
of dialogue or of making comparative judgements oriented to a more 
open, future state of freedom. Nevertheless, he has been criticised for 
implying a blind subjugation to tradition and authority (Habermas, 
1977; on the ongoing debate between Habermas and Gadamer see 
Misgeld, 1976; McCarthy, 1978: 162-193; Hekman, 1986; Bernstein, 1991) 
and for being a metaphysical idealist (Rorty, 1982: 139-159; Lyotard, 
1984). As these particular criticisms touch upon important questions 
raised within the educational debates with respect to the relationship 
between tradition and hegemonic relations, on the one hand, and the 
idealistic as opposed to the socio-political aspects of traditional literary 
criticism and textual analysis, on the other, they will be considered 
below. 
Habermas has criticised Gadamer for denying that the context of 
tradition-as the point of convergence of possible truths and real 
unity-serves at the same time as a site in which truths are 
systematically distorted (Habermas, 1977). According to Habermas, 
Gadamer's 'fusion of horizons' can only be considered legitimate if it 
has been worked out in the medium of a linguistic tradition 
unconstrained by such distortion. Habermas insists that, 
... the dogmatism of the traditional context is the vehicle not 
only for the objectivity of language in general, but for the 
repressiveness of a power relationship which deforms the 
intersubjectivity of the understanding as such and 
systematically distorts colloquial communication (Habermas, 
1986: 314). 
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Although Habermas and Gadamer are in essential agreement 
about the linguisticality of all understanding, Habermas contends that 
language must also be viewed as a medium of domination that serves 
to "legitimate relations of organised force," and claims that "in so far as 
the legitimations do not articulate the relations of force that they make 
possible, in so far as these relations are expressed in the legitimations, 
language is also ideological (Habermas, 1977: 360). He criticises 
Gadamer, and the hermeneutic endeavour, for reducing social inquiry 
to the interpretation of meaning, of "sublimating social processes 
entirely to cultural tradition" (Habermas, 1977: 361 and see McCarthy, 
1978: 183; Bernstein, 1985: 20-25). He insists that tradition, or what he 
refers to as the 'lifeworld,' be viewed as intrinsically related to other 
societal processes, or 'systems,' which are not manifested completely in 
language. Habermas thus argues for the linkage of the cultural and 
linguistic with the social, political and economic and in particular, 
their relationship to labour and relations of power, 
Tradition as a whole can be assigned its place; it can be 
conceived in its relation to the systems of social labour and 
political domination. It thus becomes possible to grasp 
functions that the cultural tradition assumes within the system 
as a whole, functions that are not made explicit as such in 
tradition-i. e., ideological relations ... (Habermas, quoted in 
McCarthy, 1978: 183-184). 
At the same time that he maintains the inter-connectedness of 
systems and the lifeworld, however, Habermas distinguishes 
analytically between 'systems rationalisation' which is 'purposive,' 
i. e., oriented toward the organisation and efficiency of particular ends, 
and 'lifeworld rationalisation' which is 'communicative,' i. e., 
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constructed around communicative action oriented toward reaching 
understanding (rationalisation in both cases refers to the development 
of the rationale, or internal logic, of a form of social 
action/ coordination (Bernstein, 1985: 20; Cooke, 1994: 5». 
Habermas specifically sets out to address the problem faced by 
modern society when 'systems rationalisation' threatens the 
communicative integrity-the very means of internal coherence-of 
the lifeworld, leaving it in a fragmented, alienated and culturally 
differentiated state in which "the actions, practices and interpretations 
of its members have become increasingly detached from established 
normative contexts and increasingly reliant on action oriented toward 
understanding" (Cooke, 1994: 141). Importantly, however, unlike 
Weber or members of the Frankfurt School with whom he shares 
certain affinities, Habermas does not conclude that the total destruction 
of the lifeworld by purposive-instrumental reason is either inevitable 
or inescapable. Instead, he suggests that under threat from systems 
rationalisation, individual members of modern society develop and 
engage communicative reason all the more, seeking and learning new 
ways to reflexively realise their intersubjectivity in different degrees of 
solidarity, 
The closer the proximity in which competing gods and demons 
have to live with each other in political communities, the 
more tolerance they demand, but they are not incompatible ... To 
be sure, it is also characteristic of modernity that we have 
grown accustomed to living with dissent in the realm of 
questions that admit of "truth"; we simply put controversial 
claims to one side "for the time being." Nonetheless, we 
perceive this pluralism of contradictory convictions as an 
incentive for learning processes; we live in the expectation of 
future resolutions (Habermas, 1985: 194). 
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But whereas Gadamer's belief in the possibility of fusion reflects 
his belief in the ontological precedence of linguistic 
tradition/ convention (McCarthy, 1978), Habermas argues that, the 
"expectation of future resolutions" is presupposed in the "general 
structures of possible communication" and the "structures of social 
reproduction" themselves (Bernstein, 1991: 191), through "the gentle 
but obstinate, a never silent although seldom redeemed claim to 
reason" (Habermas, 1979: 97) that underlies all communicative action 
oriented toward understanding. 
For Habermas, it is reason, not tradition, that allows 
individuals/ cultures to transcend the authority and domination that 
he perceives are "inculcated as rules for interpreting the world and of 
action" in the grammars of language games (Habermas, 1977: 358). He 
maintains that "the supposition of a common objective world is built 
into the pragmatics of every single linguistic usage" (Habermas, 1992: 
138, emphasis added). This, he suggests, is true even for speech 
situations in which reasons are not given or required-including 
within cultures/traditions which do not have practice at "distancing 
themselves from themselves." Drawing, in part, on Chomsky's theory 
of generative grammar, Habermas attempts to disclose the set of 
universal conditions presupposed in all communicative action. In 
contrast to Chomsky, however, who draws a distinction between 
linguistic competence and performance, and for whom generative 
grammar refers only to underlying competence (i. e., the ideal speaker-
listener), Habermas claims that actual linguistic performance, what he 
refers to as 'communicative competence,' also contains a universal core 
(McCarthy, 1978: 274-275). This belief in universal formal features of 
communication serves as the basis for Habermas' universal pragmatics: 
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Only the formal anticipation of the idealised conversation as a 
future way of life guarantees the ultimate contrafactual 
standing agreement which united us provisionally, and on the 
basis of which any factual agreement, if it be a false one, can be 
criticised as a false consciousness (Habermas, 1986: 315). 
For Habermas, every speech act anticipates or presupposes the 
argumentative procedure of providing and evaluating reasons in 
support of the universal validity claims: comprehensibility, truth, 
truthfulness and rightness. Furthermore, he maintains that certain 
forms of argumer:tation, or 'discourses,' are based on a number of 
"idealising presuppositions of communicating action," which are set 
down in the very structures of action oriented toward understanding, 
for example, that all participants are motivated by concern for the better 
argument, that no force except that of the better argument is used 
(Cooke, 1994: 30-31). As McCarthy explains, 
The very act of participating in a discourse involves the 
supposition that genuine consensus is possible and that it can be 
distinguished from false consensus. In attempting to come to a 
rational decision about truth claims, we must suppose that the 
outcome of our discussion will be (or at least can be) the result 
simply,of the force of the better argument and not of accidental 
or systematic constraints on communication. This absence of 
constraint-both external (such as force or threat of force) and 
internal (such as neurotic or ideological distortions)-can, 
Habermas argues, be characterised formally in terms of the 
pragmatic structure of communication. His thesis is that the 
structure is free from constraint only when for all participants 
there is a symmetrical distribution of chances to select and 
employ speech acts, when there is an effective equality of 
opportunity for the assumption of dialogue roles (McCarthy, 
1978: 306). 
Although Habermas acknowledges that his thesis is 
counter factual-the fact is that undistorted dialogue rarely if ever 
occurs-he is nevertheless insistent that the idea of unconstrained 
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communication is an unavoidable supposition of discourse of 
participants in dialogue (Cooke, 1994: 30-31; McCarthy, 1978: 309). 
Moreover, and of particular relevance to the objectivism/relativism 
debate, Habermas also maintains that the presupposition of an 
idealising concept of truth or validity is what makes dialogue possible, 
especially across riyal conceptions: 
Even in the most difficult process of reaching understanding, all 
parties appeal to the common reference point of a possible 
consensus, even if this reference point is projected in each case 
from within their own contexts. For, although they may be 
interpreted in various ways and applied according to different 
criteria, concepts like truth, rationality, or justification play 
the same grammatical role in every linguistic community 
(Habermas, 1992: 138). 
Habermas, however, also makes clear that his universal 
pragmatics does not suggest some extra-contextual or extra-linguistic 
standpoint from which individuals raise validity claims. He believes 
that whether a validity claim is capable of rational consensus can only 
be established dialogically in unconstrained communication. Thus, 
the development of a notion of truth, while dependent on a notion of 
an ideally free community, is ultimately established by consensus 
within and between actual communities. Thus, he states, "the validity 
claimed for propositions and norms transcends space and time, but in 
each actual case the claim is raised here and now, in a specific context, 
and accepted or rejected with real implications for social interaction" 
(Habermas, 1992: 139). 
For Habermas, the proposition of universal pragmatic 
presuppositions of communication is intrinsically related to his fear 
that the 'colonisation of the life world' by purposive rationalisation has 
created modern societies where individuals have become 
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'communicatively' alienated from themselves and one another. For 
Habermas, this a,lienation and fragmentation carries with it both a 
potential emancipation, in the sense that individuals are freed from 
traditions that bind, and a loss of self, in that they can no longer rely on 
a shared sense of 'communitas.' For Habermas, the emancipatory 
potential can only be realised if individuals learn, discursively, to make 
the transition to greater universalism. For Habermas, this does not 
imply a loss of self or individuality, but an increase in the strength of 
diversity in unity, 
For the transitory unity that comes about in the porous and 
refracted intersubjectivity of a linguistically mediated 
consen~us not only supports, but furthers and accelerates the 
pluralisation of forms of life and the individualisation of life 
styles. More discourse means more contradiction and difference. 
The more abstract the agreements become, the more diverse the 
disagreements with which we can nonviolently live 
(Habermas, 1992: 140). 
Habermas' universal pragmatics both displays affinities to and 
distinguishes him from Herder and Gadamer, and contributes to the 
exploration of the notion of unity in diversity undertaken in this thesis 
in several ways. Both Gadamer and Herder share Habermas' search for 
a common ground on which individuals and cultures 
recognise/realise their inherent intersubjectivity. Although Gadamer 
maintains that individuals cannot transcend 'the dialogue that they 
are,' and therefore refutes Habermas claim to a universal pragmatics, 
he nevertheless proposes a notion of historically agreed 'truths,' 
argumentatively validated and reformulated through the affirmation 
of traditional prejudice and reflection. And Herder, whilst 
emphasising the cultural-historical nature of cognitive/linguistic 
transformation, recognised an inherent unifying nature in the concept 
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of Humanitat. All three attempt to demonstrate the inter-connection 
between self-knowledge and knowledge of an-other whilst at the same 
time emphasising that the unity brought about in dialogic 
communication does not do away with difference (or the individual) 
but instead confirms it. Habermas, however, moves beyond both 
Gadamer and Herder by proposing a context-transcendent as well as a 
context-dependent account of this process. For Gadamer, in so doing, 
Habermas reasserts the Enlightenment's imposition of a false 
distinction between reason and tradition. Gadamer argues that because 
it is historically situated, reason must be understood as necessarily 
limited, partial and based on taken for granted prejudices and 
preconceptions. Communicative action cannot dissolve traditional 
prejudice by an appeal to universal validity or rationality-for 
Gadamer, like Herder, the central point of the 'labyrinth of human 
fancies' can be found in language and tradition alone. 
Habermas' critique of Gadamer for failing to acknowledge the 
disturbance of modernity itself on tradition as a 'means to the truth/ is 
echoed in the critique of hermeneutic understanding by Richard Rorty 
and Jean-Francois Lyotard, but from a postmodernist perspective (see 
Lyotard, 1984; Rorty, 1982: 139-159). Their criticism of Gadamer (and 
hermeneutics in general) is for his wishing to guarantee that there is 
'meaning to know.' Richard Rorty, for example, though elsewhere 
sympathetic to Gadamer (see Rorty, 1980: 357-364), criticises him for 
attempting to turn hermeneutics into a philosophical alternative to 
epistemology; for using hermeneutics as a method of criticism for 
getting at the core 'truth' of a text. He faults Gadamer for thinking that 
criticism (of a text) is discovery rather than creation, 
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[He] thinks that if he stays Wid,h1 ~~12 bo'..:nc.c:.ries of a text, 
takes it apart, and shows how it works, then he will have 
escaped the "sovereignty of the signifier," broken with the 
myth of language as mirror of reality, and so on. But in fact he 
is just doing his best to imitate science-he wants a method of 
criticism, and he wants everybody to agree that he has cracked 
the code. He wants all the comforts of consensus ... (Rorty, 1982: 
152). . 
Rorty believes that any 'method' of criticism implies a 'privileged' 
vocabulary, "one which gets to the essence of the object, the one which 
expresses the properties which it has in itself as opposed to those which 
we read into it" (Rorty, 1982: 152). He argues that all vocabularies and 
all standards are merely a result of conventions and that, therefore, no 
one can be privileged-all vocabularies, he suggests, are as mortal as 
men (Rorty, 1982: 153). 
But Gadame-.:-'s position, like Herder's, is that at any given time, 
any vocabulary, embedded within a tradition can be said to be 
'privileged,' not in a metaphysical sense, but simply in that it is shared 
by a community of users (Hekman, 1986: 165). For Gadamer 
individuals belong to traditions, histories and languages; it is only in 
attempting to understand themselves in dialogue with other 'mortal 
men' that they become reflexively aware of their contingency-then 
their vocabulary ceases to be 'privileged' in the original way? 
7 Elsewhere Rorty admits that, in practice, individuals must 'privilege' the 
interpretive horizon of their own linguistic communities, that they must" grasp the 
ethnocentric hom" in the face of pretending an endless tolerance of all others, "even 
though there can be no noncircular justification for doing so" (Rorty, 1991: 29). Here 
Rorty appears to treat ethnocentrism in much the same way Gadamer does the 
notion of prejudice. He attempts to rehabilitate it from its strictly negative sense 
and allow it to mean simply the beliefs proposed by one culture that must be tested 
by trying to weave them together with the beliefs of another. 
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The Language and Culture Debates: a Retrospect 
The period in English education in the 1960s and 1970s has been 
presented in this thesis as one which saw the emergence of a number 
of contradictory political and intellectual positions with respect to 
language and culture. It has been argued here that the variety of 
different ideas about language and culture which gathered on the 
intellectual field of English education during this period, while 
contributing to important educational innovations, also generated an 
enduring discord and confusion within and around English education. 
In the attempts to weld together the arguments that were articulated by 
some of the important actors within the field, political and other 
instrumental concerns sometimes overshadowed the ideas that 
informed individual positions, and for this and other reasons, the 
ideas and underlying concepts were not adequately explored. 
This thesis, in attempting to illuminate this moment, has not 
been concerned with exploring the underlying social conditions that 
led to these events, although these have been touched upon in passing. 
The primary aim of this thesis has been to provide a synchronic 
account of the various and complex intellectual strands that appeared 
in English educatbn in the 1960s and 1970s period. It has attempted to 
unravel some of the main arguments that were present and which 
took shape in the form of debates over language and culture. It has 
also sought, however, to look at these same arguments diachronically; 
to examine the history of their origins in the philosophy of language in 
an attempt to see how far contemporary confusions might be clarified 
through an examination of their early history. The following points 
summarise some of the clarifications of the confusions and 
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contradictions that were generated in the language and culture debates 
that this thesis has attempted. 
With respect to Leavis and literary criticism, it was shown that 
the political context created the will for relativist arguments to be used 
opportunistically in order to articulate the charge of elitism and to 
instigate a willful overreading of its implications. The development of 
a view of aesthetic criticism as a dialogic communicative practice across 
diverse interpretive horizons, however, suggests the possibility of 
breaking through the relativist/incommensurability thesis. 
Britton's emphasis on creativity and Bernstein's recognition of 
constraints on the generation and patternings of meanings established 
an apparent distinction in English education between culturally-
dislocated and culturally-located individuals. The social/linguistic 
perspective developed in this thesis suggests that creativity and 
constraint with respect to cognition have to be and can be taken 
together without contradiction. 
The relationship between language, culture and thought has 
been considered through the intellectual line traced from Herder and 
von Humboldt to Whorf, Chomsky and Bernstein in an attempt to 
rescue the mind in relation to the 'social.' Hallidayan SOciolinguistics 
has been characterised as a contrast to theories of language and culture 
which link the social to the cognitive in all its cultural variants. The 
significance of these contrastive theories to the elaboration of concepts 
of culture within English education has also been considered. 
It is evident from the discussion of Herder above that, while his 
concern for ethnicity and the integrity of ethnicity has been taken as 
support for the relativist/incommensurability thesis, claims of this 
kind are not fully supported in his writings. Herder's understanding of 
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language and culture as activities of evolution and synthesis suggests 
the possibility of a 'unity in diversity' within multi-cultural realities. 
There were two relevant and inter-related losses that resulted 
from the confusion of the 1960s and 1970s. These were: an inadequate 
account of the social dimension of language and cognition and a denial 
of the relevance of critical engagement with aesthetic experience in 
transforming consciousness. Based on a view of language and culture 
that links the social to the cognitive, this thesis has argued for a view of 
aesthetic experience as a communicative practice capable of 
transforming cognitive interpretations and permitting individuals to 
develop new perspectives, drawing from their conventionalised modes 
of thought. Within this conceptualisation, aesthetic criticism is 
viewed not as a discussion aimed at demonstrating truth by 
discrediting or denying an-other's position, but as a conversation that 
serves as an end in itself. 
The practice of learning to dialogue across difference is of 
fundamental importance within multicultural societies seeking to 
develop simultaneuusly a politics of unity and, to use Charles Taylor's 
phrase, a 'politics of recognition' (see Taylor, 1994). The claim made for 
dialogue in this thesis, and for a 'unity in diversity' within 
multiculturalist societies, does not assume a juxtaposition of several 
intact cultures or their assimilation into one common culture, in 
which the particularities of individual cultures are dissolved. It is a 
claim for dialogue across difference about difference that acknowledges 
the complexities of relation between cultural interpenetration and 
conservation. The principle aim of such a dialogue is not to eradicate 
difference or even to promote a 'healthy tolerance' toward diversity, 
but to extend the discourse and practice of social life. This is not a 
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denial of the 'politics' of cultural appropriation-of the way that power 
and domination work to silence and subjugate cultured individuals 
and individual cultures (Spivak, 1988; Trin T. Minh-ha, 1989; hooks, 
1990; West, 1993; Goldberg, 1994), nor it it an attempt to do what Cuban-
American performance artist Coco Fusco warns against-to conflate 
'hybridity' with 'parity,' 
Appropriation cannot be reduced to what happens once 
something identifiable is removed from the place it previously 
occupird. Cultural appropriation is as much a political act as 
it is a formal operation or linguistic game. It involves taking 
something, often from someone, and it is rarely an isolated 
gesture (Fusco, 1995: 71). 
This thesis argues that any effective critical and interpretive 
vocabulary which interrogates processes of cultural appropriation 
must recognise that cultural identities, including those of subaltern 
groups, are constituted in dialogue with a range of others-and that 
all acts and contacts involving cultural appropriation must be 
viewed as part of a dialectical movement of history and of political 
processes. That these processes involve individuals and cultures 
made up of divergent or even competing sets of values, beliefs and 
practices does not lead to the inevitable conclusion of 
incommensurability, however, but to the continuation of the 'quest 
for commensurability' which this thesis has begun. 
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